

I. INTRODUCTION

Military History is the account of how force served political ends and how man, individual hero or leader or aggregated professionals, conscripts, or irregulars, accomplished this service.¹

—Colonel F. B. Nihart, USMC, *Military Affairs*

The study of military history has always been important to soldiers. General of the Army George C. Marshall, while he was a colonel at the Infantry School before World War II, directed the writing of a series of case studies that were published as *Infantry in Battle*. Years later, in 1971, the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, formed an ad hoc committee to determine the need for the study of military history in the Army. The committee's review determined that there continued to be a need for military history studies and made several recommendations concerning incorporating history into the officer education program. The committee's recommendations also resulted in the publication of *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*.²

In this regard, the staff ride provides an excellent methodology for the application of military history because it offers a detailed program of study for campaigns and battles. The unique aspect of the staff ride is that, after classroom work, the campaign or battle study includes a visit to the battlefield site. After the battlefield visit, there is a final period of instruction that synthesizes the information learned during the preliminary classroom studies and the field visit.

Since the early twentieth century, staff rides have been an important tool in the U.S. Army to train leaders. Army staff rides were first implemented in 1906 as a formal part of the education of officers at the General Service and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In that year, Major Eben Swift led a small contingent of students to Chattanooga, Tennessee, to study the 1864 Atlanta campaign.³ Since 1906, the staff ride has remained an important part of formal military education programs.

Staff rides are also an integral part of informal programs conducted as home station training. Units often sponsor staff rides as part of their officer and noncommissioned officer development programs. The staff ride remains relevant to the study of military history because it permits students to become familiar with a campaign or battle and to conduct an analysis of the engagement(s) at the actual locations where key events happened.

Finally, the staff ride promotes critical thought about the actions surrounding a particular aspect of military history.

Staff rides are simple to incorporate into many types of unit training programs. Through a historical analysis of a commander's use of terrain, maneuver, and the decision-making process during the extreme stress of battle, a class of officers and NCOs can hone their leadership abilities. Because trainers and students often confuse staff rides with other types of training events that include battlefield visits or terrain analysis at a field site, it is important to define what a staff ride is, as well as some of the other terms commonly used to describe the study and analysis of battles and campaigns.

The terms "staff ride," "historical battlefield tour," and "tactical exercise without troops (TEWT)" are the most commonly confused or misused terms when describing the activities that organizations perform in the conduct of training at a battlefield. Dr. William G. Robertson, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, in his pamphlet, *The Staff Ride*, has developed definitions for these terms. This study will use Robertson's definitions.

A staff ride is an event that

. . . consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. It envisions maximum student involvement before arrival at the site to guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. A staff ride thus links a historical event, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions. It consists of three distinct phases: preliminary study, field study, and integration.⁴

Historical battlefield tours, in contrast, are visits to battlefields or campaign sites that do not include preliminary study. Such historical battlefield tours, led by an expert, can stimulate thought and promote student discussion, but they will be limited by the students' lack of systematic preparation. TEWTs, for their part, utilize hypothetical scenarios that are played out on actual terrain and involve the employment of current doctrinal concepts. During TEWTs, terrain and doctrine, rather than history, are the instructional vehicles.⁵

There are many battlefields throughout the United States that support the development and conduct of staff rides. The preferences, goals, and

resources of those developing the staff ride determine the battlefield to use. Many of the sites have easy access because they are open to the public and are part of permanently established state or national parks. Other locations may be on privately owned land and require coordination with the owners for approval to visit the site. The available sites span the spectrum of American eighteenth- and nineteenth-century warfare. Many staff ride sites for Revolutionary War and Civil War battles are available to the public. In addition to these locations, there are also Indian War battlefields available. Overseas U.S. units (particularly in Europe or Korea) can often develop staff rides for locations in their areas.

This handbook describes a staff ride for the Tippecanoe battlefield at Battle Ground, Indiana. The field study phase of the staff ride covers the 7 November 1811 battle between the Shawnee-led Indian confederacy and U.S. forces commanded by General William Henry Harrison. A staff ride of the Tippecanoe campaign allows one to examine many lessons that still apply to twentieth-century military operations, especially in the realm of operations other than war. A critical analysis of the centers of gravity, decision points, force protection measures, and methods of battlefield leadership that were important almost 190 years ago will provide insight into notions of how to think and make decisions that are still relevant for today's officers.

Students of the military art often overlook the Battle of Tippecanoe because it occurred for the United States between the American Revolution and the War of 1812. The campaign is nonetheless important because it was a critical step that helped the new country establish dominance over the American northwest, where continuing tensions existed among the Americans, Indians, and remaining British in the area. (The War of 1812 eventually forced a resolution to the political and military struggles in this part of America.) The Battle of Tippecanoe, moreover, served as a precursor to the types of political and military activities that happened in the territory during the War of 1812.⁶ Henry Adams, who has written extensively about early U.S. history, called the Battle of Tippecanoe “a premature outbreak of the great wars of 1812.”⁷

The organization of this staff ride provides the participant with background information about events that led to the battle, and not just what happened at the battle site. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relationships and treaty obligations among the United States and various Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory and the American northwest from the late eighteenth century through the War of 1812. Chapter 3 describes the

Tippecanoe campaign. Chapter 4 describes the important battlefield activities at Tippecanoe. The suggested route of the staff ride, battlefield vignettes, and discussion points make up chapter 5. The attached appendices provide information about casualties, meteorological data, biographical sketches, tactics, doctrine, and how nineteenth-century Americans and Indians organized for battle.

