

## CHAPTER V.

### THE PRUSSIAN WAR MINISTRY.

NATURE AND GENERAL SCOPE.—That Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony have each a separate army administration and war ministry has been already pointed out, and it is also a fact that no federal or imperial war ministry exists. Practically, however, the Prussian War Ministry takes the place of one in many respects. This is natural, since, besides being located in Berlin, the German capital, it is the highest administrative authority for the bulk of the German Army. In a general way it may be said that all affairs relating to administration, organization, and armament fall within the scope of its functions. With personal, disciplinary, and purely military matters it has only an indirect connection, the theory being that in these the commanding generals, subject, of course, to imperial direction, are supreme. Yet, as it controls the purse strings, hardly any disposition, no matter what department of the service it may affect, can be carried to completion without its cooperation, if not without its concurrence. The head of the department is always a military man. The present War Minister is a general of infantry, his immediate predecessor, General von Verdy du Vernois, having been some years ago forced into retirement by his alleged premature disclosure of plans for a material increase of the army, which the Reichstag has since been asked to adopt, and has adopted.

Some 70 officers and numerous clerks and messengers represent the working force of the Prussian War Ministry, which is divided into the following departments and divisions, the former being headed by lieutenant-generals or major-generals:

(1) THE CENTRAL DIVISION, under charge of a colonel, acts on all military affairs requiring the personal decision of the minister. The affairs of the personnel of the ministry and intendency, the administration of the library and archives, the public printing, and all matters relating to military decorations also come within the sphere of its action.

(2) THE GENERAL WAR DEPARTMENT embraces all business relating to tactical formations and organizations and is subdivided into four branches, viz:

(a) *The army branch*, of which a lieutenant-colonel is the chief. Sphere of action: Peace and war organization, ersatz, the furloughed state and landsturm, the more extensive tactical exercises, changes of station, the railroad system, construction of roads and bridges, military conventions.

(b) *Branch for foot troops*, under the charge of a lieutenant-colonel. Sphere of action: Special affairs relating to the infantry, rifles, foot artillery, pioneers, railroad troops, aerial navigation divisions, infantry institutes, garrison schools, army music, target ranges for small arms, system of military training and education, military libraries, literary affairs, statistics.

(c) *Branch for mounted troops*, under the charge of a lieutenant-colonel. Sphere of action: Special affairs relating to the cavalry, field artillery and the train, military riding institute, veterinary system, government police (gendarmerie), target ranges for cavalry and field artillery.

(d) *Fortification branch*, under the charge of a major-general. Sphere of action: Affairs relating to the engineer corps, siege warfare, construction, armament and maintenance of fortresses, explosives, telegraph system, mines connected with bridges and tunnels, carrier pigeon system, fortification construction school.

(3) THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ECONOMY (*Militär-Ökonomie Departement*) is subdivided into (a) a finance branch, (b) a subsistence branch—each under a civilian, styled actual privy war councilor (*wirklicher geheimer Kriegs Rath*); (c) a clothing branch under the charge of a lieutenant-colonel; (d) a “servis” branch under the charge of a colonel, which deals with questions relating to barracks and quarters and the sheltering of troops, military churches, cemeteries, the maintenance of places of exercise, indemnification for injury to private property, etc.

(4) THE DEPARTMENT FOR THE INVALID SYSTEM (*Invalidenwesen*) is subdivided into (a) the pension branch, (b) the relief branch, the former being under the charge of a lieutenant-colonel and the latter under that of a civilian functionary; (c) the appointment branch, under the charge of a colonel, which acts on affairs relating to the employment of retired officers and noncommissioned officers, institutes for invalid soldiers, war associations (corresponding to our Grand Army posts), execution of judicial sentences, labor and disciplinary companies, military justice, church attendance, extradition, taxation, elections, muster-rolls, standards and colors.

(5) THE ARMS DEPARTMENT, which is divided into (a) the branch for small arms, (b) the artillery branch, and (c) the technical branch—each under the charge of a lieutenant-colonel, the last named treating affairs pertaining to arsenals or artillery manufacturing establishments.

(6) THE REMOUNT DIVISION, under charge of a colonel. The president of the five itinerant horse purchasing commissions (majors and captains of cavalry) report to this division.

(7) THE MEDICINAL DIVISION, headed by the general staff physician of the army. The nature of its functions is not unlike that of our Surgeon General's Office, and will be explained further on.

Controlled by the War Ministry are also: The general military treasury (*General Militär-Kasse*); the cavalry committee; the inspection of the field of artillery; the inspection of the infantry schools; the commission for testing artillery (*Artillerie Prüfungs-Commission*); the inspection of small arms and ammunition factories; the commission for testing small arms; the military riding institute; the artillery depot inspections; the train depot inspections; the inspection of the military veterinary system; the inspection of military penal institutes; the commission for examining military physicians; the medico-surgical military academy; the military clergy; the military intendants.

The war ministries of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Saxony are similarly, though, of course, much less extensively organized.

(8) THE DIVISION FOR PERSONAL AFFAIRS, at one time a bureau of the Prussian War Ministry and still reported as temporarily detached therefrom, is now united with the imperial headquarters and occupies rooms separate, and, in fact, at a considerable distance from the War Ministry building. The adjutant-general, with the rank of a general of infantry (von Hahnke), is the chief of both, as well as of the Military Cabinet. The division of personal affairs acts on appointments, promotions, transfers, the furloughing and dismissal of officers, etc. The Military Cabinet submits to the Emperor—also receiving and executing his commands thereon—all questions referring to the assignment of officers to command, cases presented by the commanding general, and matters relating to courts-martial, courts of honor and pardons. The “*General Auditoriat*” communicates with the Emperor (or sovereign) through the Military Cabinet.

## CHAPTER VI.

### WAR STRENGTH.

WAR ORGANIZATION—PREPARATORY MEASURES.—Having briefly sketched the organization of the German peace establishment and the relations of the army in peace and war to the constituted authorities, we will next take a survey of the principal organic changes that occur upon the outbreak of war. For such an eventuality the most minute and complete preparations are made by Germany, which realizes from its own comparatively recent experience the immense, sometimes decisive, advantage that one of two opposing armies possesses over the other which effects its transition from a peace to a war footing with the least hitch and delay.

\* \* \* The annual plan of mobilization embraces explicit instructions touching the filling of the peace cadres to the war strength, the formation of new organizations for incorporation in the field army, as well as for ersatz, garrisoning, and numerous other purposes; the transportation of troops by rail according to carefully worked out time-tables, and every other important detail. It contains as many parts as there are states or groups of states with which war is contemplated as a possibility, and is based upon information derived from all available sources. Its secrecy is well guarded, only so much being confided to each commander and officer as pertains to his own particular sphere. While specific and explicit in its directions as regards important dispositions, the plan is filled out by the various commanders as to the details, the latter becoming more minute as it descends the scale of command. \* \* \*

The commander of each unit (*Truppenteil*) and the head of each administrative department submit their proposed action under every requirement of the plan and the instructions of the corps commander thereunder to their superiors, which, when reduced to writing and approved, governs them or their successors.

\* \* \* Within three days after the order of mobilization has been issued all the railways in the Empire pass under full military control and management, and private traffic so far as it interferes with military transportation ceases.

The time allowed the organizations to mobilize varies, and depends upon their distance from the enemy's frontier, and other circumstances. \* \* \*

Responding to the summons of the district commanders (*Bezirks-Commandos*), the reservists and ersatz reservists join their commands; arms and equipments are issued to them, and new clothing, already in possession of the regiment, to all hands taking the field. \* \* \*

No difficulty is likely to be encountered in the concentration of the reserves, since during the first few days the railways are not so greatly taxed as they will be later on when the concentration of the troops before the enemy (*strategischer Aufmarsch*) begins. As each unit completes its mobilization the fact is reported by the commander to his superior, and when similar reports have been received from all branches of his command the commanding general telegraphs to the Emperor and the Minister of War that his corps is ready to march.

Every contingency is sought to be provided for, and for every place requiring military experience or training a suitable person is designated beforehand. \* \* \*

Add to the persons discharged or retired from the active army as officers who may be utilized for positions in the mobilized establishment, the reserve officers, numbering about 6,000, and the landwehr officers, estimated at double that number, all of whom are physically and professionally fit for the discharge of the duties of their grades, and we must acknowledge that Germany is not likely to suffer for lack of leaders in the next war.

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Each infantry regiment \* \* \* takes the field composed of three battalions of four companies filled to 250 men each.

The rifle battalions go to the front with 22 officers and 1,000 men. \* \* \*

The cavalry regiments take the field each numbering \* \* \* 23 officers, 604 men, and 710 horses.

\* \* \* \* \*

Every field artillery regiment \* \* \* moves to the front with all of its batteries raised in strength each to 5 officers, 150 men, 150 horses, and 6 guns. The horse batteries receive 18 extra horses.

\* \* \* \* \*

Each pioneer battalion mobilizes three independent companies with a strength each of 5 officers and 200 men, and forms, moreover, several field telegraph sections. Two of these companies are each supplied with a bridge train of 14 wagons, carrying the materials for a bridge 39 yards long. A corps bridge train of 33 wagons, carrying material sufficient for bridging wider streams, is also taken along for the use of the battalion. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

The railway troops form operating, construction, and labor companies.

Each train battalion \* \* \* mobilizes 5 provision columns, 1 field bakery, 1 horse depot, 3 sanitary detachments (bearer companies), each with 12 vehicles and 54 stretchers, also 5 wagon park columns. Of the train soldiers, a large number are attached on mobilization to the staffs of the higher commands as teamsters, officers' servants, and for other purposes.


As a rule the organizations that are grouped in peace under a commanding general constitute a mobilized army corps which consists of two divisions. The infantry division is generally made up as follows: Four infantry regiments formed into two brigades—270 officers, 12,000 men, and 133 horses; one cavalry regiment—23 officers, 604 men, and 710 horses; one field artillery battalion—22 officers, 650 men, 620 horses, and 24 guns; one pioneer company—5 officers, 200 men, 19 horses; one division bridge train—2 officers, 52 men, and 88 horses; one sanitary detachment—3 officers, 194 men, and 45 horses. Including the physicians, paymasters, intendants, and other officials and noncombatants, the division has an aggregate strength in round numbers of 350 officers and officials and 15,000 men. This computation assumes the incorporation of a cavalry regiment with an infantry division. The corps commander may, however, organize his cavalry as an independent brigade subject only to his own orders.

When we add to the aggregate strength of the two divisions the following usual constituent parts of a mobilized army corps, not included in divisional commands, namely, the headquarters guards, one regiment of field artillery, the ammunition columns, the field post, the corps intendancy, the field subsistence department, the wagon park columns, the field bakery, the horse depot, the corps bridge train, the field hospital, and the corps staff, we find that its aggregate strength does not fall much short of 37,000 men, 100 guns, 1,700 wagons, and 11,000 horses.


The subjoined *ordre de bataille* is taken from Colonel Meckel's edition of the work of von Schellendorf on "The Duties of the General Staff," published April 19, 1893 :

**Ordre de Bataille of the III Army Corps.**


Commanding General: General of Infantry.....  
 Chief of General Staff: Colonel.....  
 Commander of the Artillery: Major General.....  
 Commander of Engineers and Pioneers: Lieut. Colonel.....




**Corps Artillery.**



**Ammunition Columns.**



**Train Battalion.**



The bulk of the cavalry will presumably be formed into cavalry divisions, embodying besides three brigades of two regiments each, a battalion of 3 horse batteries and a pioneer detachment, or an aggregate, exclusive of noncombatants, of 160 officers and 4,100 men.

Such divisions are likely to be grouped with two or more army corps and reserve divisions (organized as infantry divisions) and form separate field armies.

It has been already mentioned that the corps, brigade, and district headquarters are replaced as they take the field with their troops by substitutes already decided on during peace and that regiments are represented at home by ersatz or depot battalions. Ample

machinery is thus provided for repairing losses and supplying the wants of field troops. The touch with the latter is kept up by the so-called "Etappen system" and etappen troops, whose business it is to secure the communications of the army in the field with the home country, to provide return transportation and attendance for the sick and wounded, as well as shelter, subsistence, and transportation for bodies of troops or individuals destined for the front, and to govern the enemy's country occupied by German troops.

*Three categories of troops* may accordingly be distinguished in the mobilized German military establishment according to the service for which they are each intended, namely, the field army, the ersatz troops, and the garrison troops. The latter are landwehr men, organized into battalions and regiments. While principally employed in the holding of strong places and in connection with the etappen system, they may of course also be incorporated in the field army, and in a war lasting for any length of time this is likely to be done.

AGGREGATE WAR STRENGTH.—The great work of the general staff on the war of 1870-'71 informs us that the maximum strength the German Army, comprising the three categories, reached during the said war was 1,350,787. In 1890 the German war strength, embracing all men who had received military training, including the ersatz reserve, was officially reported as 2,900,000. It is computed that the law of 1890, which provides for an annual enrollment of about 212,000, will so operate as to place at the disposal of the German Emperor in war a trained aggregate force of 3,900,000, including officers and noncommissioned officers; the computation being based upon twenty-four years' continuance of liability to military service, and allowing 25 per cent for loss on account of death, disability, and emigration.

REASONS ADDUCED FOR AND AGAINST THE INCREASE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.—Notwithstanding the formidable showing of her present resources Germany, which must be conceded, in the light of history, not to be an aggressive or war provoking power, is about to increase her military establishment very considerably, and this, too, in the face of the unsettled state of things in France and the apparent improvement in her relations with Russia, factors admittedly favorable to the peace of Europe.