Notes

1. F. B. Nihart, *Military Affairs*, as quoted in Robert Heintz, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 149.
2. E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley, *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1982), ix–x.
3. William G. Robertson, Edward P. Shanahan, John I. Boxberger, and George E. Knapp, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18–20 September 1863* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), ix.
4. William G. Robertson, *The Staff Ride* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), 5.
5. *Ibid.*, 5.
6. Alfred Pirtle, *The Battle of Tippecanoe* (Louisville, KY: John P. Morton and Co., 1900), xviii.
7. Henry Adams, *History of the United States of America During the Administration of James Madison*, ed., E. N. Harbert, 3d ed. (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1986), 342.

II. EXPANSION INTO THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY

. . . the opinion of Mr. Jefferson on the subject, went so far as to assert a claim of the United States as lords paramount to the lands of all extinguished or decayed tribes, to the exclusion of all recent settlers.¹

—Governor William Henry Harrison,
Letter to the Secretary of War, William Eustis

To understand fully the context of the Tippecanoe campaign, it is important to consider how the United States developed her claims to the areas that made up the Northwest Territory. It is also important to review America's relationship with the Indian tribes in the area. These issues are important because the Battle of Tippecanoe resulted from American attempts to settle new areas in the northwest and from Indian attempts to prevent that expansion.

During the eighteenth century, three European countries competed for and claimed rights of control over territory in North America: Spain, France, and Britain. Great Britain eventually gained the rights to Canada and most of the French territory east of the Mississippi River upon the conclusion of the French and Indian War in 1763. Control of the immense area was important because of the vast revenues gained from the fur trade.²

The fur trade was managed several ways in North America. In addition to private ventures, governments also owned or sponsored trading posts in an area and bartered directly with individual Indians or Indian tribes for furs. As a result, the first traders dramatically improved the quality of life of the Indians with whom they came into contact. With the advent of the traders, iron, steel, and firearms were introduced that supplemented or replaced traditional Indian tools and weapons made of bone, wood, or stone. These new technologies allowed the Indians to improve their hunting ability and to produce items important in sustaining a higher (by European standards) quality of life. But as their lifestyle changed, the Indians became more dependent on the resources gained through trade and came to rely on particular governments for trade. Political consequences arose out of these relationships. One eventual consequence was that a government could demand allegiance from an Indian tribe that was its trading partner, a frequent occurrence during the various wars in North America.³

During the period between the French and Indian War and the Revolutionary War, the British made an effort to reorganize their territory

in North America. On 7 October 1763, the British issued a Royal Proclamation regulating the governmental organization of the colonies and separating the colonists and the Indians. The proclamation established colonial boundaries and created a vast interior region under the jurisdiction of the government in Great Britain. The western limit of the colonial area ran generally along the Appalachian crest from eastern Florida to Quebec. This western limit became known as the "Proclamation Line."⁴

The Proclamation Line provided for the separation of the colonists and the Indians by prohibiting colonial governments from purchasing land or establishing new settlements in areas west of the line. Meanwhile, the royal government in Britain would manage activities with the Indians in the interior.⁵ Although there were eventually modifications to the boundary, the Proclamation Line was generally in effect until the American Revolution.

Even though the British government attempted to prevent friction on the frontier by separating the Indians and the colonists, disputes continued and culminated in major outbreaks of violence. One such occurrence was the 10 October 1774 battle between Shawnee Indians and the militia forces at the white settlement at Point Pleasant (in future West Virginia). The day-long battle resulted in the Treaty of Camp Charlotte, which gave the settlers control of the area that would eventually become Kentucky and established the Indian-white boundary at the Ohio River.⁶

Within a year, the American Revolution was under way. Even more so than the Camp Charlotte treaty and other previous agreements, the Revolutionary War had many unexpected consequences regarding Indian lands in the area set aside under the 1763 Royal Proclamation. The 1783 Treaty of Paris that ended the American Revolution defined the western boundary of the new American republic as the Mississippi River. It also gave the United States all former British possessions from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, southwest through the Great Lakes, to the Mississippi River. The United States now controlled the area in which the British had prohibited new settlements under the 1763 Royal Proclamation. After the Treaty of Paris, the Indians theoretically retained title to the land set aside under the proclamation; however, the United States government viewed these Indians (many of whom were allied with Great Britain during the Revolutionary War) as a conquered people with few rights.⁷

The political dynamics that developed as a result of alliances formed during the Revolution continued to influence frontier events after the war.

Most of the Woodland Indian tribes⁸ allied themselves with the British during the war. The Indians viewed the Americans as their enemies, rather than the British, because the British were more generous with trade goods, and the settlers encroached on Indian areas.⁹ Thus, in their efforts to prevent expansion of the new republic, the British continued to support their former Indian allies during the post-Revolution period.

The political traditions of the United States and the Indian tribes were distinctly different, and the accompanying confusion that these differences caused resulted in frequent problems and misunderstandings. The United States viewed the various Indian tribes as independent nations who should be dealt with in the same fashion as European nations. Many problems arose because the Indians did not organize themselves politically in ways that American leaders understood. For instance, an Indian tribe was generally a group with common cultural traditions that did not have a central authority to make and enforce political decisions. This was because the tribe included several subgroups (called septs or clans) that were politically semiautonomous.¹⁰

Indian perceptions about land ownership, moreover, also differed from the American point of view. The eighteenth-century northwestern Indian viewed land as a resource to be occupied and used. Once the desired resources were exhausted, the group moved to another area.¹¹ The Indian concept of common use rather than ownership was significantly different from Euro-American concepts that encouraged citizens to amass large tracts of land as symbols of wealth.