The bill which the Government introduced into the last Reichstag to this end provided for an *average* peace strength of 570,877, as against the then authorized maximum of 486,983, an increase amounting in reality to more than 100,000, seeing that the *actual* strength averages about 20,000 less than the *authorized* strength. An augmentation of officers and military physicians, the former by 2,138 and the latter by 234, was also contemplated. The bill increased the infantry by 173 battalions (from 538 to 711); the cavalry by 12 squadrons (from 465 to 477); the field artillery by 60 batteries (from 434 to 494); the foot artillery from 31 to 37 battalions; the pioneers from 20 to 24 battalions, and the railway troops from 22 to 28 companies. The noncommissioned officers were to be increased by 11,000. On the other hand it proposed, as a general rule, to reduce the period of actual service of the foot troops with the colors to two years, but the legal obligation to serve three years was to remain in force.\*

In support of this measure it was alleged by the Government that in consequence of the law of July 15, 1889, France has during the past three years maintained a peace establishment

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\*The government estimated that the enactment of the bill would result in a permanent increased expenditure per year of \$16,000,000, and, in addition, in an outlay for barracks, etc., of \$62,500,000. Although the number of organizations was somewhat increased, the increased number of men annually conscripted were to be used chiefly in strengthening the existing organizations, and the battalion that it was intended to add to each of the 173 infantry regiments was to have an enlisted strength of but 195, of whom 15 were to be noncommissioned officers, the object of its establishment being to relieve the other battalions as much as possible of the training of such classes of men as one-year volunteers, school teachers, etc., many of whom enter (in April) after the recruits have had their winter's training and are prepared to take part in the company drill. To the fourth battalion were to be assigned officers' servants, tailors, shoemakers, and other men who work at their trades, whom we would describe as extra and daily duty men, and who are always a great hindrance to the effective training of a company.

averaging 519,000. Taking the number of recruits enrolled in 1890 (230,000) as a basis, and multiplying this number by 25, the term during which liability to military service continues, France could put 4,053,000 trained soldiers in the field, deducting 25 per cent for casualties.

Russia, the Reichstag was told by the Government, is also arming to the teeth. Her army rolls for 1892 exhibit a strength present in round numbers of 987,000 men, of whom only 100,000 have Asiatic stations—an increase since 1889 of nearly 60,000. There are annually conscripted 257,000 men from her European population alone, giving her a trained war strength, upon the basis of twenty-three years' military service liability, of about 4,400,000, allowing 25 per cent for losses.

The Government argument on behalf of the measure also pointed out that the contemplated future annual enrollment of 244,000 men\* would, on the basis of twenty-four years' service liability, and of a deduction of 25 per cent for losses, give the fatherland a trained force in war of 4,400,000 men, in round numbers, greater by 300,000 than that of France, which has gone to the utmost limit in taxing her resources, and fully equal to that of Russia. It was admitted that the above figures do not form an absolutely correct basis for comparing the strength of armies that could be put into the field, and it was the Government's expressed intention to exempt from future war service as many of the older landwehr men as possible. But the fact was emphasized *that the strength of the several annual classes (i. e., the number of men enrolled in a particular year) carries with it the greatest weight in a comparison of this kind.* The state whose annual classes contain the greatest number of men can enter the decisive combat with a comparatively young army. To compensate for this deficiency, its opponent is obliged to fall back from the start upon considerably older annual classes, that is upon men who have founded a family and a business, and whose military spirit and physical effectiveness are more or less impaired for this reason as well as by age. In this predicament, the Government claimed, Germany finds itself at present.

On the other hand the opposition in the Reichstag contended that heretofore Germany has not augmented her military strength, except to keep abreast with the military establishments of the neighboring states. If she should now take the lead in this respect she would tighten the screws to the complete exhaustion of the people within and without her border.† Moreover, an estimate of the war strength of the French Army cannot be properly based upon the French recruit quota for 1890 (230,000), for this quota, the first under the law of 1889, has not since been, nor is it likely hereafter to be, equalled. In 1891 the recruit quota amounted to 217,071, and in 1892 to but 209,376. This decline is apt to keep pace with the gradual diminution in the population of France. Again, the French recruit contingent contains 60,000 who are enrolled for only one year, as against but 9,000 one-year volunteers in the German Army. If 51,000 men were let off in the latter with one year's service, the contemplated increase of the army by 84,000 would shrink to 33,000. In comparing, then, the prescribed peace strength of the French Army (519,000) with the proposed peace strength of the Army of Germany (570,000), the fact must not be lost sight of that the actual peace strength of the former falls very considerably below the prescribed strength.

The German estimate of Germany's war strength, and that of France and Russia is as follows: Germany, 3,900,000; France, 4,000,053; Russia, 4,556,000 (including her Asiatic troops). In 1890, the German Government estimated the then war strength of its allies to be as follows: Austro-Hungary, 1,150,000; Italy, 1,090,000.

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\*The average number enrolled heretofore is 212,000.

† It is reported that Russia has actually added two army corps to her peace establishment since the passage of the German Army bill.

While admitting that 2,649,000—the all aged numerical superiority of the combined war armies of France and Russia over those of the states of the Dreibund—is apparently a most formidable one, the opposition in the last Reichstag maintained that even if the correctness of the figures be conceded—a concession it would not make—there is no cause for alarm or need of any material increase of the German peace establishment. For in the first place, it is clear, it was claimed by the opponents of the measure, that an offensive and defensive treaty between France and Russia does not now exist, and that the conclusion of such, or any other treaty, is becoming more improbable every day. And in the second place, even if a coalition was formed by these powers against the Dreibund, numerical superiority would be largely offset, if not wholly neutralized, by the fact that the forces of the latter could be readily united and interposed between those of the former, hundreds of miles apart and separated by hostile territory as they are, and slow as the mobilization of the Russian Army must necessarily be in view of the immense distances and the complicated railway system of Russia.

The Reichstag having rejected the bill, owing to the heavy burden it would entail upon an already heavily taxed people, it was dissolved on May 5 last, and the newly elected Reichstag, convened on July 4, has by a majority of 16 enacted a modified bill submitted to it by the Government.

PROVISIONS OF THE NEWLY ENACTED ARMY LAW.—The following are the principal provisions of the newly enacted army law:

Exclusive of one-year volunteers, the yearly average peace strength of the German Army in privates and vice corporals is fixed at 479,229 for the period from October 1, 1893, to March 31, 1899, distributed according to population among the four federal states having their own military administration.

For the same period the liability of the men of the standing army to service with the colors is limited to the first three years in the cavalry and the horse batteries of the field artillery, and to the first two years in all other branches of the army. Detention beyond the term specified can be authorized by the Emperor, should an exigency render the reinforcement of the active army necessary, and counts as part of the time for which reservists and men of the landwehr are legally liable to military training.

By reference to the tabular statement on page 12, it will be noticed that the concessions made by the Government to the party opposed to an increase of the military establishment, now represented by a minority in the Reichstag, are but slight. The following is a summary of the differences between the present law and the original bill, the rejection of which by the former Reichstag led to its dissolution:

(1) The peace strength is reduced by (a) 12,839 privates, and (b) 945 noncommissioned officers. The future strength present, therefore, amounts to only 479,229, instead of 492,068 privates; the increase in noncommissioned officers amounts to only 10,912, instead of 11,857; the aggregate strength of the army, including noncommissioned officers, amounts to only 557,093, instead of 570,877 men.

(2) Other reductions to be noted are as follows: 345 officers; 6 military physicians; 8 officials.

(3) As a result of the above reductions in the personnel, the present law omits the provisions contained in the original bill for the creation of the following organizations: 10 squadrons of cavalry, 1 company of engineers.

The increase in the annual recruit quota, which under the original bill amounted to 60,000, amounts under the present law to only 54,000.



## CHAPTER VII.

### THE GENERAL STAFF.

GENERAL REMARKS; THE TERM GENERAL STAFF DEFINED.—Having thus outlined the mode of recruitment, the cost, composition, organization, training, and the present and future strength of the German Army, we will now turn our attention to the "General Staff." Here we are confronted at the outset by a confusion likely to arise from the use of the term without a clear comprehension of the meaning that is variously attached to it. While in most countries, our own included, all the heads of the different administrative departments and special arms, both at the War Department and the Military Geographical Departments, viz: the Adjutant General, Chief Quartermaster, Chief Commissary, Chief Paymaster, Chief Medical Officer, Judge-Advocate General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Artillery, etc., are known as General Staff Officers, none of the officers enumerated fall within the category of "General Staff," as understood by the Germans. In Prussia, at least, the term has been exclusively and distinctively applied, since about 1789, to a body of officers to whom, as assistants to the Commander-in-Chief and of his subordinate generals, is confided such work as is directly connected with the designing and execution of military operations. That in Germany, as elsewhere, chiefs of special arms, heads of supply departments, judge-advocates, etc., form an important branch of the higher commands goes without saying; but they are not included in the term General Staff. Clausewitz's dictum that the General Staff is intended to convert the ideas of the commanding general into orders, not only by communicating the former to the troops, but rather by working out all matters of detail, and thus relieving the general from a vast amount of unnecessary labor, is not a sufficient definition of General Staff duties, according to von Schellendorf (upon this question certainly the better authority), as it fails to notice the important obligation of the General Staff Officer of constantly watching over the effectiveness of the troops, which would be impaired by a lack of attention to their material welfare. Out of this obligation grows, he says, the further duty of furnishing to the heads of the supply departments and other officers attached to headquarters, such explanations touching the general military situation, or the effect of a sudden change therein, as will enable them to carry out intelligently what is expected of them. The General Staff thus becomes a directing and explaining body, and its chief, therefore, is in some respects the head of the whole staff. It follows that of the two terms, Staff and General Staff, the Germans regard the former as the more comprehensive one and as embracing the latter.

It is conceded on all hands that the almost phenomenal success that has attended the German (Prussian) arms during the last thirty years is due in a large degree to the corps of highly trained General Staff officers which the German Army possesses. It is natural, therefore, that much should have been written by experts about the preliminary training, duties, and utility of the members of this corps. Indeed, the well-known work of General von Schellendorf, himself a distinguished staff officer and in recent years a war minister and corps commander, has well nigh exhausted this subject, and the changes in the General Staff system that have occurred since the publication of the edition of 1884 are embodied in a new edition, by Colonel Meckel, of the Great General Staff, that has appeared quite recently. In view of the elaborate treatment the subject has received at the hands of such men, it would be useless

and perhaps presumptuous, for me to attempt to enter into an extensive description and discussion of the *duties* of the General Staff. I shall, therefore, do little more as regards the General Staff *duties* than mark out the dividing line between them and the functions of the corps to which it has the nearest relations—the Higher Adjutantur, the latter corresponding to our Adjutant General's Department. Knowing however that the Department is greatly interested in the German General Staff—perhaps all the more because we have no institution that exactly corresponds to it—I shall first sketch its historical development and its organization up to the present time, availing myself for this purpose of documents placed at my disposal by the Chief of the General Staff, some of which have not thus far been published, not even in Germany. In accordance with a frequently expressed desire, I shall also endeavor to give a clear statement of the conditions under which admission is obtained to the German War Academy, the justly celebrated Staff College, and secondly, to the General Staff itself. Incidentally, the regulations and the curriculum of the War Academy will be referred to, though a translation of both has been already submitted by me. The rules governing the promotion and the periodical reassignment of General Staff officers to regimental duty (*Front-Dienst*) will likewise be outlined.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.—The Prussian General Staff of to-day is indebted for the groundwork of its organization to the genius of General von Scharnhorst. It was the privilege of this man, after the breakdown of Prussia in 1806-7, to be able to proceed with the reconstruction of the army on virgin soil, as it were. At the time of this great catastrophe, the most of the Prussian military institutions had either collapsed entirely or become so shaky that it seemed useless or impossible to build upon them as a foundation. It was a fortunate circumstance for Prussia that Scharnhorst was in a position to push aside what had outlived its usefulness and become antiquated, without encountering the many obstacles and protests that ordinarily confront the reformer. From this point of view, the disaster of Jena can almost be regarded as a boon for Prussia, for the demolition of the existing organizations cleared the way for new formations, new regulations, and other much needed changes. This juncture is therefore an eminently appropriate starting point for tracing with some degree of particularity the development of the General Staff, as Scharnhorst's scheme for its organization took but small account of the prevailing staff methods.

A document written in 1808 by Maj. von Rauch, under Scharnhorst's direction and inspiration, foreshadows a radical change in the views touching the proper functions and peace training of the General Staff, in that it contemplates a closer union of the staff with the troops, and a division of its members into a Great General Staff and the General Staff of army corps. In regard to the functions and business of the General Staff in war and peace, the paper advocates the compilation and publication of a digest of such of the various circulars, orders, regulations, instructions, etc., existing on the subject as should remain in force, and in particular quotes one circular, dated December 1, 1806, to this effect: "The officers of the General Staff and their adjoints are in war charged with the conduct of the different columns, which they must not leave on any account. The carpenters and mechanics of the battalions must march at the head of the columns, in order that there may be no delay in repairing roads, bridging streams, etc. The General Staff shall take whatever measures are calculated to facilitate and accelerate the marches. When the army is to form up before the enemy, they (the staff officers) are to direct it to and reconnoiter the *terrain*." "The digest of this and other instructions," the paper goes on to say, "should be prepared by the Quartermaster General, and when approved by the sovereign, should serve for the guidance, not only of the General Staff, but of the generals of the army, in order that every one may know precisely what is expected of him, and to prevent misunderstandings, undue assumption of authority, and unjust imputations. The mode in which the scientific and practical training

of staff officers has been carried on in peace has not been, in all respects, judicious. To gain a detailed knowledge of a province requires a long time, which is often wasted; for of what use in the present war was, for example, the intimate acquaintance the 2d brigade\* had acquired during several years of incessant work of the Silesian Mountains?"

"The General Staff, especially the higher officers, should gain within a short period a general knowledge of the country, rather than to limit the several members to the examination of particular provinces. Of paramount importance is it that the staff officer should not lack an intimate acquaintance with the interior composition and the tactical maneuvers of the troops, or a general knowledge of the application of the evolutions to the conditions of the *terrain*, with which he should be reasonably familiar. To this end, he should always take part in the spring and fall maneuvers. The summer and what remains of the autumn can then be used for practice tours, and the scientific and theoretical instruction of the officers must occupy the winter months."