Conflict on the frontier between Indians and Americans, therefore, was inevitable because of their different perceptions about one another and the American government's desire to settle the new territory. During the postwar period, the United States planned to establish control over its new territories. Because the Articles of Confederation did not allow Congress to levy taxes, exploitation of the potential wealth in the American northwest provided the United States with a way to pay off the country's large war debt that had resulted from the Revolution.¹² Consequently, the government sponsored expeditions to explore the new areas and provided incentives to individuals to move to the frontier. The Indian tribes' options to maintain their traditional communities and ways of life were few after the Revolution. The tribes could attempt to coexist with the white man, or they could contest American encroachments upon their traditional territory.

Meanwhile, the British maintained a continued interest in the American northwest, seeking to retain their lucrative fur trade in the area bordered by the Mississippi River, Great Lakes, and Ohio River, as well as to protect Canada. Initially, the British wanted an Indian buffer state between British possessions in Canada and the United States. But the final boundaries established by the Treaty of Paris made this impractical because the treaty ceded the buffered area to the United States. To protect their North American interests, the British encouraged the northwestern Indian tribes to resist American expansion and to keep the Americans south of the Ohio River. Indian successes at keeping settlers south of the Ohio would create a de facto Indian buffer state even if a de jure one were impossible.¹³

The Treaty of Paris and the subsequent Jay Treaty allowed the British to maintain existing posts and garrisons on U.S. soil until 1796. Maintenance of these posts allowed the British to continue a profitable fur trade in the area and to control the important trade routes along the Great Lakes. The posts also provided the northwestern Indians with guns, ammunition, and other supplies. As a result of the treaties, the British maintained garrisons at Detroit and Fort Mackinac in Michigan, as well as several others that controlled entrances to the Great Lakes.¹⁴

Engagements with the Indians continued in the American northwest as U.S. forces occupied the new territories and established communities in the unsettled countryside. In 1787, Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, outlining the procedures governing the area that would eventually become Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. The ordinance described the requirements for territorial government and the conditions for statehood in a vast area designated as the Northwest Territory. The ordinance also stated that the area would contain no fewer than three states and no more than five, and it prohibited the invasion of any land that the Indians retained title to except in the case of a lawful war authorized by Congress.¹⁵

The Northwest Ordinance, in addition, formalized the procedures settling the area south of the Great Lakes. Prior to the ordinance, President George Washington tried to develop policies designed to gain control of the Indian titled lands east of the Mississippi. The policy was to make the area attractive to settlers by providing land grants or selling government land at extremely low prices. The growth of the white settlements would also kill off much of the game, thereby making the area unattractive to the Indians. Washington felt that the loss of game coupled with government

inducements would cause the Indians to sell their land to the government in return for better land to the west of the Mississippi. The enticements worked for the settlers, and large numbers of them flocked to the frontier. The Indians, however, desired no land beyond the Mississippi River and insisted that the frontier should remain at the Ohio River.¹⁶ As the Indians resisted white encroachment onto their lands, violence erupted, forcing the president to send a series of military expeditions in an attempt to establish American dominance in the region.

The first military expedition to the Northwest Territory occurred in 1790. After a two-month training period, General Josiah Harmar left Cincinnati with a 1,400-man force. In September 1790, Harmar's force fought engagements with a combined Indian force of Miami, Shawnee, Potawatomi, and Chippewa in the Maumee valley. The Indians, led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, dominated the action and defeated the Americans. After the series of engagements, Harmar's casualties were 183 killed and thirty-one wounded.¹⁷ As a result of the expedition, problems in the territory increased as the Indians gained confidence.

As the Indian harassment increased, Congress voted in 1791 to raise another expedition to deal with the strife in the northwest. The force gathered for the campaign again turned out to be inadequately trained and disciplined. The quality of the soldiers was often poor because enticements to enlist for the campaign were few. The offer of a scant two dollars per month pay usually resulted in the enlistment of men "purchased from prisons, wheelbarrows and brothels."¹⁸

The army, organized in March 1791, consisted of about 1,400 men, with General Arthur St. Clair commanding. St. Clair's expeditionary force was plagued by poor leadership, poor supply discipline, and desertion. The Indians, once again led by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, engaged the expedition at dawn on 4 November 1791. The battle stands as the worst defeat of American arms during the Indian Wars; of 920 Americans engaged, the Indians killed 632 and wounded 264!¹⁹

In 1792, Congress authorized the organization of the American Legion ("Legion" was then a term that denoted a combined arms force). General Anthony Wayne commanded this Legion, which consisted of infantry, artillery, and light dragoons. A combination of ongoing peace negotiations with the Indians and Wayne's desire not to employ the Legion before it was prepared kept the force from conducting major operations for two years. Wayne used the time wisely, building and garrisoning small outposts

throughout the area to protect his lines of communication. So that the force could quickly build redoubts and abatis while on campaign to provide protection for encampments, Wayne spent considerable time training his men, employing standards from Steuben's Blue Book to teach close-order drill, and training his force extensively in marksmanship and the employment of field fortifications.²⁰

As Wayne continued his preparations for action against the Indians, the British became increasingly alarmed and feared that Detroit might be Wayne's possible objective. Consequently, the British, in violation of the 1783 peace treaty between the United States and Great Britain, established Fort Miamis to protect Detroit's approaches.²¹ In addition to providing protection for the British garrison at Detroit, establishment of the fort restored the Indians' confidence that the English would continue to lend aid and support to their attacks against the Americans. By the summer of 1794, the situation on the frontier had deteriorated to the point that military action became necessary. As the Legion left its winter quarters at Fort Washington (present-day Cincinnati, Ohio), several units of mounted Kentucky militia arrived to reinforce the well-trained and well-supplied army.²²

On 20 August 1794, Wayne defeated a large Indian force four miles from Fort Miamis at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, near present-day Maumee, Ohio. After the battle, the Indians retreated toward their British allies in Fort Miamis and attempted to gain sanctuary inside the protective walls of the fort. The British, however, closed the gates and refused to shelter the Indian force. The Indians, without refuge and their confidence in their British allies shaken, had little choice but to seek terms with Wayne's advancing Legion.²³ Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers resulted in the 1795 Treaty of Greenville.²⁴

The treaty allowed the United States access to the disputed areas and established the conditions for future American expansion. The accord also relinquished the United States' claim to all Indian lands in the Northwest Territory, except for parts of Ohio and sixteen other small tracts of land. These tracts were administrative areas at strategic locations throughout the Northwest Territory. In addition, the treaty allowed the United States to build forts at these locations and obtain unrestricted access to important waterways, portages, and other mobility corridors. The treaty also allowed the United States to survey the sixteen tracts and to have the right of free passage to them. Finally, the agreement required the Indians to recognize that they were under the protection of the United States. As a protectorate of

the United States, the Indians could sell their land—but only to the United States government.²⁵

As things quieted down after Wayne's successful campaign, the United States began to take additional steps to develop the frontier area. In 1800, all of the Northwest Territory, with the exception of Ohio, became the Indiana Territory. During the early 1800s, the Indiana Territory was a sparsely populated area with William Henry Harrison as the first territorial governor.²⁶ Harrison was not a stranger to the American northwest; as a young officer, he had served in the American Legion commanded by Wayne. After leaving the army, Harrison remained in the area and served as the Northwest Territory's delegate to Congress, before his appointment as governor by President John Adams. After his appointment as governor, Harrison established the capital for the territory at Vincennes and began his administration of the immense area.²⁷

U.S. public policy toward the Indians in the Old Northwest shifted during the administration of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson enunciated his Indian policy in his second inaugural address on 4 March 1805, stating that "humanity enjoins us to teach them [the Indians] agriculture and the domestic arts."²⁸ The address implied that Jefferson wanted to find ways to coexist peacefully with the Indians on the frontier. But the president's inaugural remarks were deceptive; his private views were quite different. An earlier letter to Governor Harrison, written 27 February 1803, outlined the "unofficial" United States policy. In the letter, Jefferson informed Harrison to draw the Indians into farming and encourage their indebtedness to the U.S. trading posts. The reason for the emphasis on agriculture was twofold. Once the Indians were farmers, they would realize that they did not need vast areas of land for hunting and would sell them to the United States. The second point was that the Indians would need to buy their farming supplies from the trading posts. Once Indian leaders were sufficiently in debt, the United States could offer them the opportunity to sell their lands to reduce their debt. If peaceful attempts to gain territory failed and hostilities ensued, Jefferson told Harrison that "seizing the whole country of that tribe and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others and a furtherance of our final consolidation."²⁹

As white encroachment of Indian lands continued, many Indians began developing different ideas about the possession of land and how to live in the same areas as white men. The sustained American expansion indicated

to many Indians that it was impossible to coexist peacefully with white settlers. The Shawnee became preeminent among the Indians in resisting white encroachments into Indian territory, although they were not always successful in these endeavors. As settlers began moving into the wilderness, the Shawnee were forced to move several times in the American south and northwest, eventually winding up in Ohio. Although forced to migrate, the Shawnee developed a reputation that made them feared by the settlers for their warlike prowess.³⁰

Two Shawnee brothers eventually emerged as Indian leaders who attempted to unify the Indians throughout the Old Northwest. The two brothers, Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh, moved from Ohio to the Indiana Territory after the Treaty of Greenville.³¹ Tenskwatawa, or “The Prophet,” was a spiritual leader in the Shawnee tribe and rose to prominence about 1805. The Prophet preached that Indians should abandon alcohol and anything associated with the Americans’ way of life. The Prophet’s teachings also emphasized a return to the traditional Indian ways. Tenskwatawa was familiar enough with one of the most common evils associated with the white man—alcohol. Before the development of his revivalist religion and subsequent rise to power as the “Shawnee Prophet,” Tenskwatawa had been a vagabond and drunk.³²

Meanwhile, the Prophet’s brother, Tecumseh, attempted to organize the Indians politically. The Prophet’s religious ideas often attracted Indians to the various villages that the brothers established, and Tecumseh used their attendance to promote his ideas about reestablishing Indian ownership of lands lost to white encroachment. Tecumseh eventually established an Indian confederacy or amalgamation of tribes. A respected warrior and leader, he served as the political leader of the confederacy. In his role as organizer and leader, he traveled throughout the American northwest and south to gain support for his pan-Indian confederacy. By 1810, he had assembled over 1,000 warriors from various tribes, including the Shawnee, Kickapoo, Delaware, Ottawa, and Chippewa Indians.³³

Tecumseh’s ideas about protecting Indian lands were a radical departure from traditional Indian thought. Tecumseh proposed that Indians were linked culturally, racially, and politically. Because of these common associations, any Indian land was under the common ownership of all Indians. A particular tribe had the right of transitory ownership as long as it physically occupied an area. But once a tribe abandoned an area, the land


reverted to common Indian ownership and required the mutual agreement of all tribes to sell the land.³⁴

If Tecumseh could successfully establish an amalgamation of tribes, it would destroy ideas of tribal independence and limit the authority of tribes to establish individual confederacies. Accomplishment of this goal would establish joint ownership of Indian lands and prevent individual tribes from making separate land cessions to the United States.³⁵ The resulting confederacy would strengthen the Indians' political and military responses to U.S. encroachment on Indian lands. In 1808, the confederacy led by Tecumseh settled near the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers. The village established by Tecumseh and his brother, known as Prophet's Town, became the headquarters of the confederacy.