\*Based upon a series of memoirs submitted to him by Col. von Massenbach, of the Quartermaster General's Staff during the year 1802-4, the King of Prussia (Frederick William) issued on February 11, 1804, after consultation with prominent generals, a Cabinet Order which, while giving a permanent organization to the General Staff, proceeded upon the idea that its hitherto aimless labors ought to be regulated according to fixed principles and a well adjusted system. The Quartermaster General's Staff was made to consist of 1 quartermaster general, 3 lieutenant-quartermasters general, 6 quartermasters, 6 lieutenant-quartermasters, and 16 adjoints (detailed lieutenants to be divided into three classes).

The following extracts from the voluminous instructions for the guidance of the General Staff, contained in the Cabinet Order, indicate their general tendency, which gave rise to the unfavorable criticism above referred to:

"The General Staff is divided into three brigades, each to consist of—

"One lieutenant-quartermaster general, ordinarily a field officer (in exceptional cases he may be a general officer).

"Two quartermasters, of whom one must be a field officer.

"Two lieutenant-quartermasters—captains or lieutenants—and 6 adjoints.

"The division will be made by the quartermaster general and be based upon the individual capacity of the officers concerned. The spheres of duty of the three brigades will coincide with three districts of the state, as follows:

"The first comprising the eastern part, from the right bank of the Vistula to the 'Haff' and the Baltic.

"The second comprising the southern part, to wit: South Prussia, Silesia, namely, from the right bank of the Vistula to and including the Silesian Mountains, also Saxony, 'Franken,' and Bavaria; further, all provinces lying between the mouths of the Vistula, Oder, and Elbe, that is to say, West Prussia, Pomerania, on both banks of the Oder, and Mecklenburg.

"The third comprising the western part, to wit: All German provinces situated between the Elbe, the Rhine, and the Main to the mouths of the streams named. This division is merely geographical."

\* \* \* \* \*

The work of the General Staff is divided into two classes, namely: First, the fundamental work; second, the current work.

In the fundamental part the principles are developed according to which the plans of operations are to be worked out.

Current business is classed, (1) the review of all written or printed treatises pertaining to war which may be submitted to the sovereign by officers of the army or other persons; (2) a thorough treatment and elaboration of probable cases of war in which the state may become involved from various causes.

The fundamental work to be performed by the General Staff embraces an investigation of and treatises on the following subjects:

(1) The principles according to which the *terrain* must be judged, or the *coup d'a'il*.

(2) The arranging of the marches of the army and selecting positions (camps); the marches of the army to and from an assumed battlefield are to be indicated after the example of Frederick the Great; the dimensions of the spaces set apart for the different arms, and the mode of constructing temporary barracks or huts must not be omitted.

(3) The art of establishing cantonments and winter quarters.

(4) The provisioning and sheltering an army in the field and the foraging of the animals; the best means by which such an army can be given the greatest mobility and capacity for maneuvering; an estimate of the cost of certain outlined expeditions.

(5) Battles and the spirit in which war must be conducted.

(6) The organization of a bureau of intelligence, in order that there may be no lack of information in peace time in regard to whatever may become a theater of war in foreign countries; the strength and location of foreign armies, their depots of supply, etc.

(7) How fortresses may be regarded as included in the *ordre de bataille* of armies; the influence of fortresses upon military operations.

(8) Telegraphy with reference to German theaters of war, together with estimates of cost.

(9) The landing of hostile fleets and what may be or may not be apprehended in consequence thereof.

(10) The principles and rules which must be observed in planning a general war or the operations of single campaigns, particularly in a state which is bound to so order its war resources that wars in which it may have to be engaged will be shortened by decisive blows.

(11) On the necessity of connecting statecraft with a knowledge of the science and art of war, illustrated from modern history.

(12) The question as to what is the condition, shape, and extent at the present time of the various theaters of war within the Prussian monarchy; what ought to be their condition, shape, and extent.

[It was intended that each brigade should work out four (two by each quartermaster of a brigade) of these fundamental problems, and that they should be completed within the space of one year; that the papers should not be laid before the quartermaster general until the lieutenant-quartermasters general had perfectly agreed upon their contents. The papers were next to be discussed before a committee consisting of the three latter and the quartermaster general, and it was to be recognized as a fundamental law that the discussion, which was to be private, should be most exhaustive, and that no final conclusions should be reached on any subject until the matter in hand had been most maturely examined into and deliberated upon, and the conviction arrived at that pure and unadulterated truth was being submitted to his Majesty the King.]

\* \* \* \* \*

“The officers of the General Staff are required to inform themselves in regard to all positions within the Prussian States at all worthy of note (*merkwürdig*), whether intended for defensive or offensive purposes, whether they can be utilized only for the Prussian Army or the enemy as well. Not only the prominent features, but every minute detail of such positions is to be considered. If the position is liable to be occupied by an enemy the General Staff officer must carry in his memory so vivid a picture of it and the best means of attacking the enemy therein, as well of the roads and paths leading thereto, that he can without hesitation point out by night or day the way to an attacking column. In order that this picture may not be obscured by the lapse of time, the viewing of the position must be repeated periodically; hence the practice tours must not be interfered with; they take place in summer, while during the winter months the material collected is arranged and utilized to the best advantage.”

Of the creator of this scheme, namely, Col. von Massenbach, Clausewitz says, that while endowed with a brilliant intellect, he was deficient in tact, judgment, consistency, and stability of character; that he was essentially an individual in whose mental makeup imagination and fancy predominated; that he early showed a bad tendency of ascribing an excessive importance to the *terrain*, the geographic conditions, and considerations of space, and of losing sight of the troops and even of the conflict itself and its consequences. He also showed, Clausewitz continues, a disposition to urge changes in matters beyond his proper sphere, a trait which, though perhaps not always censurable—for if every one only did what he was paid for needed reforms would never be brought about—is never excusable if the proposals are impracticable and the premises upon which they rest faulty.

Though the present German General Staff admits the justice of much of the above criticisms, it nevertheless feels bound to concede to Col. von Massenbach the great merit that it was he who first called into life a distinctly delineated organization of the General

Staff which had a scientific basis and involved on the part of the officers the same extraordinary and constant diligence for which he himself was noted. This merit is all the greater, as the spirit and conditions of the time were decidedly unfavorable to deep going reforms. The self-satisfied spirit of those days opposed everything new simply because it was new. Add to this the distrust of many generals in a scheme which they thought contemplated the establishment of a guardianship over them and, further, the general discontent of the corps of officers with a system which authorized the introduction of outsiders into the higher grades of a regiment, and threatened the, up to this period strictly observed, time-honored rule of seniority promotion, and the obstacles which confronted Massenbach were formidable indeed. But his restless activity overcame them all. By repeated written and oral communications he sought to gain influential persons, both in and without the King's *entourage*, for his plans. Adj. Gen. Zastrow's word of honor that he would not oppose the proposed organization did not satisfy him; he pleaded with him to work for his scheme. In short, he omitted nothing to clear the way for his project and he accomplished his end despite all difficulties.

This is and remains the merit of Massenbach. His organization paved the way for future progress. Not that it was free from faults, and serious faults. The employment of the General Staff officers became one-sided, and, notwithstanding the extensive field work which it involved, it failed to facilitate the conduct of actual war to the degree that had been expected. The prevalent belief that "positions," and the registration of them according to office rule, furnished a sure means of achieving victories stifled every free and independent thought upon war, and obscured the immense importance of the leading of troops suitable to the requirements of the moment. The accomplishment of a subsidiary, however in itself necessary measure—the reconnaissance and the judging of the *terrain*, give rise to expectations which the energetic nature of actual war was certain to disappoint. Equally useless was the collection of plans of operations, based upon hypothetical cases that could never correspond to a later real state of things.

It was upon Scharnhorst's proposal that a Cabinet Order, dated February 25, 1808, established as the fifth division of the Council of State (*Staatsrath*) the War Department. The latter was to be the supreme authority, not only upon all matters pertaining to military administration, but also as regards everything that related to the army, its constitution, organization, and the use that was to be made of the troops. The War Department was divided into—

*I. The General War Department*, under von Scharnhorst :

1st Division.—Personal affairs of military persons.

2d Division.—Training of troops and their utilization in strategic and tactical respects. The map rooms (*Plan Kammer*).

*II. The Military Economic Department (Ökonomie Departement) :*

1st Division.—Administration of public funds, billeting of troops

2d Division.—Subsistence and forage.

3d Division.—Clothing and leather equipments.

4th Division.—Institutes for invalid soldiers.

It was intended that the chief of the General War Department should always be the senior General Staff officer, under whose orders another officer of the General Staff, assisted by an officer each of the infantry and cavalry, was to conduct the 2d Division. The latter, therefore, nearly corresponded to the present Great General Staff.

The memorial of 1808, referred to, estimated the number of General Staff officers needed in war at 26, but the full number was not appointed in peace, the register for 1808 showing only 1 quartermaster general (Scharnhorst), 2 quartermasters, 6 quartermaster lieutenants, 10 adjoints, besides 15 detailed officers. Of this aggregate of 34 officers there were attached,

beginning with the year 1809, to the three "Gouvernements" and six brigades (cadres respectively for army corps and divisions to be formed in war) at the rate of one to each brigade, and of one or two to each "Gouvernement." The remainder constituted the Great General Staff in Berlin.

To the staffs of the Prussian auxilliary corps, which took part in the campaign of 1812 against Russia, there were attached in all 20 General Staff officers, as follows: To the staff of the general-in-chief, Lieut. Gen. von Grawert, 6; to the staff of Lieut. Gen. von York, 5; to the general commanding the infantry, 5; to the general commanding the cavalry, 4. Considering that the corps consisted of only 21,000 men, this assignment shows that it was deemed highly important to afford to as many officers as possible the opportunity for acquiring a practical knowledge of the duties of the General Staff in war.

It was natural that the enlargement of the army during the war period 1813-15, which was considerable, should be attended with a corresponding increase in the General Staff, as the principle that members of it ought to be permanently attached to the higher commands down to that of the brigade was consistently adhered to. It is well known that this measure proved of great advantage, and that a good share of the successes can be justly claimed by the General Staff. The performance of the General Staff of the Silesian Army headed by Gneissenau excites admiration even to this day.

By Cabinet Order of August 28, 1814, a change was effected in the organization of the War Ministry, to which the General Staff was still subordinated, by which the ministry was divided into five departments, severally headed by a "director." The second department, under Maj. Gen. von Grolman, was charged with the working out of projects for the General Staff, and with the superintendence of the employment of officers of the General Staff and the higher adjutantur. On January 31, 1816, the second department was divided as follows:

(1) The Eastern theater of war; (2) the Middle theater of war; (3) the Western theater of war; (4) the Historical Division; (5) the Survey; (6) the Astronomic-Trigonometric Bureau; (7) Survey and Drawing Bureau; (8) the Map Rooms.

The following was fixed upon as the peace establishment of the General Staff, by a Cabinet Order of June 20, 1817: For each of the five larger army corps, and the Guard and Grenadier corps, 1 colonel, 1 field officer, and 1 captain or lieutenant; for each of the smaller army corps, 1 field officer and 1 captain; for each of the seventeen brigades, 1 captain; for the Great General Staff in Berlin, 2 colonels, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 4 majors, 4 captains, and 4 lieutenants; for the principal legations, 3 field officers and 3 captains.

All difference between the larger and smaller army corps having ceased in 1820, each corps had assigned to it, in addition to the chief of the General Staff, two General Staff officers.

An important advance in the development of the General Staff was effected when on January 11, 1821, the King appointed Gen. von Muffling as Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and intrusted to that officer the conduct, independently of the War Ministry, of the Great General Staff, as well as of the General Staff attached to the troops, although the second department of the War Ministry continued for a time under the direction of Maj. Gen. Ruhle von Lillianstern, of the General Staff. The relations between the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the director of the second department of the War Ministry, who was to be, as a rule, a General Staff officer of rank, were determined by specific regulations. General Staff officers no longer transacted business directly with that department, but, as regards all official matters, communicated exclusively with the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

The latter divided the Great General Staff in Berlin into sections, each of which was placed under the direction of a separate chief. The personnel belonging to the survey was

distributed among a trigonometrical and a topographical division, both of which divisions were assigned to the sections of the Great General Staff. Accordingly, the organization was the following :

*I. Section of military history*, the conduct of which was retained by Maj. Gen. von Ruhle. To this was assigned the trigonometrical division.

*II. Section of the Eastern theater of war*, embracing the part of the topographical division pertaining to it.

*III. Section of the Middle theater of war*, together with its part of the topographical division.

*IV. Section of the Western theater of war*, together with the part of the topographical division pertaining to it.

Officers of the army were detailed for a three years' term of duty with the topographical survey. In connection with this reorganization, the following peace establishment of the General Staff was announced, March 29, 1821:

(1) For the headquarters of each corps, 1 chief of the General Staff, 1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant.

(2) For each division, 1 captain or lieutenant.

(3) For the Great General Staff in Berlin, 4 chiefs of sections (of whom one was to be, as a rule, director of the second department of the War Ministry), 4 majors, 8 captains or lieutenants.

(4) For the six principal legations, 3 field officers, 3 captains.

(5) For duty under the "Gouverneur" of Luxemburg, 1 captain.