During the years between 1800 and 1810, a series of disputes erupted between the Indians and the territorial government at Vincennes. The problems ranged from Indian attacks of settlements, to settlers violating treaty provisions and hunting on Indian lands. Meanwhile, Harrison's continued treaty negotiations with separate tribes rather than the confederacy caused friction between the Indians, settlers, and the territorial government. The most serious problems stemmed from the Treaty of Fort Wayne (1809) (see map 1). In this treaty, a few tribes ceded 3,000,000 acres of land to the United States. Tecumseh, who was traveling to gather support for his confederacy during the treaty negotiations, refused to agree to the land cessions. Since Tecumseh's followers and many other area tribes failed to agree to the provisions of the treaty, the confederacy refused to recognize its terms.³⁶

By the summer of 1810, both sides were posturing for war in the territory. Tecumseh continued to travel in attempts to strengthen his confederacy. Between 1810 and 1811, the U.S. secretary of war ordered an infantry regiment and two separate companies to the Indiana Territory. Even though the American military presence increased, Harrison, the Prophet, and Tecumseh met several times between 1808 and 1811 to attempt to resolve the developing problems. Harrison and Tecumseh conducted the most important series of meetings, the last of which occurred during the summer of 1811. The two leaders discussed rumors that the confederacy was preparing for war, Indian and white attacks on one another, and Indian dissatisfaction with land cessions.³⁷

The final meeting was inconclusive, and Tecumseh traveled south to recruit other Indians for his confederacy. Harrison believed that the



Map 1. Treaty of Fort Wayne

confederacy was a major threat and became determined to destroy its headquarters at Prophet's Town and force the dispersion of its occupants. Shortly after Tecumseh began his southern journey, Harrison prepared for a campaign in the new purchase. Harrison recruited and organized his force, and it left Vincennes late in September 1811, moving toward the new land cessions.³⁸

After a brief halt to train and to establish an army post, Harrison continued his march through the new purchase and arrived in the vicinity of Prophet's Town on 6 November 1811. The American force and the Indian confederacy fought the Battle of Tippecanoe the day after Harrison's army arrived outside of Prophet's Town. The American army defeated the confederacy, destroyed the Indian headquarters at Prophet's Town, and then returned to Vincennes.

The confederacy immediately dispersed. As a result of the battle, it lost a large part of its support from other tribes. Meanwhile, Tecumseh returned from his southern trip and tried to rebuild the federation, but without the manpower pledged from the tribes formerly in the confederacy, the amalgamation of tribes failed to present a major military threat to the United States.³⁹ In a final effort to restore Indian independence in the American northwest, Tecumseh joined forces with the British.

At the time of the Tippecanoe battle, an ongoing national debate existed in the United States about the merits of going to war with Great Britain. Napoleon had been waging war on the European continent during much of the first decade of the eighteenth century, and the effects of the Napoleonic wars retarded American commerce. The French and British tried to establish naval blockades during the Napoleonic wars to interdict each other's sea lines of communication. The French blockades, however, had little effect since they were unenforceable because of Great Britain's dominant naval power. The English naval policies, however, seriously disrupted American trade and frequently resulted in the impressment of American seamen.⁴⁰

The problems with Britain, and to a lesser extent France, occurred throughout the first decade of the nineteenth century. Congress, the shipping classes in New England, and many newspapers became incensed with British practices. Prompted by these highly charged emotions, many Americans agitated for war. Meanwhile, Tippecanoe fueled the war fires in the American east, as many citizens blamed America's frontier problems on Britain's influence over the northwestern Indian tribes. As a reaction to the

battle and the British aid to the Indians, Congressman Henry Clay called for the punishment of Canada and Britain.⁴¹

In the spring of 1812, the Indians again began raiding the white settlements on the frontier. The increased Indian attacks in the northwest and the potential for war with Britain and its Indian allies persuaded the United States to raise another force for service in the Old Northwest. General William Hull arrived in Dayton early in June 1812 to assume command of the forces in the Northwest Territory. Later that month, on 18 June 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain. After his arrival, Hull conducted inconclusive operations throughout the area. Eventually, a combined British-Indian force placed Hull's command under siege at Detroit. On 16 August 1812, Hull surrendered Detroit and all U.S. forces in the area to the British and Indian force led by General Isaac Brock and Tecumseh.⁴²

After Hull's surrender, William Henry Harrison became the supreme commander of the Northwest army.⁴³ There were two major actions in Harrison's area that were significant enough to influence the outcome of the war in the Old Northwest. The first was a naval engagement, during which Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry defeated the British naval force on Lake Erie on 10 September 1813. After his victory, Perry sent his famous dispatch to Harrison at Fort Meigs: "We have met the enemy and they are ours."⁴⁴

Once the Americans controlled Lake Erie, the British-Indian position at Detroit became untenable, and British General Henry Proctor (Brock's replacement) prepared to abandon Detroit. Simultaneously, Harrison prepared to invade Canada. To facilitate the invasion, Perry ferried Harrison's force across Lake Erie to the mouth of the Detroit River. On 27 September 1813, American forces led by General Harrison occupied Fort Malden and Detroit.⁴⁵ After securing each, Harrison's army pursued Tecumseh and Proctor into Canada. On 5 October 1813, the American army engaged and defeated the British-Indian force at the Battle of the Thames near Moraviantown (Ontario, Canada). Tecumseh died during the battle, and Harrison's forces routed the combined British-Indian force.⁴⁶