This reorganization gave to the Prussian General Staff an independent position which the General Staff of no other country except that of Japan enjoys. It necessarily devolved upon the Chief of the General Staff of the Army the conduct of the operations of the army in war. This fact, says von Schellendorf, explains in a great measure the brilliant performances of the General Staff in the last campaigns; and the circumstances already noted that, as regards the relations between it and the sovereign, the Prussian General Staff is placed on a different footing from the General Staff of the other great continental armies, justifies a closer consideration of the questions involved. It must demonstrate that if the Prussian General Staff had not for more than seventy years enjoyed this independence, it must have acquired it as the result of the political development of states, the organization of modern armies, and the utilization of new means for war purposes. The principal point to be considered here is the position of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. It must be patent to every one that *he* is best fitted for the conduct of operations in war who during peace is charged with overseeing the requisite preparations for such a contingency. For it seems wholly inadmissible, in view of the rapidity with which well organized armies nowadays pass from a peace to a war footing, and are concentrated by rail on the enemy's frontiers, that the ways and means of such concentration, constituting as they do the commencement of the operations, should be determined upon only at the time of mobilization. Precious time, not easily made up later on, would be lost by such a delay. It is equally inadmissible, on principle, that a person should be expected at this time to undertake the conduct of operations, when a definite direction has been given to them by a concentration already begun, and for which all preparations had been made beforehand. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Chief of the General Staff in peace and in war should be the same person. Those states in which the Chief of the General Staff is subordinated to the War Minister, presumably proceed on the supposition that the latter, without whose knowledge and influence the more important preparatory work can not be carried out, will take over to himself at the decisive moment all the business of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. But

such a supposition is based upon erroneous views, for it will be hard to find a person in whom the necessary qualities of a War Minister and Chief of the General Staff are combined, and who, while conversant with military organization and administration, is also a competent leader of armies. The choice of a War Minister is, moreover, frequently restricted by political, constitutional, and other considerations. But if such a person existed and could be found—an almost impossible assumption—he could not discharge the duties of the two positions in time of war. Even an individual endowed with the greatest conceivable capacity for work could not do justice to both, and one or the other of these laborious and responsible offices would have to be confided to other hands at a critical moment. If, however, the War Minister finds himself unable on the outbreak of war to continue the general supervision of General Staff work which he has exercised in peace, no one else who was subordinated to him during this period can assume such supervision, for such a person would lack the requisite authority and, what is even more important, the complete confidence of the army. It is manifest that one regarded as unfit in peace time for the independent discharge of the duties of so responsible a position could not carry on the much more far reaching functions in war. It follows that the Chief of the General Staff of the Army must already in time of peace be independent of ministerial control, and, like the commanding general of a corps be subordinated directly to the Commander-in-Chief. This will enable him to train his officers judiciously, and with their aid to fulfill the high demands that are made upon the General Staff in war. It appears, then, that in the development of its organization, the Prussian General Staff is ahead of the other General Staffs by half a century, and that the step taken in 1821 was an eminently correct one.

A further step in the emancipation of the General Staff from the War Ministry was taken when on August 31, 1824, the second department, in its entire sphere of action, together with the map room and lithographic institute, was transferred to the former. Maj. Gen. von Ruhle, who had been director of the department, remained attached to the War Ministry, however, for the purpose of conducting the business relations of the Ministry with the General Staff.

On economical grounds the peace establishment was reduced as follows by a Royal Cabinet Order dated November 11, 1824:

(1) *Great General Staff*.—One lieutenant-general as Chief of the General Staff of the Army; 3 field officers to act as chiefs of the three theaters of war; 1 field officer to take charge of the archive and to conduct the business with the War Ministry; 3 field officers and 9 captains or lieutenants for duty with the sections in charge of the theaters of war, and for the performance of special tasks.

(2) *General Staff attached to troops*.—Nine field officers as chiefs of the General Staffs of army corps; 1 field officer as chief of the General Staff of the general inspection of the artillery; 9 field officers and 9 captains or lieutenants for duty at corps headquarters.

It was intended that no General Staff officers should be permanently assigned to divisions in peace time, but that from the General Staff officers serving at corps headquarters some were to be attached to the divisions when assembled for the more extensive exercises, who were to be replaced by the temporary detail of regimental officers.

The above establishment fell short by more than one-half of the requirements in war, to wit: 14 generals or colonels, 19 field officers, 62 captains, 6 lieutenants, a proportion all the more insufficient from the fact that the attempt to obtain 56 suitable officers from regiments in war times would necessarily have been difficult, when we consider that in those days an interchange between General Staff and regimental officers was comparatively rare, and the number of regimental officers trained for General Staff services relatively small.

During the next ensuing years only minor changes in the organization of the General Staff are to be recorded. The chiefs of the three theaters of war of the Great General Staff obtained,

in 1826, the rank and allowance of the regimental commanders, already enjoyed by the chiefs of the General Staffs of army corps. On November 28, 1829, Lieut. Gen. Krauseneis was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Army; in 1830, a General Staff officer was assigned to the recently appointed Governor-General of Westphalia. In 1833, it was ordered that advantage should be taken of every opportunity to attach officers to troops of all arms, in order not to estrange them from service at the front (*Front-Dienst*). The General Staff establishment was increased in 1842, by one officer. A Cabinet Order issued in 1843 called attention to the necessity of a timely return of General Staff officers to regiments, in order that their practical fitness for the service might be secured and furthered. On May 2, of the same year, the designation of Eastern, Middle, and Western theaters of war, in the Great General Staff, was changed to 1st, 2d, and 3d Division respectively, each chief receiving at first the title of "Director," and later, "Chief" of such division. On May 13, 1848, Lieut. Gen. von Reyer was placed in charge as acting, and on April 11, 1850, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

The mobilization and military operations of 1848-50 had meanwhile shown that in the long years of peace the organization of the army had in many respects suffered injuries, which were mainly ascribable to considerations of extreme economy. In consequence, the necessity for reorganization and enlargement began to be felt.

The General Staff was among the first to receive attention, for as early as December 16, 1852, General Staff officers to the number of 18 were assigned to divisions, a corresponding number of assistant, or second adjutants, being dispensed with. The regular General Staff establishment was fixed as follows, by Cabinet Order of February 15, 1853:

One lieutenant-general as Chief; 13 colonels, of whom 3 were chiefs of the principal divisions of the Great General Staff; 9 chiefs of the General Staff at corps headquarters and 1 attached to the inspector general of the artillery; 32 field officers, 9 attached to corps headquarters, 18 attached to divisions, 5 serving with the Great General Staff; 18 captains, 9 attached each to corps headquarters and to the Great General Staff; in all 64 officers.

Inasmuch as, in consequence of the reorganization of the 36 divisions of 6 battalions each into 18 divisions numbering severally 12 battalions, the number of General Staff officers required in war was reduced to 83, only 19 officers had to be supplied by detail, a proportion which must be conceded to be an improvement over the former one.

On September 18, 1859, Maj. Gen. von Moltke, who had been acting Chief of the General Staff of the Army since October 29, 1857, was appointed to that position. We have, therefore, reached the most important turning point in the life of this distinguished man. Henceforth the fate and the sphere of action of the General Staff were to be inseparably united with his name. In order that the narration of events may not be interrupted, let us briefly sketch the external development of the General Staff under Moltke in connection with its organization up to this time.

In 1862, Moltke succeeded, with a view of forming the "Military Scientific Division," in having the General Staff establishment increased by 1 chief of division, 1 field officer, and 1 captain. This nucleus was extended, on May 5, 1865, into a *Neben Etat* (auxiliary establishment), which embraced the officers attached to the General Staff for scientific purposes. It consisted of 3 chiefs of division, 9 field officers, and 5 captains, who were reported as "*à la suite*" of regiments.\* It was intended to entrust the scientific work (military history, military geography, statistics, etc.,) to a number of officers who seemed to be specially suited for it,

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\* An officer is said to be "*à la suite*" of a regiment when he is borne upon its rolls in excess of its authorized strength. His actual incorporation in the regiment is not contemplated. Officers are sometimes placed "*à la suite*" of a prince or of the army. The latter are nearly all members of princely houses, on whom military rank is conferred to enable them to wear the uniform, but of whom no military service is required.

and who were to be less frequently affected by the prevailing system of interchange between general staff and regimental duty. At the same time an increase of both the peace and war establishments of the General Staff became necessary. The campaign of 1864 against Denmark had not resulted in a general mobilization of the army, only particular divisions having gone to the seat of war; these were formed into army corps, which had to be provided with General Staffs. As it was not desired to break up those of the existing corps, the only alternative was to detach for this purpose officers from the Great General Staff, which was thereby so weakened that it was unable to keep up its current work.

Accordingly, an increase of the peace establishment of the Great General Staff by 4 field officers, 6 captains, and 3 detailed lieutenants, as well as of the war establishment of the entire General Staff by 6 field officers and 11 captains was decreed by Royal Cabinet Order of May 5, 1865. This decree was not, however, immediately carried out; on the one hand, there was a lack of available funds, and on the other, the conflict that arose between the Government and the representatives of the people in regard to the appropriations impeded every change in army organization.

The complications with Austria in the spring of 1866, which in June culminated in war, showed that even the contemplated increase of the General Staff fell far short of the requirements. At the outset the necessity for the creation of substitutive Great General Staff became evident, as even during the pendency of the war a large part of the business in Berlin had to be carried on as usual. The observation of the neutral armies, whose attitude and doings just at this time were of special interest, also the management of the intelligence service with respect to the hostile armies, and the supply and supplementation of maps, were among the business that required constant attention. Upon the proposal of Gen. Moltke, 1 substitutional chief of the General Staff of the Army, 3 substitutional chiefs of division, 1 director of the central bureau of information, 1 director of the map room, and 8 officers for duty in the several divisions, were left behind. This force proved, however, to be inadequate to the demands made upon it.

It further became apparent, at the time of the mobilization and the strategic concentration of the army, as well as during the time the operations were actually in progress, that the railways would have to be placed under full military control and management in order to keep the conduct of them in hand, and for this General Staff officers were likewise required. The needs of the mobilized armies also greatly exceeded the supply of General Staff officers, despite the relatively short period that the entire campaign lasted; and it thus happened that, although four mobilized army corps (the 3d, 4th, 7th, and 8th—the latter two constituting the *nuclei* for the Elbe and Main armies) and several cavalry divisions were not formed, the war establishment of 83 officers had to be exceeded by 22. As the peace establishment amounted to but 64, as many as 41 had to be detailed from the army at the beginning of the mobilization and retained during the war.

These experiences, as well as the formation of three new army corps at the close of the war (9th, 10th, and 11th), led to a considerable increase of the General Staff in 1867. A Royal Order of January 31 of that year, based upon a proposal contained in a memorial submitted by Gen. von Moltke, provided for the following increase, exclusive of that rendered necessary by the formation of the additional army corps, to wit: For the *Haupt Etat*, 3 chiefs, 8 field officers, and 3 captains; for the *Neben Etat*, 1 chief, 2 field officers, and 11 captains. The war establishment was also augmented by 1 quartermaster general, who was to be attached to the General (Imperial) Headquarters, and by 1 field officer for every army corps.

Accordingly, the new peace establishment of the General Staff was composed of—

(1) *Haupt Etat*.—One Chief of the General Staff of the Army, 3 chiefs of division of the General Staff, 12 chiefs of the General Staff of army corps, 1 chief of the General Staff of the

general inspection of artillery, 7 field officers of the Great General Staff, 12 field officers attached to corps headquarters, 25 field officers attached to divisions—including one for the cavalry division of the guard, 15 captains of the Great General Staff, and 12 captains attached to corps headquarters—in all 88 officers.

(2) *Neben Etat*.—Four chiefs of division, 5 field officers, 12 captains—21 officers.

The two *Etats* formed thus an aggregate of 109 officers, of whom 46, that is to say 42.2 per cent belonged to the Great General Staff, while the former establishment assigned to that body only 26.6 per cent. These figures show that the General Staff officers needed for new formations and other purposes could be supplied with far less embarrassment than formerly. It was further decided that henceforward not to exceed 40 lieutenants should be detailed from their regiments for instruction in general staff duties, this detail securing to the corps a constant source of supply.

The increase of the Great General Staff necessitated a reorganization of the same, with a view of effecting which Gen. von Moltke ordered, on February 24, 1867, as follows: "The Great General Staff consists of (1) the 1st Division; (2) the 2d Division, including the Railway Division;\* (3) the 3d Division; (4) the Military History Division; (5) the newly formed Geographical and Statistical Division; (6) the Topographical Division; (7) the Office (*Kanzlei*) Division; (8) the Map Room (*Plan Kammer*). Connected with it is (9) the Triangulation of the country."

In this shape the Prussian General Staff entered the campaign of 1870-71, in which it was destined to play a role probably never assigned to such a corps.

THE PRUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF, 1870-72.—The composition of the General Staff during the war, 1870-71, is set forth in detail in the work of von Schellendorf. The record shows that the original war formation required 138 mobilized Prussian General Staff officers, to which must be added 23 immobilized officers (substitutional General Staff in Berlin), in all 161. As the peace establishment numbered only 109, 52 officers had to be taken from regiments. Including the General Staff officers of the other contingents, of whom Saxony had 11, Hesse 3, Bavaria 25, Württemberg 9, and Baden 5, the German Army on taking the field had 214 such officers. This number was, however, increased by 27 for the Prussian contingent alone during the course of the campaign, so that it numbered 165 mobilized officers at its close. The enlargement of the German Army after the war by several army corps, as well as the incorporation of the officers of the Baden, Hessian, and Mecklenburg contingents into the Army of Prussia, led to a further increase of the General Staff establishment, which amounted for the *Haupt Etat* to 3 field officers and 3 captains, and for the *Neben Etat* to 2 field officers and 6 captains.

On December 29, 1874, 5 field officers were added to the Great General Staff to cover the demand made upon it for instructors by the War Academy. At the same time the divisions belonging to the General Survey were partly separated from the Great General Staff, and designated respectively as the topographical, trigonometrical, and cartographical divisions, and were placed under a chief (major-general) of the "Survey of the Country" (*Landesaufnahme*). This separation not only relieved the Chief of the General Staff of much labor, but impressed a distinctive character upon the surveying system, which could now be carried on according to a definite plan and fixed principles. As the Survey remained under the general control of the Chief of the General Staff, the latter would still have the final decision of all important questions. The arrangement has proved a most judicious one, and has materially contributed to the development of the Survey, both in scientific and technical respects. In connection with the Survey it may be mentioned that on April 1, 1882, a so-called *Evidenz* Section (under a captain) was formed and incorporated with it, its office

\*The latter was constituted an independent division January 30, 1869.

being to keep the maps up to date by reconnaissances, and to enter upon them all changes such as the construction of new roads (*Chausseen*) and railways.