Following the Battle of the Thames, all of the major impediments to continued American settlement of the Old Northwest disappeared. The destruction of the Indian confederacy that began at Tippecanoe became complete when Tecumseh died in Ontario. In the end, most of the tribes recognized the authority of the United States in the Old Northwest.⁴⁷ After

the War of 1812, there was never another serious Indian threat in the American northwest. In 1816, Indiana became the nineteenth state, and by 1826, almost all Indian title to land in Indiana had been extinguished.⁴⁸

NOTES

1. C. F. Klinck, ed., *Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction in Early Records* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), 63. This is from an extract of a letter from Governor Harrison to the secretary of war, 4 July 1810. The letter explains Harrison's position on determining with whom he needed to negotiate to purchase Indian lands. In the letter, Harrison states that it was President Jefferson's opinion that the United States did not need to negotiate land purchases with tribes that had recently moved to the area. So from Harrison's perspective, the Miami was the major tribe with rightful claims to territory in Indiana. Harrison felt that the remaining tribes, such as the Shawnee (who migrated to Indiana after the Treaty of Greenville), had no legitimate claims.
2. Robert G. Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison: Apprentice in Arms," *Northwest Ohio Quarterly* 65, no.1 (1993): 21. The fur trade continued to be the single most profitable industry in North America well into the 1790s.
3. Fairfax Downey, *Indian Wars of the United States Army, 1776-1875* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 7-8; Allan W. Eckert, *Gateway to Empire* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 34, 38, 88-90 (hereafter referred to as *Gateway*); and James A. Maxwell, ed., *America's Fascinating Indian Heritage* (New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1978), 149-53. The Iroquois generally sided with the British, and the Great Lakes Algonquian tribes usually sided with the French during the early Colonial period. Most tribes sided with the British during the American Revolution.
4. Cappon, ed., *Atlas of Early American History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 86; and Maxwell, 152.
5. Cappon, 86; and Maxwell, 152.
6. Allen W. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 107-17, describes the battle and peace negotiations between the Indians and the militia.
7. Charles Beavans, ed., *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States: 1776-1949*, vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), 9-10; Cappon, 16; and Jack J. Gifford, "The Northwest Indian War," Ph.D. diss., University of California-Los Angeles, 1964, 34-35.

8. Michael Johnson, *American Woodland Indians* (Great Britain: Osprey, 1995), 5. Eighteenth-century Woodland Indians lived east of the Mississippi River, throughout the Great Lakes region, and the northeastern United States and Canada. A few Woodland tribes (namely the Shawnee) lived at one time in the southeastern United States. Woodland Indians also shared a language association. Woodland Indian language groups are Algonkian, Iroquoian, Siouan, and Muskogian.
9. Downey, 7; and Eckert, *Gateway*, 34.
10. Benjamin Drake, *Life of Tecumseh* (Cincinnati, OH: E. Morgan & Co., 1841; reprint, New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969), 17-18; David R. Edmunds, *Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1984), 46-72, 97-98; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 723-26; Logan Esarey, *A History of Indiana*, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, IN: Hoosier Historical Press, Inc., 1970), 89-91; and Fred L. Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648-1967*, vol. 1 (New York: Chelsea House, 1967), 664. After the Revolution, the United States adopted an Indian policy that recognized Indian tribes as governments and allowed the Indians to hold complete title to U.S. government land in several areas, to include the area that became the Northwest Territory. A Congressional Ordinance of 7 August 1786 divided Indian country into two areas separated by the Ohio River. Superintendents of Indian affairs were appointed to two-year terms in each area. The superintendent licensed all traders. Indian agents and military officers were prohibited from personal trading with the Indians. Regular passports, signed by an Indian agent, were required for travel in Indian country. This ordinance bears some similarity to the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
11. Drake, 17-18; Edmunds, 46-72, 97-98; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 723-26; and Esarey, *History*, 89-91.
12. Esarey, *History*, 89-91; and Gregory J. W. Urwin, *The United States Infantry: An Illustrated History, 1775-1918* (New York: Blandford Press, 1988), 30. The Articles of Confederation provided the initial framework of government for the United States. The Articles were largely ineffective and eventually replaced by the U.S. Constitution, which went into effect in 1789.
13. Eckert, *Gateway*, 107, 116, describes British efforts to define the American boundary at the Ohio River during the negotiations to end the Revolutionary

War. The references also describe continued British promotion of the idea that the Indians should focus on the Ohio River as the Indian-white border after the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Eckert, *Gateway*, 763, describes British efforts to establish an Indian buffer state at the negotiations to end the War of 1812. It would have required the United States to cede Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, half of Ohio, and part of Minnesota. The American negotiators refused to entertain the idea.

14. Beavans, 9-14; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 363; Eckert, *Gateway*, 239-40; David R. Edmunds, "The Thin Red Line: Tecumseh, the Prophet and Shawnee Resistance," *Timeline* 4, no.6 (1987-88): 15; and Urwin, 30. The British turned over their posts to the United States in 1796. Afterward, the British established new posts in Canada to fulfill the roles of their former posts in the United States. Fort Malden, for example, was established on the Canadian side of the Detroit River after the British turned Detroit over to the United States. After 1796, the British, from their Canadian posts, continued to support the northwestern Indian tribes through British traders (or army personnel disguised as traders) that traveled throughout the American northwest.
15. See Eckert, *Gateway*, 138-40, 699, for more details on the impact of the Northwest Ordinance and the attitude of the local settlers toward the ordinance. The ordinance also prohibited slavery or other forms of involuntary servitude, described procedures for territorial representation in Congress, and had clauses designed to promote education. The Northwest Ordinance is relevant to congressional authority to declare war because the United States Constitution was not in effect until 1789. The U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, grants Congress the authority to declare war and to raise and support armies.
16. Washington proposed his plan as early as 1783, and the Northwest Ordinance was one method to bring it to fruition. Washington's plan is from Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart* (New York: Bantam, 1992; New York: Bantam, 1993), 880. Indian insistence on the Ohio River boundary is from Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison," 14, and Russell Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 90. Weigley also notes that the British continued to encourage the Indians to seek the river as the border.
17. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 363-68; and Jason Hook, *American Indian Warrior Chiefs* (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1990), 18.

18. As cited in Downey, 52-53; and Weigley, 91.
19. Downey, 54-60; Eckert, *The Frontiersman*, 392-401; Eckert, *Gateway*, 701-2; and Hook, 18-19, provide detailed accounts of the battle. St. Clair began the expedition without ample supplies, so his soldiers were on reduced rations from the start. Camp followers probably consumed part of the army's provisions, even though St. Clair prohibited the release of supplies to them. Additionally, about 300 militia deserted, and St. Clair sent a company of regulars to catch them. Finally, the night prior to the attack, St. Clair's force failed to establish proper defensive positions. The Indian attack at first light quickly overwhelmed the American position, and only twenty-four members of those engaged returned uninjured. In addition to the American military casualties, there were approximately 200 camp followers killed. Only sixty-six Indians were killed and nine wounded. Eckert reports that Chief Blue Jacket, a white man adopted by the Shawnees, killed and scalped his brother during the battle. The boys were separated as youngsters, and Blue Jacket (Marmaduke Van Swearingin) grew up to be a Shawnee war chief; his brother (Charles Van Swearingin) was a captain on the expedition.
20. Esarey, *History*, 122; Gifford, 319-21; Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison," 10-24; Weigley, 93. Weigley calls Wayne the "Father of the Regular Army" because he provided the army with its first "model of excellence." Wayne issued every officer in his command a copy of the *Blue Book* and demanded that they become proficient in the drills that it contained. Wayne also trained his units in open-order formations in addition to the standard formations. The Legion trained extensively with the bayonet and live ammunition. In addition to marksmanship training, Wayne conducted maneuver live-fire as well as blank-fire exercises. He also conducted training exercises that included soldiers dressed and acting like Indians to simulate an opposing force. He commented that "We must burn a good deal of powder, . . . to make . . . marksman and soldiers." Wayne's approach to training was unique for the time. William Henry Harrison had served as a company grade officer in Wayne's command.
21. There were at least three forts in the general area over a period of years, and in use at different times, known as "Fort Miamis" or "Fort Miami." These forts are easily confused with one another.

22. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 425-27; and Bruce Grant, *American Forts Yesterday and Today* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1965), 96-97.
23. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 426-29.
24. Greenville is the modern spelling. Greeneville is the eighteen-century spelling, and it is still found in many references.
25. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 439; and Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties 2* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904), 39-43. The treaty also formally gave the United States control of a few other areas to which the American government had previously extinguished Indian title. The treaty specified annuity arrangements to compensate the Indians and had clauses about the punishment of whites that murdered Indians (and vice versa). The treaty established the means for the United States to gain title to land that the United States felt was already American territory (after the Treaty of Paris).
26. Howard Peckham, *Indiana: A Bicentennial History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 36, and Family History Section, Indiana Historical Society, *Census of Indiana Territory for 1807* (Indianapolis, IN: Family History Section, Indiana Historical Society, 1980). Peckham estimated that the territory had a population of about 2,500. The 1807 Census shows a population of 2,587. The figures, however, are somewhat misleading because the census only counted free white males of voting age; the census did not count women, children, slaves (although illegal, there were slaves in the area), etc. Some estimates of the population are as high as 25,000 people. The original Indiana Territory encompassed most of the Northwest Territory except for Ohio. The area of the Indiana Territory decreased as Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin became populated enough to become territories, separated territories, or states.
27. P. D. DeHart, *Past and Present of Tippecanoe County Indiana*, vol. 1 (Indianapolis, IN: B. F. Bowen & Company Publishers, 1909), 67. As governor, Harrison was also the superintendent of Indian affairs. In 1803, President Jefferson appointed Harrison as the sole commissioner for treating with the Indians.
28. Klinck, 58. This reference contains an extract of Jefferson's speech from James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897* (published by authority of Congress, 1901), I, 380.

29. Ibid., 56-57. Jefferson said that his letter was “unofficial and private.” Several sources describe the letter or quote passages from it. There are some slight variations between sources, but the concepts of turning the Indians toward agriculture, forcing their indebtedness, and removing them beyond the Mississippi River are essentially the same in each reference.
30. Drake, 21; Hook, 14-15; and Johnson, 6. The Shawnee were a Woodland tribe of the Algonkian language group who moved from the Cumberland River area in Tennessee to Ohio. Shawnee groups also lived as far south as Georgia, Alabama, and Florida.
31. Reed Beard, *The Battle of Tippecanoe* (Chicago, IL: Hammond Press, W. B. Conkey Co., 1911), 22; and Peckham, 40. The brothers established several villages, to include one at Greenville, Ohio. The Greenville village was established in an area that violated the terms of the Treaty of Greenville, and in the spring of 1808, the Kickapoo and Potawatomi tribes offered the brothers land in Indiana. The brothers relocated to Indiana and established Prophet’s Town to the immediate south of the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers.
32. Beard, 13-14; Rachel Buff, “Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa: Myth, Historiography and Popular Memory,” *Historical Reflections* (1995): 279; Drake, 86-88; Eckert, *Gateway*, 346-48; David R. Edmunds, “Thin Red Line,” 7-8, 11, 19; Edmunds, *Quest*, 83-98, 160; Esarey, *History*, 182; Hook, 22-23; and Pirtle, 2. The Prophet said that he had a dream in which he saw all who had died as drunkards “with flames issuing from their mouths.” The Prophet also preached that Indians should return to their traditional lifestyle, which also included prohibitions on Indian and white intermarriages. The Prophet’s religion emphasized that Indians needed to reject practices learned from white men (to include the tools, clothes, and food learned from contact with whites). The Prophet’s teachings specifically focused on abandoning anything associated with Americans and said that Americans developed from an evil spirit. According to the Prophet, the French and British developed from the same Master of Life deity as the Indians. By teaching that the British and French shared the same positive spiritual legacy as Indians, the Prophet gave his followers a way to continue their access to the white man’s technology (although in a limited way). The Prophet promoted obviously political topics, such as the idea that Indians should unite in common goals as one people. Buff notes that the Prophet’s ideas focused on a return to traditions that would ensure restoration of