The development of the "Line Commissions" (*Linien Kommissionen*) deserves special consideration. Upon these commissions devolves the military management of railways in peace and war. They are also the channel of communication between the General Staff and the directors of both the Government and private railways. The entire German railway network is divided into a number of "lines" (*Linien*), which are constituted with reference to the military utilization of the railways, especially for effecting with promptness the mobilization and the strategic concentration. For every such line a commissioner is appointed, with station, as a rule, in the principal town of the district, whose duty it is to carry out the dispositions that may be declared necessary by the Railway Division of the Great General Staff for the transporting, sheltering, subsisting, and detraining of troops, and in reference to the holding of rolling stock in readiness, etc. The number of "Line Commissions" has had to be increased, of course, to correspond with the constant development of the German railway system. At present there are 14, whose main offices are at the following points: Berlin, Breslau, Bromberg, Königsberg, Altona, Hanover, Erfurt, Magdeburg, Cologne (one on the right and the other on the left bank of the Rhine), Elberfeld, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Karlsruhe, and Strasburg.

The increasing age of Field Marshal von Moltke made it necessary, toward the close of the year 1881, that he should be relieved of a part of his work. With this object in view the office of quartermaster general was created, the incumbent of which (Maj. Gen. Count Waldensee) assumed the bulk of the current business, leaving to the Field Marshal the decision of important questions only. Upon his own request Gen. von Moltke was wholly relieved from his position as Chief of the General Staff, on August, 1888, and assigned to duty as President of the Commission for the defence of the country. He was succeeded as Chief of Staff by Count Waldensee.

As the necessity for assigning General Staff officers to duty in connection with the larger fortresses became apparent, several new places in the General Staff were created to supply this lack, notably for Metz and Strasburg, in 1878; for Königsberg and Thorn, in 1885; for Cologne, Mentz, and Posen, in 1886. Small augmentations of the General Staff establishment having taken place during the preceding years, which were chiefly rendered necessary by the gradual increase of the railway division, a most important change occurred in 1889. By Royal Cabinet Order, the discontinuance of the office of quartermaster general, and the substitution in its place of three superior quartermasters (*Oberquartiermeister*) was decreed. The latter were to act as chiefs of the General Staffs of armies, and to prepare themselves for this work during peace time. They also assumed a part of the business of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, as most of the divisions of the Great General Staff were placed under them.

#### PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

PEACE ESTABLISHMENT (*Freidensetat*).—The Prussian "General Staff of the Army" is composed of—

(1) *The Great General Staff.*

(2) *The General Staff attached to the troops, viz:* To headquarters of corps (*General-Kommandos*), and to divisions, as well as to *Gouvernements* and *Kommandaturen* of the larger fortresses.\* It consists of the following officers of the General Staff: 1 Chief of the General Staff of the

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\*The commanding general of a fortress is styled *Gouverneur* or *Kommandant*, depending upon its importance, the former being the higher title. The terms *Gouvernement* and *Kommandatur* embrace the personnel of the headquarters of the general.

Army; 3 superior quartermasters; 25 chiefs of divisions of the Great General Staff and chiefs of General Staff of army corps and of the larger fortresses; 69 field officers; 48 captains. Of these the following are attached to troops, viz: To the General Staff of each army corps, 1 chief, 1 field officer, 1 captain; to the General Staff of each division, 1 field officer or captain—in all 16 chiefs and 66 field officers and captains.

The assignment of General Staff officers to fortresses is regulated by the necessities of the service in each case. Provided for this purpose are 3 chiefs, 11 field officers and captains.

The remaining General Staff officers, that is to say, 6 chiefs of division, 40 field officers and captains, belong to the Great General Staff in Berlin. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army decides whether a General Staff officer is to serve with the Great General Staff or the troops.

Special provision is made in the appropriation act for the General Staff officers who are to serve with the staffs of the Army Inspections\* and as military plenipotentiaries or attachés abroad, but officers of the Great General Staffs are sometimes detailed for service in these places.

The frequent changes in the positions and stations of General Staff officers, rendered necessary by the conviction that familiarity with the various branches and relations of the service adds greatly to their value, having been found to interfere seriously with a certain class of General Staff work, mainly of a scientific nature, led (as has been already stated) to the institution of a *Neben Etat* of the Great General Staff. To this are assigned officers who, besides having an exceptionally broad and thorough general military education, are distinguished in some special field or department of knowledge, such as the military railway system, military history, military geography and statistics, the survey system, etc. These remain so long in their positions as the interests of the particular department to which they are attached seem to demand.

To the *Neben Etat* of the Great General Staff belong: 1 chief of the survey of the country, 5 chiefs of division, 12 field officers, 40 captains.

Officers of the *Neben Etat* below the rank of major-general are borne *à la suite*, either of the General Staff or of a regiment.

With a view to their training in the duties of the General Staff about 60 first lieutenants, who have passed through the War Academy with distinction, or have been otherwise especially recommended, are annually detailed (on April 1) from regiments for service with the Great General Staff. These officers are nearly equally distributed between "the Survey" and the divisions of the Great General Staff. A certain number (depending upon existing vacancies) of such of them as have made the best general record, and have shown special skill in the working out of the tactical projects set them, are each year nominated to the Sovereign for transfer to the General Staff or the *Neben Etat* of the Great General Staff. It sometimes happens, however, that vacancies in the General Staff are directly filled by the appointment of exceptionally well-equipped regimental officers.

Special General Staffs exist in the kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, which are in constant communication with, and officers from which are always attached to, the Prussian Great General Staff in Berlin. The communication is either direct or passes through the War Ministry of the States concerned. The General Staff of the three kingdoms named is made up as follows:

*Bavaria.*—One chief of the General Staff (lieutenant-general), 4 colonels, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 12 majors, 10 captains.

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\* See page 70.

*Saxony*.—Two colonels, of whom one is the chief, and the other the director of the topographical bureau, 4 majors, 7 captains.

*Württemberg*.—Four majors.

THE WAR ESTABLISHMENT (*Kriegsetat*).—The supply of General Staff officers required in case of mobilization for the general headquarters, the several field armies, the army corps, infantry, cavalry, and reserve divisions, for the Etappen inspections and the fortress "Gouvernements," and, finally, for the substitutional Great General Staff in Berlin, is drawn from the existing General Staff and the *Neben Etat*, and also from regiments by the detail of officers who formerly belonged to the General Staff or are known to be especially fitted for service therein.

#### STATUS AND SPHERE OF DUTY.

THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY is directly subordinated to the Emperor and King. Within the sphere of his action fall all matters relating to the disposition of the army in war, and the leading of all large bodies of troops (*höhere Truppenführung*); and, in conjunction with other departments, he deals with all questions touching the fighting condition of the troops and the defense of the country. He is a member of the defense commission,\* and president of the central directory of the Prussian Survey, the composition and function of which will be outlined later on. The Railway Brigade, together with the Aërial Navigation Division, as well as the War Academy, as regards all scientific matters, are subordinated to him. He superintends the training of officers for the General Staff, as well as the higher training of the officers already members of that body. Once a year he submits to the Sovereign a list of those officers who, in his judgment, should be returned from the General Staff to the troops, and from the troops to the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff is in constant communication with the Minister of War upon all questions relating to the military training of the army, its organization in peace and war, and its transition to a war formation. On General Staff matters he communicates directly with the headquarters of army corps (*General-Kommandos*). The senior superior quartermaster is his representative when prevented from discharging his duty from any cause.

THE SUPERIOR QUARTERMASTERS.—The three Superior Quartermasters are placed directly at the disposal and under the orders of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and constitute an intermediate authority between him and the divisions of the Great General Staff, as shown in the tabular statement hereto annexed. They take final action on minor matters not affecting important principles "by authority," without actual reference to the Chief of the General Staff, the object being to prevent as much as possible the overburdening of the latter.

THE GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS SERVING WITH TROOPS OR AT FORTRESSES, are subject to their General, *Gouverneur*, or *Kommandant*. Proposals relating to their promotion and transfer emanate, however, from the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, who is also expected to promote their military-scientific training by means of special tasks which he may impose on them.

The General Staff officers serving at army corps headquarters perform general staff duties under the direction of the chief of the General Staff of the army corps, who sees that it is conducted according to regulations. The latter has also a general oversight over the office work of the adjutantur, the intendatur, corps auditeur, and other staff officers at

\*The other members are Field Marshal Gen. von Pape, the Commanding General of the Guard Corps, the Inspector General of the system of military education and training, the Commanding General of the Third Army Corps, the Inspector General of the Foot Artillery, the Admiral commanding the Navy, the Chief of the Pioneer and Engineer Corps and the Inspector General of fortresses, the Director of the Navy Department (a rear admiral), and the Director of the General War Department, the latter being the representative of the Minister of War.

headquarters. In the absence of the commanding general, he carries on the current business by his (the general's) authority, questions relating to courts-martial and leaves of absence being referred to the senior division commander; but the power of disposing of such business does not devolve upon the General Staff officer next in rank in the event of the absence of both the general and chief of staff. The duties of General Staff officers attached to the divisions are similar to those at corps headquarters. They have no supervisory power over the other departments of the staff. In the absence of the general, orders are issued in his name by the senior officer of the General Staff and Adjutantur present. In time of war the officers of the higher Adjutantur (adjutant general's department) are often called upon to perform General Staff duties, for which they have been specially trained; and in time of peace the senior adjutant takes over the General Staff work whenever the General Staff officer is prevented from discharging his functions.

The following is an outline of the peace duties of General Staff officers, serving with troops (corps and divisions), and at fortresses, which vary, of course, with the nature of the commands held by their respective generals: Marches; the sheltering and distributing (*Dislokation*) of troops; drills and maneuvers, and the selecting of ground therefor; matters relating to the use of roads, railways, and telegraphs; political questions; strength, condition, and distribution of neighboring armies; matters (other than technical) connected with the artillery, engineers, pontoons, and bridges, and the defense of fortresses; questions with foreign governments touching the apprehension and return of deserters; maps, plans, reconnaissances, and topographical sketches.

Bronsart von Schellendorf thus defines the duties of the General Staff in war:

(a) The drafting and working out of the necessary instructions relating to the shelter, safety, marching, and fighting of the troops.

(b) The timely transmission of the necessary oral or written orders to the proper authorities or individuals.

(c) The collecting, sifting, and working out (*Bearbeitung*) of all information relating to the nature and proper military utilization of the theater of war; procurement of maps and plans.

(d) The collection and valuation of incoming information relative to the hostile army.

(e) The maintenance of the effectiveness of the troops, and keeping constantly informed of their condition in every respect.

(f) The keeping of journals and preparation of reports of combats. The compilation of other information that may be important to the future historian.

(g) Special tasks, especially reconnaissances.

#### THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF.

Its organization is as follows:

(1) CENTRAL DIVISION.—This division conducts the correspondence of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with institutes and individuals within and without the sphere of his authority. It has charge of the economic affairs of the entire General Staff, as well as of the personal affairs of its officers and of those of the officials of the Great General Staff.

(2) FIRST DIVISION.—This division collects and arranges material affording information in reference to foreign armies. The East is in the main allotted to this division.

(3) SECOND DIVISION.—The military strength and resources of the German Empire form the field of inquiry and labor of this division.

(4) THIRD DIVISION.—Its duties are similar to those of the First Division, the West constituting the territory assigned to it.

(5) FOURTH DIVISION.—Deals with questions of a technical nature and touching siege warfare (*Festungskrieg*).

(6) **THE RAILWAY DIVISION.**—The sphere of business of this division embraces the preparation of military transports for war; the conduct of military transports in connection with the maneuvers; the transportation of men furloughed from or joining their regiments; the training of officers in the duties pertaining to the military railway system; the examination of projected lines from the military point of view; the collection of statistics of home and foreign railways, as well as all other matters connected with the military railway system.

For the accomplishment of the above outlined tasks there are placed at the disposal of the division, in addition to its regular personnel, fourteen railway commissions, consisting each of an officer and of a civilian engineer, as well as six railway commissioners, who are partly assigned to duty in the division itself and in part with the commissions referred to.

(7) **THE DIVISION OF MILITARY HISTORY.**—This division is employed in connection with the collecting and arranging of all material falling within its province; with a critical description of ancient and modern wars, and the administration of the war archive, and of the library of the Great General Staff.

Here it may not be out of place to say a few words in regard to the war archive, the chief source of the many valuable historical publications which have emanated from the Great General Staff and have contributed in no small degree to its renown throughout the literary world.

This archive is arranged in six medium sized, plainly furnished, but well-lighted rooms on the ground floor of the extensive general staff building. The rooms are en suite, and, although doors connect each with the adjoining hall, all of them are locked except one, so that access to the room farthest removed from the latter can only be had by passing through the other five rooms. The four walls of each of the rooms are lined with wooden shelving (for the reception of the records) extending up to the ceiling, which is 15 feet in height. The doors are of iron.

If an archive must be judged according to its completeness, arrangement, and management, the German war archive need not fear unfavorable criticism in either of these respects, especially when it is considered that the records it contains originated in the field with the General Staffs of divisions, corps, armies, and the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. It is true that since then they have been looked over and, as far as possible, arranged according to the subject of which they respectively treat; and such as contain information that ought to be kept secret have been separated from the others and stored in safe places; but economical considerations have, up to this time, prevented further systematization. Nevertheless the arrangement of the archive is such that every measure, set of instructions, report, and communication that influenced a decision of any sort can be readily traced according to the day and hour of its date; and for this the credit is nearly all due to the organization of the General Staff and to the well-considered business methods which are observed by all parts of the army in the field.

The most interesting feature of these records consists in the fact that they afford the means of tracing from the handwriting the origin and the perfecting of the plans which form the basis of important decisions and decisive events. A general staff such as that of the Prussian-German Army during the campaign of 1870-71 is probably unique in the history of the world. Its training, especially as regards unexpected war situations, is positively phenomenal when we consider the uniformity it has produced in the judging of such situations by the individual members. A certain degree of uniformity is said to be apparent even in the handwriting; and it has been claimed that the handwriting of many General Staff officers reminds one of the plainly formed letters of their late illustrious chief, von Moltke.