land and peace and that politics and religion were traditionally associated with one another in Indian culture. Edmunds and Buff believe that the Prophet's role was much more significant than is usually acknowledged and that the religion that he sponsored was a genuine movement in its own right, rather than merely a subset of Tecumseh's confederacy. Many authors submit that the Prophet's movement predates Tecumseh's and was the initial reason that Indians assembled—to hear the Prophet and not Tecumseh. Regardless of whether or not the Prophet's movement predated Tecumseh's political efforts, it is commonly recognized that between the two brothers, Tecumseh's leadership and influence were ascendant at the time of the Battle of Tippecanoe.

33. Drake, 43; Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 11-13; and Hook, 26. Tecumseh is often referred to as an "Indian Chief"; this is incorrect. Although he was a political and combat leader, Tecumseh was never recognized as a chief in the traditions of the Shawnee tribe. In fact, Tecumseh usually referred to himself as a warrior. Tecumseh's confederation ultimately included tribes as far away as the west side of the Mississippi River. The Chickasaws and Choctaws in the American south refused to join the confederacy, but the Creeks (Alabama) sent a party north with Tecumseh in 1811-12.
34. Beard, 23; Edmunds, *Quest*, 97-98; Pirtle, xiii.
35. Adams, 351; Downey, 83.
36. Hook, 26. The Indian nations listed on the treaty are "Delawares," "Putawatomies," "Miamies," and "Eel River Miamies." See Kappler, 101-4, for a copy of the treaty. Adams, 334-35, has an excellent map that shows Indian cessions from 1795-1810 and includes this treaty. Adams, 342-64, also details many of the problems, such as Indian attacks, treaty violations, and 1809 treaty issues that led up to the Battle of Tippecanoe. Eckert, *Gateway*, 339-40, 352; Maxwell, 152-53, discuss some of the methods used to gain Indian agreement during treaty negotiations. American treaty negotiators employed many methods to gain Indian agreement to treaties; some of the methods were ethical; many were not. See chapter 3, note 8, for more details on negotiation practices during treaties.
37. Adams, 360; and Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., *The Territory of Indiana 1810-1816: Territorial Papers of the United States*, vol. 8 (Washington: GPO, 1939), 130. The 4th U.S., a company from the 7th U.S., and a company from

the Rifle Regiment were the Regular Army organizations ordered to the Indiana Territory. Adams, 357-59, details Indian-white attacks (1810-11) and the 1811 meeting. All of Eckert's works, as well as Hook, 27-30, provide details of Harrison's meeting with Tecumseh.

38. Bill Gilbert, *God Gave Us This Country* (New York: Atheneum, 1989), 268-69; and Peckham, 41.
39. Drake, 155-56.
40. Adams, 374-76; Eckert, *Gateway*, 365-30; Maurice Matloff, ed., *American Military History, Volume 1: 1775-1902* (Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1996), 120-23. Britain and France adopted policies that led to the search and seizure of American merchant shipping regardless of whether or not the ships carried contraband. Great Britain was able to carry out its policies with greater effect. An example of British action is the *Chesapeake* incident. On 22 June 1807, a British warship, *Leopard*, fired on the *Chesapeake*, an American warship in American waters, and accused the Americans of hiring British deserters as sailors. The crew of the *Leopard* boarded the *Chesapeake* and impressed some of the crew. President Jefferson signed the Embargo Act as a response to these European naval policies. The act restricted all international trade in American ports and was unpopular with American merchants. The 1809 Non-Intercourse Act replaced the Embargo Act and restricted trade with only Great Britain and France. The United States declared war on Great Britain in the summer of 1812; a Senate vote to declare war on France failed by two votes.
41. Adams, 376; Israel, 664; Matloff, 120-21; Pirtle, 10.
42. Drake, 157; Klinck, 147; Weigley, 118-20.
43. Weigley, 123, 132. Weigley considers Harrison a competent officer whose militia performed well. Weigley's analysis is that "When volunteer companies were led by a William Henry Harrison or an Andrew Jackson, who used them with regard to their limitations but who both disciplined and inspired them, meeting the British was not likely to end in rout and might even lead to victory."
44. Adams, 707, provides an excellent summary of the Lake Erie battle. Heinl, 166, contains Perry's complete quotation.

45. Adams, 708-9.
46. Adams, 710-15; Klinck, 184-215, discusses the Battle of the Thames. Klinck also provides primary source accounts of Tecumseh's death. Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, has extensive notes on Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames.
47. Adams, 717, Klinck, 194.
48. Adams, 1297, Israel, 664.