Misunderstandings, a not infrequent cause of disaster, were guarded against, not only by the terse and clear style that characterizes all the instructions, but by the distinct manner

in which words descriptive of persons, time, and places were written out. The intelligence system must have been well-nigh perfect, and affords an insight into the comprehensiveness of the mind of von Moltke and of the unison that existed between him and his three principal assistants, among whom von Verny du Vernois may be regarded as the foremost. It fell to the lot of these men to reduce to writing many of the dispositions ordered by von Moltke, and it is interesting to note his emendations of their drafts. They are not numerous, but the considerations of clearness, brevity, and plainness upon which they are based are very striking.

Of course the archive is far from being the deposit of the productions of prominent officers alone; its collections embrace also accounts of the ordinary scout and reconnaissance, which may be traced from its original source through the various commands up to the highest headquarters and back again. Especially valuable for historical purposes are the reports of the troops, their stories of the battles in which they took part and of the manner in which they executed the tasks that were required of them. A double report in every case is on file. The first was transmitted from the field immediately after the event; and under the instructions of von Moltke the other was written after the conclusion of peace, and contains supplementations and corrections.

(8) THE GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL DIVISION.—This division is charged with as exhaustive as possible a compilation of the military geography of all parts of European territory that may become important in connection with the conduct of wars. It also collects geographical and statistical matter that is necessary for general staff work, and has charge of the maps of foreign countries prepared by its personnel.

Each of the above-named divisions is presided over by a chief of the *Haupt* or *Neben Etat* to whom the requisite General Staff officers, officers of *Neben Etat*, or detailed officers, as well as technical assistants (draftsmen, etc.), and one or more registrars are assigned.

(9) THE CHIEF OF SURVEY.—Under the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, the Chief of the Survey conducts and regulates, according to a general plan, the work of the three following divisions subordinated to him, the administrative affairs of which are likewise superintended by him:

(a) *The Trigonometrical Division.*—It is the duty of this division to cover Prussia and several of the German Federal States with a network of principal triangulation, and to carry out a complete triangulation of the same, as well as to prepare for the general topographic survey of said States and, if desired, for that of the adjacent German territory.

(b) *The Topographical Division* carries on the topographical survey of Prussia and of those German Federal States with which military conventions exist.

(c) *The Cartographical Division.*—This division, which embraces the printing establishment and the photographic institute, is charged with the preparation and the correcting of the general staff maps. It also prepares other maps and does the printing required for military purposes.

*The Map Room.*—All maps are preserved in and issued from the map room (*Plan Kammer*), which is under the charge of a retired officer as inspector, who is assisted by a registrar.

Each of the above named divisions of the Survey is under the charge of a chief of division of the *Neben Etat*, to whom are assigned, besides the directors of surveying, officers of the *Neben Etat*, and detailed officers, a number of registrars, civil functionaries, and technical assistants (trigonometers, topographers, cartographers, engravers on copper, lithographers, photographers, printers, etc.).

Each chief of division of the Great General Staff, placed under a superior quartermaster primarily, submits all cases to his immediate superior, but may be required, particularly when a question is to be decided which he has made the subject of special study, to attend

the latter at his regular interview (*Vortrag*)\* with the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

The chiefs of the division of military history and of the survey department report directly to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

The Great General Staff (*Haupt* and *Neben Etat*) is quartered in a very large and substantially constructed building, which is situated in one of the most beautiful parts of Berlin, outside of and a short distance from the historic Brandenburger gate, and covers an entire square. The General Staff officers have separate office rooms, which are comfortably, though plainly furnished. A handsome and extensive suite of rooms is set apart for the private residence of the Chief of the General Staff. In these the late General von Moltke ended his days, although, as has been already stated, his official connection with the General Staff had ceased some years prior to his death.

**SPECIAL DUTIES OF THE GENERAL STAFF.**—Among the special duties of the General Staff may be enumerated the following:

(1) It supplies a considerable number of officers to the War Academy as instructors, and to the superior military examination committee as members.

(2) It conducts the General Staff practice tours, and carries on reconnoissances, in both of which its officers take part.

**THE GENERAL STAFF PRACTICE TOURS.**—The subject of these staff tours deserves more extended notice. They are distinguished as the Great General Staff, the Corps General Staff, and the Fortress General Staff tours; and, as regards commencement, duration, and extent, are regulated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army within the limits of the means provided by the appropriation act and subject to special regulations approved by the Emperor. They are made by officers, under the leadership of a General Staff officer of rank; their object being to train the former—a definite “war situation” being assumed in every case—in quickly determining upon tactical requirements from a correct judgment of the *terrain*. A favorite *modus operandi* is for the leader to designate two officers as commanders or chiefs of staff of two supposititious opposing corps, the other officers acting as general staff officers of the advance guards, as intendants, commanders of the artillery, of the train, etc. Each officer has a task given him every morning, the manner of performance of which is discussed by the leader in presence of all the participants in the evening. The “situation,” as determined by this general discussion, serves as a basis for the next day’s operations. By the judicious conduct of a practice tour the officer participating in it is compelled to apply his general views on the science of war to concrete cases, and is practiced in forming and formulating quick decisions, such as are constantly called for in actual warfare.

**GREAT GENERAL STAFF TOURS.**—The majority of the officers who take part in General Staff practice tours conducted by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army are officers of the Great General Staff; but two generals, two regimental commanders, and a few general staff officers attached to the troops may be required to participate in them.

For purposes connected with the sheltering, subsistence, etc., of the party, two non-commissioned officers and four privates of cavalry, all mounted, are taken along, and orderly duty, etc., is performed by a detachment of infantry consisting of a noncommissioned officer and five men. The duration of a tour depends upon the “general idea,” as well as upon the available means, but ordinarily lasts about twenty-one days. Special allowances are authorized, sufficient in amount to cover the extra outlays entailed by the tour. Under certain circumstances the officers, their servants, and escort may be billeted in private houses. The necessary wagons for the transportation of the officers’ baggage,

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\*“*Vortragen*,” to carry before, to present, and “*Vortrag*,” presentation, proposal, are terms much in vogue in German governmental circles. They signify the submission by an inferior to his superior of questions requiring the latter’s decision. The higher functionaries set apart certain hours for hearing of such “*Vorträge*.”

papers, instrument, etc., accompany the party. The regulations for sheltering, etc., the participants in the corps and fortress general staff tours are similar.

**CORPS GENERAL STAFF TOURS.**—As a rule, practice tours are annually organized for nine army corps under the leadership of the chiefs of the General Staff thereof. The detail of the officers who are to take part in them devolves upon the commanding general, for whose guidance the following principles are laid down:

(1) All General Staff officers serving in the corps district, including those on duty in the fortresses situated therein, are to be detailed.

(2) One official of the intendantur accompanies the party.

(3) From the "front" (*i. e.*, regiments, battalions, etc.) officers are detailed at the rate of one for every sixteen companies of each arm, including the special arms. From two to three of the officers so detailed should be field officers, and the remainder captains and lieutenants in about equal number.

(4) The general inspection of the system of military education and training may designate, not to exceed four, instructors of war schools or of the selecta of the principal cadet institute for participation in these tours, which, as a rule, do not extend beyond the limits of the corps district.

**FORTRESS GENERAL STAFF TOURS.**—As a rule such a tour is annually organized by one army corps. The participants consist of—

(a) *The leaders*, namely:

The Chief of the General Staff of the Corps.

One field officer of the General Staff.

One field officer of the foot artillery.

One field officer of the engineer corps.

One intendant.

(b) *The party designated for the attack*, to wit:

One field officer of the General Staff as commander.

One captain of the General Staff.

One junior field officer or captain, and—

One lieutenant of foot artillery.

One junior field officer or captain, and—

One lieutenant of the engineer corps.

One captain or lieutenant of pioneers.

One captain and one lieutenant of infantry.

(c) *The party designated for the defense*, namely:

One field officer of the General Staff as commander.

One captain of the General Staff.

One junior field officer or captain, and—

One lieutenant of foot artillery.

One junior field officer or captain, and—

One lieutenant of the engineer corps.

One captain and one lieutenant of infantry.

(d) *One officer*—instructor of a war school or of the selecta of the principal cadet institute.

As far as practicable, the officers are selected from the staffs and troops of the garrison of the fortress concerned.

**DETAIL (*Kommando*) TO THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF.**—It has been already stated that about 60 first lieutenants are annually on April 1 detailed for duty with the Great General Staff for one year. The great majority of these are men who have passed through and maintained

a high standing at the War Academy, but, although meritorious officers of all branches and arms may freely compete for entrance to that institution, the fact is recognized—fine, soldierly qualities being deemed of paramount importance in making selections for the General Staff—that there may be regimental officers who for some reason have not taken the academic course and who yet would make valuable General Staff officers. Accordingly commanding generals submit yearly a list of officers of this class belonging to their command, their action being based largely upon the judgment of regimental commanders, and also upon that of the chiefs of the General Staff whenever the candidates have been under the observation of the latter during the corps general staff practice tours. This year 17 officers were so recommended for detail to the Great General Staff. With the view of testing his fitness for said detail, each one of these received shortly afterwards at his station a tactical problem, for the working out of which four hours were allowed him.

✓ APPOINTMENT TO THE GENERAL STAFF.—It is plain, then, that every effort is put forth to get for the General Staff the very best material the army in all its branches affords; hence it is not surprising that hardly anything is more highly prized in peace time by the average subaltern than such an appointment. Indeed, the General Staff uniform, rendered very conspicuous by the broad red stripes on the sides of the trousers, may be said without exaggeration to be a sure indication of the mental and professional superiority of the wearer.\* It is not the honor alone, however, that makes such an appointment desirable, for the appointee is also favored with more rapid promotion than his brethren of the line. The transfer † of lieutenants to the General Staff, which is coincident with their promotion to a captaincy, the lowest grade therein, is usually timed so as to take place about two years earlier than their regimental promotion would have occurred. But this is not the only advantage in prospect. As a rule, the newly promoted captains of the General Staff are attached for two years to the Great General Staff in Berlin, after which they serve for one year as junior general staff officers at the headquarters of an army corps. Unless employed upon some duty from which they can not be spared, which rarely happens, captains are at the end of three years returned to the line and for two years given the command of a company (squadron, battery) in the arm from which they entered the General Staff, after which they reenter the latter as majors, attaining this grade at least five years in advance of captains of the line. It is easy to see that in pursuing this course the authorities have a double or, rather, a tripple object in view. In the first place capable and meritorious officers are rewarded and distinguished above their fellows, but the Government is also the gainer in that a number of the higher positions, not merely in the General Staff but in the line as well, are held by comparatively young men of exceptional push, ability, and attainments. Then, too, as has been already intimated, the principle that a member of the General Staff to be efficient as such must be a practical soldier and in complete touch with the troops, is carried out by this periodical relegation of General Staff officers to regimental duty, and on the other hand advantage is taken of such occasions to drop permanently from the General Staff those officers whose staff work has not come up to the standard, as well as those whose fondness for bureau duties has been attended with lack of interest in, or dislike for, military exercises, maneuvers, etc. It thus happens that an officer may not be recalled to the General Staff at the end of his two year's tour as company commander, but even in this comparatively rare case he has outstripped his comrades in promotion by two years. As has been already observed, the seniority rule is very

\* It goes without saying, that the primary object of giving to the General Staff this conspicuous dress is that in the field they may be readily distinguished from other officers and recognized as representatives of the general commanding, and as likely to be fully informed of his plans and views.

† Such transfer is to be carefully distinguished from a detail for duty with the General Staff, which is merely for one year, and constitutes a probationary period.

closely adhered to throughout the entire army in the promotion of field officers; but majors of the General Staff are usually assigned, regardless of their original arm, to the command of a battalion of infantry for one year; they are certain to be so assigned if they show a disposition to become corpulent, to avoid outdoor sports, or, as the Germans aptly express it, evince too great a fondness for the green table (the desk). It is further a principle that is rarely, if ever, departed from—that no one can be advanced to the grade of general who has not been a regimental commander. Accordingly, nearly every field officer of the General Staff hopes to obtain a regiment in due course. Moreover, besides a necessary stepping-stone for higher preferment, a regiment is a command of which any one may well be proud, embracing, as it does, 2,000 men in peace and 3,000 in war time. The officers of the Great General Staff are annually utilized in considerable numbers in connection with the field maneuvers, being assigned to the staffs of the generals appointed to act as umpires on such occasions, and to other duties.

From what has been said, it follows that the General Staff, while unquestionably a *corps d'elite*, is in no sense a close corporation; that it is made up of officers at once scientific and thoroughly practical, and that its members having come from and kept up their intimate connection with the troops, enjoy the respect and confidence of the latter in a high degree. This respect and confidence they possess all the more since they owe their distinction, not to the advantage of birth, wealth, or influence, but solely to their own efforts and merit.

Although the General Staff of the German Army keeps itself well informed in reference to, and has a voice in the location of, fortifications—the conduct of what is termed siege war (*Festungskrieg*) being a subject to the study of which its officers devote considerable attention—it has nothing to do with the construction of them or of the guns constituting their armament, which duties fall, respectively, to the lot of the engineer corps and the foot artillery. Indeed, it is no more concerned with these things than with the armament of the infantry, or the recruitment, equipment, clothing, training, discipline, and organization of the troops of all arms. All these matters fall within its sphere of action only in so far as they affect to a greater or less degree the great problem as to what is necessary to be done in order to produce the best possible results in war. As the life of the German nation may depend upon the proper solution of this problem, we can readily understand why to the General Staff, upon whom it devolves, should be assigned its independent position and comprehensive functions, and why the Government should be at such great pains to concentrate within its ranks the cream of the army.

**THE HIGHER ADJUDANTUR.**—The members of the Higher Adjutantur are selected from those officers who have passed through the War Academy but have not entered the General Staff, or who, as battalion or regimental adjutants, have shown special aptitude for the duties pertaining to it. After serving in the Adjutantur for from three to four years, during which they wear their regimental uniform, they return to another regiment of their arm, generally with an advance in relative rank, which is effected by the dating back of their commissions by a period varying from one to two years. After a two or three years' tour of duty in the line, they become again eligible for detail as adjutants of higher commands. While adjutants these officers are not borne on the strength of any regiment, but are provided for as such in the appropriation act (*Etat*). The brigade and division have each one adjutant, each corps has two (sometimes three) adjutants. The brigade adjutant is either a first lieutenant or captain, the adjutants of divisions and corps are captains or majors. The following is an outline of the duties of adjutants:

Orders, guard, garrison, and regimental duties; returns and reports; personal affairs of officers and men; appointments, promotions, transfers, furloughs, and discharges; recruiting; landwehr business; formation of new organizations; pensions; remounts; military

police; arms and ammunition, and all purely military staff duty not falling to the share of the General Staff. In the absence of General Staff officers, or in the lack of such (as at brigade headquarters), all general staff business devolves upon the adjutants, and in the field they are often called upon to perform general staff duty. Adjutants are also assigned to the number of 65 for duty with the German princes, the positions of these resembling those of aides-de-camp, and 13 are attached to officers of high rank not commanding troops, but filling positions such as those of heads of the general inspections, their rank in these latter positions being that of colonel or lieutenant-colonel. To the staff of the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, there are attached 12 adjutants, the senior of whom is the Adjutant General. He has the rank of a general of infantry (or cavalry, depending upon the arm with which he was most prominently identified during the early part of his military career), and is the chief of the Imperial headquarters, as well as of the military cabinet whose sphere of action, which resembles that of our Adjutant General, has already been described. Except as regards the functions performed in connection with the German princes aforesaid, the position of personal aid-de-camp is unknown in the German service.

**INSPECTION SERVICE.**—There is no Inspector General's Department in the German Army. The composition of the so-called "general inspections" and "inspections" of special arms, and of the "general inspection of the system of military education and training" has been already given. Their function to inspect is incidental only to a more or less extensive authority that is vested in them over the troops or institutions subject to inspection. Thus the pioneer battalions and the foot artillery regiments are subordinated to the corps commanders as regards administration and discipline, and are subject in all other respects to the several pioneer and foot artillery inspections, and these are in turn under the orders of the general inspections. The inspector generals are the highest officers of the special arms, and the inspectors are necessarily the superiors in rank, as well as in authority, of the commanders of the several battalions or regiments constituting their inspections. The inspector general of the military education and training system, a general of infantry, is in like manner the superior of all the heads of the several inspections pertaining to said system.

In the matter of inspections the principle observed as the correct one is, that as each superior is held responsible for the effectiveness of those under him, he is best fitted to be their inspector. The same principle is applied, as will be shown further on, to the administrative departments, the administrative act of the officials of the latter being subject to the scrutiny of the intendantur. In addition to the general inspections and inspections of the special arms and institutions already referred to, all the army corps but one (the guard corps, whose inspector is the Emperor himself) are grouped under the following five army inspections:

*I. Army Inspection—Hanover.*

Inspector General: Field Marshal General Albrecht, Prince of Prussia.  
1st, 2d, 9th, 10th, and 17th army corps.

*II. Army Inspection—Dresden.*

Inspector General: Field Marshal General George, Prince of Saxony.  
5th, 6th, and 12th army corps.

*III. Army Inspection—Berlin.*

Inspector General: Field Marshal General Count von Blumenthal.  
7th, 8th, 11th, and 13th army corps.

*IV. Army Inspection—Munich.*

Inspector General: General of Cavalry Leopold, Prince of Bavaria.  
3d, 4th, and the 1st and 2d Bavarian army corps.

V. *Army Inspection*—Carlsruhe.

Inspector General: General of Cavalry (ranking as field marshal general) Frederick, Grand Duke of Baden.  
14th, 15th, and 16th army corps.

The posts of inspectors general of the army inspections being for the most part honorary ones, bestowed upon princes, inspections are only made upon the order of the Emperor, and, as a rule, at great intervals of time. An officer informed me that during his ten year's service his corps, the 9th, had not been inspected once by the first Army Inspection. An impression prevails that these inspections exercise no particular influence on the army, favorable or otherwise. The real inspections are made by the corps, division, brigade, and regimental commanders; much more importance being attached to the practical instruction of the troops than to anything else. These later inspections take place as follows: On February 1 the regimental commander inspects the men who had joined as recruits the preceding October, and who are "presented to him" as qualified for instruction in the school of the company, battery, or squadron. On May 1 the commander of the brigade inspects the companies, accompanied by the regimental commander; and in June or July the corps commander, attended by the division and brigade commanders, inspects the battalions. In this connection the so-called qualification reports (*Qualifikations-Berichte*) deserves notice. A very minute report upon the habits, personal appearance, official conduct, moral and mental characteristics is made annually (on April 1) of each captain and field officer, and biennially (on the same date) of each subaltern of his command by the regimental commander. The report is forwarded through the proper channels to the commanding general, and is in due time returned to the regimental commander, who at the end of the year or the two years adds to it his comments upon the particular officer for the term mentioned. It thus becomes a continuous one, embracing the entire official career of the officer to whom it refers.

Formal inspections are rare in the German service, but, as frequent spectators at drills and exercises, commanding officers keep themselves well informed of the proficiency of all parts of their command.

Having thus sketched the historical development and the present organization of the General Staff, it remains to give a brief account of an institution with which it is intimately connected, and in which the most of its officers have received their preparatory staff training, to wit, the War Academy.



## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE WAR ACADEMY.

The academy is quartered in a fine building fronting on the "Dorotheen Strasse," and extending through to the street known as "Unter den Linden," and contains, besides the rooms necessary for instructional and administrative purposes, a large, handsomely decorated hall, where a military association corresponding to our United Service Institution holds its meetings; also a mess for officers and living rooms for the director and several other officers.

It is under the immediate command of a lieutenant-general, styled director, and is subordinated, as regards its scientific sphere, to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, in whom is vested also the power of appointing or detailing instructors on the recommendation of the director, ordering officers to the academy for instruction, and relieving them from such duty.

In his management of the institution, the director is assisted by two field officers, the senior of whom acts in his stead when prevented from performing his duties. The junior field officer is the president of a board which, under the direction of the War Ministry, is charged with the administration of the public funds, economic affairs and buildings of the institution, the junior and active member of said board, known as Rendant (accountant), being a civilian official of the military administration, appointed for life by the War Minister. The two field officers form, together with the director, the so-called "directory." They are subordinated to the director, and are the superiors of all soldiers and inferior functionaries of the institution, as well as all officers who are not instructors, these latter being subject only to the control of the director. The office of the academy is under the immediate charge of an adjutant (captain), who is also the custodian of the secret printed regulations and of the records of the institution. Medical attendance is furnished the student officers, their authorized servants, and the lower functionaries (machinists, doorkeepers, janitors, etc.) by a sanitary officer designated by the War Ministry from the garrison of Berlin, who is also the adviser of the director in medico-hygienic matters.

**THE COMMISSION OF STUDIES.**—The commission consists of the director of the academy as president; of several officers of high rank, styled *Referents*, who also perform other duties, and are appointed by the sovereign as members; and of a detailed officer as recorder. They examine and report upon the plans of instruction submitted by the several professors and instructors, recommend individuals for appointment to vacant professorships, determine annually upon a programme and set of problems for the entrance examination of applicants for admission to the academy, pronounce upon the value of the papers prepared at such examinations, as well as upon the proficiency of the student officers at the academy, execute the diplomas of the latter, and watch over the scientific collection. The members of the commission have each an equal vote, the director's vote being decisive in case of a tie.

**THE INSTRUCTORS.**—These are both civilians and officers. Military subjects are taught by the latter, who are selected with the consent of their superiors from the older officers by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army upon the recommendation of the director, and receive an extra compensation for their services. The civilian instructors are appointed for life by the Minister of War upon the recommendation of the director, approved by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. Their advancement to professorships, which is based upon merit, rests with the sovereign.

THE LIBRARY OF THE ACADEMY.—This library, one of the most extensive and best arranged in Germany, is under the charge of a librarian and assistant librarian, both civilian officials of the military administration.

DETAIL.—Upon the recommendation of the commission on studies, based upon the examination papers and the documents accompanying them, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army details annually not to exceed 100 officers for entrance in Class I (the lowest) of the academy.

The detail of student officers is only for one year at a time, and to a certain class, though the complete course, extends through three classes, embracing three successive years, interrupted by vacations of from two to three months between July 1 and October 1.

CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION.—Every lieutenant in good health, of not, as a rule, less than five years' service as an officer, and who is not likely to be promoted to a captaincy for four years, may apply for detail to the academy. His admission is decided upon by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and depends, (1) upon his record, which must show that he is familiar with the practical part of his duties, and has always shown himself to be a practical man; that with a serious desire for a higher scientific training he combines a corresponding capacity; that he is a man of good moral, as well as of strong character, and that his pecuniary affairs are well ordered; and (2) upon the result of the entrance examination.

THE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION is intended to determine (1) whether the applicant is sufficiently advanced in general education and knowledge of special branches of learning to enable him to attend the lectures at the War Academy with profit; and (2) whether his power of discrimination and judgment are such as to give promise of further development. Hence the subjects for the examination are so chosen that the applicant needs for a satisfactory treatment of them not only to draw upon knowledge stored in his memory, but rather to afford him at the same time the opportunity of showing whether he can present his thoughts in a clear, connected, and cogent manner.

THE EXAMINATION embraces, of military branches—tactics, applied tactics, science of arms (*Waffenlehre*), permanent and field fortifications, and topographical surveying, and as regards branches of general science—history, geography, mathematics, and French. The problem in tactics is so stated, that by his solution of it the officer under examination can demonstrate his knowledge of the drill regulations of the three arms, of the firing regulations, and of the regulations governing field duties. It does not go into minute detail, but gives prominence to fundamental principles. The problem in applied tactics is to be as simple as possible, and call for a definite conclusion as well as for the reasons upon which it is based. Only those students who wish to devote themselves to mathematical studies at the academy are required to work out a subject in mathematics, and an examination in French is indispensable only in the case of such as wish to study either that or the Russian language. The examination may include both languages when desired by the officers concerned. The officer's knowledge of French is tested by requiring him to write that language from German dictation. To afford him an opportunity of showing, unhampered and in a thorough going manner, to what extent his scientific attainments and judgment have matured, each officer is besides required to work out at his home one of the subjects embraced in the programme. The thesis may be written either in French or German, can not exceed five half sheets—the other half of each sheet being left blank—and must be accompanied by a certificate that it has been prepared without the aid of others. Works that have been consulted must be specified, and verbal extracts therefrom placed between quotation marks.

EXAMINATION PROGRAMME.—At the beginning of October of each year the commission on studies prepares a programme for the entrance examination which, as regards historical subjects, indicates the era or century and as regards geographical subjects, the division of

the earth to which they are to refer respectively. The programme also outlines a number of the subjects to be worked out at home. The programme is submitted to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, who transmits it, prior to December 1—indicating a date for the simultaneous commencement of the examination, as a rule the middle of March—to the generals commanding army corps, to the superior authorities of special arms (*Obersten Waffeninstanzen*), the inspection of the infantry and war schools, the headquarters of the cadet corps, and the Imperial Admiralty.

EXAMINATION PROCEEDINGS.—The examination—exclusively a written one—is held at the headquarters of each army corps, for all officers within the corps district, by a commission appointed by the commanding general, and consisting of the Chief of the General Staff as president, and several field officers or captains as members, to whom the subjects as well as the outlines for the tactical problems are transmitted by the director of the academy. Every officer who has been authorized to appear for examination before the commission hands to it:

(a) A duplicate autobiography (one copy in German and the other in a foreign language), which must show how and where he has been educated and how he prepared himself for the ensign and officer examinations.

(b) A self-prepared plan of a battle, with contours and mezzotinto, intended as a specimen of his skill in plan drawing; it must not exceed 8 x 3½ inches in size, and be drawn according to the regulations of the survey on a scale of 1:25,000.

(c) An essay on one of the subjects outlined by the commission on studies.

(d) A declaration whether he wishes to take the mathematical course or apply himself to the study of either the French or Russian language at the academy.

Each of the subjects to be worked out under the supervision of the commission is handed to the officers on the day, in the order, and at the particular time fixed in the programme, together with a statement of the time allowed for the completion of it. The work must be delivered within the prescribed limit of time to the commission, which endorses on it the period actually devoted to it. The use of printed or written matter other than a French dictionary and tables of logarithms is prohibited.

The Chief of the General Staff of the corps furnishes to the director of the academy an abstract of the result of the examination, accompanied by the biographies, the plans and other work, the military records, and the declarations as to election of studies of the officers examined.

THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION (*Lehrgang*).—The course of instruction prescribed by Gen. von Moltke in 1888, shortly before his retirement, has been but slightly modified since. My translation of it, in which these modifications were noted, is already in possession of the information division; but it may not be amiss to repeat here the introductory remarks as explanatory of the methods and of the scope of the instruction given at the academy.

After referring to the object of the institution, which is thus defined in the academy regulations, "The War Academy has for its object the instruction of a number of qualified officers of the army in the higher branches of military science, and thus to deepen and extend their military knowledge and to clear and sharpen their judgment. In connection with this strictly professional training, the academy is intended to afford the opportunity for exploring particular branches of the formal sciences and for acquiring skill in speaking and writing several modern languages," Gen. von Moltke declares that the course of instruction must aim at a thorough professional education and not lose itself in the wide field of general scientific studies, and then proceeds as follows:

"It is, nevertheless, to be remembered that a sound, formal education is the indispensable prerequisite of a thorough military education. The deepening of the former, as well as the strengthening of the power of discrimination and judgment must therefore go hand in hand with the purely military studies."

Accordingly, the first course of instruction at the War Academy is based upon knowledge acquired in the cadet corps, the war schools, the artillery and engineer school, and as regards subjects of general science, upon the gymnasia. But a mere repetition of what is already known, with the view of refreshing the memory, is not sufficient. As the whole course aims at a higher training, it must develop itself independently, and free from all school-room like compulsion.

It is of special importance to such a course that the practical experience of the student officer, acquired during at least five years' service, may in some respects be made a suitable starting point for the lectures.

THE METHOD OF INSTRUCTION.—The lecture at the academy, starting from the simple and easy, primarily confirms and enlarges knowledge already gained. In regular sequence it then leads up to a higher plane, its ultimate aim being to fit the officer for any service war may require of him. The instruction in the formal sciences and the military branches can not be conducted on precisely the same lines. While in the cases of the former, a lecture which addresses itself simply to the apprehension and memory of the hearer answers every purpose, it is of the first importance, as regards the *military* subjects, that he should not only understand and remember them, but know how to apply what has been taught him. It is equally essential that there be established between teacher and pupil a lively mental intercourse, impelling the latter to assist in the work. Such an interchange of thought, impossible where the one only lectures and the other only listens, naturally results from a combination of lucid exposition with exercise in applying what has been learned to particular cases (the so-called applicatory method).

The purely military lectures are therefore to be interspersed, whenever possible, with practical examples, the details of which are illustrated on plans and maps. Opportunity will also be afforded here to induce student officers to deliver now and then addresses, which must be carefully prepared, and calculated to develop original investigation. The subjects of such addresses should be military, to the exclusion of purely scientific speculations.

Participation of the officers in independent work of this kind is not as a rule to be obligatory. Outlines of contemplated addresses are submitted to and examined by the instructors, who are thus enabled to guide and cooperate with the officers delivering them, and afforded the means of pointing out erroneous propositions that may be advanced.

Such addresses, as well as the solution during academic hours of written problems which will be given out occasionally, are likely on the one hand to stimulate the officers to cooperate in the work and to broaden their views, and on the other to acquaint the instructors with the mental caliber of the latter, as well as with the degree of success that has attended their own labors. Apart from the problems given out toward the end of the third year's course, work at home is to be exceptional and voluntary.

The instructors will have accomplished their task if they succeed in so developing the mental power of the officers that they enter upon the course of the next higher class with an awakened activity. For the War Academy is not intended to impart a fragmentary and disconnected knowledge, but must so proceed that from truths of which they have already become conscious, the officers themselves recognize the necessity for each new branch of instruction.

THE SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION.—The scope of instruction shall embrace only such branches as are indispensable to the aims of the War Academy. An overtaxing of the officers would have a paralyzing effect and lessen their desire to cooperate with the instructors in the performance of original work.

The same would result from every rule which tends to cramp teachers and students in the fulfillment of their several tasks, and to give to the instruction a school-like character, and one at variance with its high aims.

His remarks defining the object and scope of the lectures on the several subjects are not, therefore, intended, Gen. von Moltke goes on to say, to restrict instructors in the free shaping of their lectures, but rather to map out in very general outlines the range of the several departments, and to insure concert of action in the common endeavor to reach the prescribed goal.

Within the scope of the plan of instruction,\* instructors are therefore given full control of their time; they themselves must judge on what occasions the form of a continuing lecture is to be adopted, and when the lecture may be advantageously interrupted by the application of principles to concrete cases, and by questions.

The officers are obliged to attend all the lectures of their respective classes, except that they have the choice (which must, however, have been made at the entrance examination) between the study of the mathematical sciences† and that of one of the two languages (Russian and French) that are taught.

THE SCOPE OF GENERAL SUBJECTS.—The subjects regarded as most important of all and to which the greatest time is devoted are tactics and military history, and concerning these and the “duties of the general staff” Gen. von Moltke’s instructions are in effect as follows:

*Tactics.*—It is the object of the tactical instruction, the paramount importance of which must not be lost sight of, (1) to impart to the officers a knowledge of the tactical regulations of our own and that of the neighboring great armies, and (2) to familiarize them with the great diversity of the conditions of modern combat by instruction and by the solution of problems.

Four hours a week are allotted to the tactical instruction of Class I, which in its formal part comprises, (a) the historical development of the army organization and tactical forms in its general outlines; (b) the drill, field service, and firing regulations, so far as they are applicable to the handling of troops in the field; (c) a thorough exposition of the recognized forms of combat of the great European armies of to-day.

*Pari passu* with this formal part, the officers will be called upon to illustrate the German Army rules touching marches, combats, and rests within the compass of a smaller detachment, special weight being attached to the cooperation and mutual support of the troops of the various arms that constitute it.‡

Only applied tactics will be taught during the second and third year’s courses (four hours a week being set apart for Class II, and two hours for Class III). While in Class II the tasks of the infantry and the cavalry division, particularly as regards the issuing of orders and the conduct of combats are to be thoroughly considered, the instruction of Class III will embrace the action of the army corps as the constituent of an independent army.

The instructor should always endeavor to make his lectures interesting by illustrations and by exercises on the map and outdoors. In this he will be successful in proportion as he utilizes the experiences of modern and of recent wars.

*Military History (Kriegsgeschichte).*—Lectures on military history offer the most effective means of teaching war during peace, and of awakening an interest in the study of

\*Every teacher is required to submit his plan of instruction through “the commission on studies” to the directory.

†This term embraces mathematics, physics, chemistry, physical geography, and geodesy. Less than one-third of the detailed officers take the mathematical course.

‡This is effected by questions propounded by the instructor. For example, at one of the tactical lectures at the War Academy, which I had the privilege of attending, the lecturer, who had for his subject the debarkation of a German Army corps on the Russian frontier in the immediate vicinity of a suppositious hostile army, called upon one of the students, each of whom had a map spread out before him, to frame the orders the commander of one of the divisions might properly send to each brigade upon its arrival at a certain point.

important campaigns. They should exhibit the relations in which the immutable and fundamental principles of good generalship stand to the ever changing tactical forms, and place in the proper light the influence upon the course of operations of eminent characters and of moral force, as compared with that of material resources. While avoiding a monotonous description of loosely jointed military events, the lectures should consider operations as to their causes and connections, concern themselves with troop leading, and represent the views of war peculiar to each age. They will become specially valuable if they bring into play the judgment, and thus secure the cooperation of the officers. This judgment must not, however, degenerate into carping criticism but take the form of definite suggestions of measures and decisions.

The campaigns of Frederick the Great; those of the French Revolution, and of Napoleon I; those of the subsequent period, notably that of William I, will form the several subjects of the lectures to the three classes.

*General Staff Duties and Practice Tour.*—The lectures under this head, for which four hours in Class III are set apart weekly, deal with the functions in peace and war of the General Staff as a body, and of the General Staff officer as an individual, and embrace in any order that may be determined upon by the instructor:

- (1) The historic development of the General Staff.
- (2) The corresponding provisions in other great States.
- (3) The organization of the army as determined by the federal constitution, military laws, and conventions.
- (4) The office work of the General Staff officer in its general lines, the preparations for maneuvers and mobilization, and the various constituent parts of the mobile army.
- (5) Railways and *Etappen*.
- (6) The functions of a General Staff officer in the field, especially his position toward the commanding general, and its requirements.
- (7) The supply of the army in peace and war; the personnel, resources, means, and methods of the supply department.

The war strength and the composition of the armies of the great powers on our border.

The practice tour, which terminates the course of instruction, offers the opportunity of testing the talents, knowledge, performance, and endurance of each officer. The decisions of the higher commander and the General Staff officer's share in his dispositions will be illustrated upon the basis of simple, general, and special ideas, which, as a rule, the leader will enounce. For this purpose it will be expedient to form two sides, the supposed strength of each of which should generally not exceed a mobilized infantry division. Formal tasks, by which skill in the framing of orders and knowledge of the various departments of the army are promoted, should alternate with the discussion of tactical situations, the analyzation of dispositions according to their effect upon the troops, and finally, with a general deliberation upon the state of the war or combat. Each participant in the tour should in the course of it be given the opportunity of solving as many as possible of such and similar problems.

While in the main the tour will be conducted according to the plan of the General Staff tours, some deviation therefrom, such as the division of each class into sections—each under the charge of a General Staff officer—will be necessary, owing to the greater number of persons who take part in it. Though the officers in charge of the sections will be given the largest possible latitude, they are nevertheless bound by the general dispositions and the division of time of the leader.

The first few days it will be found useful to combine exercises in field sketching with examinations of the country from tactical points of view. In the further course of the tour

there will be opportunity for testing the physical qualities and the endurance of the participants by a gradual increase of the work required of them. On the other hand, the chiefs of sections and the leader have it in their power to ease upon them by letting them solve problems in the saddle instead of at the end of the day's march. Upon the conclusion of the tour the leader will hand to the director of the War Academy a report on the qualifications of each officer, specifying (without implying that he is not fitted for other lines of work not mentioned) whether he is suited for—

- (a) An instructorship at a cadet or war school, or
- (b) The Higher Adjutantur, or
- (c) The General Staff.

The recommendation for the General Staff includes the two departments first mentioned.

APPORTIONMENT OF STUDIES.—The subjoined tabular statement shows the apportionment of the various subjects among the several classes:

CLASS I.		CLASS II.		CLASS III.	
	Hours Weekly.		Hours weekly.		Hours weekly.
1. Tactics .....	4	1. Tactics .....	4	1. Tactics .....	2
2. Military history .....	3	2. Military history .....	4	2. Military history .....	4
3. History of ancient military systems .....	1	3. Means of communication .....	2	3. Duties of the General Staff .....	4
4. Science of arms .....	3	4. Military surveying .....	2	4. Siege war .....	3
5. Fortifications .....	3	5. Military law .....	1	5. Municipal and international law, state administration .....	2
6. History .....	3	6. Military hygiene .....	1	6. Mathematics .....	3 } -or } 6
7. Physical geography .....	2	7. Military geography .....	2	7. Geodesy .....	3 } -or } 6
8. Mathematics .....	4 } -or } 8	8. History .....	3	8. French .....	6 or
9. Physics .....	2	9. Mathematics .....	4 } -or } 6	9. Russian .....	6
10. General geography .....	2 and	10. Chemistry .....	2 } -or } 6		
11. French .....	6 or	11. French .....	6 or		
12. Russian .....	6	12. Russian .....	6		
	25		25		21
The choice here lies between the mathematical sciences on the one hand and general geography and one of the languages on the other.		The choice here lies between the mathematical sciences and one of the languages.		The choice lies between the mathematical sciences and one of the languages.	

CLASSES, LECTURES.—The student officers of the three annual courses (*Jahrgänge*) form a class which is divided into two sections. The lectures for all classes commence on October 1, and end on June 30; their scope and method is determined by the course of instruction. In order that the lectures may be practically illustrated, the student officers visit the various artillery workshops and manufacturing establishments in Berlin and Spandau, as well as the fortifications of the latter town, and witness the exercise of the railway troops. The theoretical instruction in tactics, fortifications, the transport service, and topographical surveying is followed by practical exercises, conducted by the instructors in the several subjects named. Immediately upon the conclusion of the lectures in Class III, the members of each of the sections thereof make a practice tour similar to the General Staff tours, under the conduct of their respective instructors in the duties of the General Staff.

EXAMINATIONS.—In order that a reliable estimate may be obtained of the degree to which the student officers have profited by the lectures, each one is subjected to a written examination before the end of the school year, upon which a valuation is placed by the lecturers. These examinations are intended at the same time to furnish to the members of the commission on studies\* a basis for their final judgment of the aggregate results. The officers

\*The examination papers on the several subjects are distributed for review among the members of the commission.

belonging to Class III are required to work out in their own homes larger subjects in military history and in siege war (*Festungskrieg*); every other part of the concluding examination is carried on under supervision (*Klausur*), the director deciding how far books of reference may be used. The final practice tour constitutes the examination in "the duties of the General Staff."

CONDITIONS OF TRANSFER TO A HIGHER CLASS.—The transfer of an officer to a higher class at the end of the year's course and his continuance at the institution, depend upon his deportment while on and off duty and upon his performance at the examination, which must show that he can follow the lectures of the next higher plane of instruction intelligently and successfully.

SERVICE WITH OTHER ARMS.—During the interval between July 1, and October 1, student officers are attached for instruction to arms as follows:

Infantry officers of Class I to a field artillery regiment, and those of Class II to a cavalry regiment of their own corps.

Cavalry officers of Class I to a field artillery regiment, and those of Class II to an infantry regiment of the Guard or 3d corps.

Artillery officers of Class I to an infantry regiment, and those of Class II to a cavalry regiment of their own corps.

Engineer officers of Class I to an infantry regiment, and those of Class II to a cavalry regiment of the 4th corps.

In these cases of cavalry and engineer officers, the above rule is so far modified as to require their attachment to a regiment of their own corps in years when the latter participates in the great autumnal maneuvers before the Emperor. The attached officers are liable only to such service as promotes the object of their attachment—the acquiring of knowledge of an arm other than their own. Of the extent to which they have profited by the instruction, a report is rendered by the commanding officer of the organization to which they were attached.

RETURN TO THE REGIMENT; DIPLOMAS; SPECIAL REPORTS.—On the completion of the three years' course, including the practice tour, all student officers return to their regiment and receive a diploma (*Abgangs-Zeugnis*), which is signed by the members of the directory and the commission on studies, and in which their proficiency in the several subjects is set forth in detail. The director transmits the diplomas to the graduates through the commanding general of their corps, to the general inspection, etc. An officer of marked proficiency may be recommended for special consideration by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, or he may be mentioned in the annual report of the director as worthy of special distinction by the sovereign. In special reports, not intended for the eyes of the student officers, the director is required to express an opinion whether, and in what degree, they are severally fitted for a detail to the General Staff, the trigonometric or topographical division of the survey, the Higher Adjudantur, or as instructors; also whether they are qualified for several of the branches of duty named. A recommendation for a detail to the General Staff always embraces a recommendation for one to the Adjudantur. The reports, which must show for what length of time and with what success the officers concerned have served with other arms, are submitted to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army in regard to all student officers, and to the commanding generals in regard to the officers belonging to their respective corps.

RELIEF FROM THE DETAIL AT THE WAR ACADEMY.—Officers whose continuance at the academy is not likely to be attended with the desired result may be relieved from the detail by the Chief of the General Staff upon the recommendation of the director.