

## IV. TIPPECANOE BATTLE

... the troops nineteen twentieths of whom had never been in action before behaved in a manner that can never be too much applauded.<sup>1</sup>

—General Harrison, *Post-Battle Report*

### *The Approach*

General Harrison faced a few unexpected difficulties after stopping to build the blockhouse. For instance, the army's trackers came across signs indicating that large war parties were moving south. Additionally, Harrison received word that a few Indians had ambushed the supply boat en route to the army and forced it to return to Fort Harrison. Realizing that a quick response would eliminate the threat of a possible Indian attack on Vincennes, Harrison ordered Major Jordan and forty soldiers to return to Vincennes to prepare defenses there. Meanwhile, there was little to do to redress the lost resupply; the army would have to continue without the additional provisions.<sup>2</sup>

Harrison's 2 November 1811 letter to the secretary of war provides some insight into his frame of mind. The governor hoped that the army's military presence would force the Indians at Prophet's Town to disperse, but he remained ready to attack and force their dispersion. Harrison wrote the letter to inform Eustis that the Indians had attacked the resupply boat and killed a member of the crew. He also noted that 4 November 1811 was the anniversary date of General St. Clair's defeat by an earlier Indian confederacy. He told Eustis that, if attacked, he hoped to "alter the color with which it [St. Clair's defeat] has been marked in our calendar for the last twenty years."<sup>3</sup>

The army left the blockhouse on 3 November 1811 and crossed the Vermillion River into Indian territory. The blockhouse, twenty-five-foot square, with breastworks on each corner, held the army's boats and heavy baggage. A small detachment of eight soldiers and a sergeant remained to guard the equipment. Although the army dropped off its unneeded equipment at the blockhouse, the force still remained large and cumbersome. The column that crossed the Vermillion included a supply train of wagons, cattle, hogs, and cannon that were needed to support the infantry and mounted troops.<sup>4</sup>

As Harrison maneuvered the army into Indian territory, he was careful to avoid terrain that would inhibit the employment of his force. This often meant taking a less than direct route toward Prophet's Town, one that

provided the better security afforded by open prairie. Meanwhile, Harrison relied on his company of Spies and Guides to reconnoiter ahead of the force. He also carefully posted advance guards and flank security. Traveling in open terrain allowed him the freedom of employing his mounted elements forward of the column, in a security role, to reorient the army quickly in case of an attack.

The army conducted a slow and difficult approach to Prophet's Town. Preparing the way, scouts carefully investigated ambush sites ahead. Harrison took pains to change the order of march whenever the terrain required, sometimes changing formation as often as three times in a mile and a half. Throughout the last day of the march, the army encountered hostile parties of Indians, who rebuffed with insulting gestures Harrison's interpreter's efforts to communicate. Harrison subsequently dispatched Captain Toussant Dubois, commander of the Spies and Guides, with a flag of truce to request a conference with the Prophet. As Dubois moved toward the town, Indians appeared on both of his flanks and attempted to cut him off from the army. Once Harrison realized this, he recalled Dubois and ordered the army to continue its approach toward Prophet's Town.<sup>5</sup>

As the army moved closer to the village, Harrison prepared to attack. Leaders halted their columns, ordered the men to place their backpacks in the wagons, and formed their units for battle. The army approached Prophet's Town from the southeast and, as units came within sight of the village, the troops changed into their final attack formations and prepared to conduct an immediate assault. Although Harrison wanted to adhere to his initial orders and resolve the situation peacefully, he remained prepared to fight given the hostile intentions demonstrated by the Indians since the wounding of the sentry in October.<sup>6</sup>

Harrison decided to place the interpreters in front of the army as it advanced, giving the Prophet a final opportunity to communicate his intentions. The Indians, seemingly surprised by Harrison's final dispositions in preparation for an attack, sent a delegation to meet with the army commander before his forces could start an assault. The delegation expressed surprise at the army's rapid advance and seeming haste to attack. The Prophet's representatives informed Harrison that they were told by the delegation of Delaware emissaries that the army would not attack until the Prophet responded to Harrison's demands. The Prophet's response went undelivered since the group supposedly searched for the army on the wrong side of the Wabash. Harrison promised the Indians that he did not intend to

attack unless the issues expressed in the demands were not resolved. Harrison and the Prophet's representatives agreed to meet the next morning for a conference.<sup>7</sup>

Harrison, meanwhile, inquired about a location with enough wood and water for the army. The Indians informed him that there was a suitable location to the northwest, within a few miles of Prophet's Town, on what is today known as Burnett Creek.<sup>8</sup> A few officers departed and examined the site, assessing its fitness. After a quick reconnaissance, they sent word that the location suited the army's purpose.<sup>9</sup> The area, in Harrison's words, was

a piece of dry oak land, rising about ten feet above the level of a marshy prairie in front toward the Prophet's town and nearly twice that high above a similar prairie in the rear, through which and near to this bank ran a small stream [Burnett Creek], clothed with willows and other brushwood. Towards the left flank this bench of land widened considerably but became gradually narrower in the opposite direction and at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards from the right flank terminated in an abrupt point.<sup>10</sup>

Harrison tried to organize his encampment in the form of a hollow square, but a rough trapezoid was as close as the terrain would allow. The back of the trapezoid was against the creek, while the front of the camp's perimeter faced Prophet's Town. An infantry force of regulars and Indiana militia guarded both of these areas. The smallest part of the perimeter was the battle position of the Indiana militia. Meanwhile, the eastern side of the encampment was under the control of the mounted riflemen from Kentucky. Dismounted dragoons served as the army's reserve and positioned themselves behind the intersection of the 4th U.S. and mounted riflemen.

Based on the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew, Harrison ordered his men to sleep dressed and on their arms. The men also lit warming fires, and many soldiers, with only their uniforms or light blankets to provide protection from the weather, tried to rest. Meanwhile, a heavy guard of almost two companies patrolled the perimeter, while everyone else slept within a few feet of their assigned battle positions.<sup>11</sup>


The Indians, in the meantime, retired to Prophet's Town and began planning for their meeting with Harrison in the morning. Although little historical record remains of what happened in the Indian camp, a council was probably held to determine the Indians' course of action, select war chiefs, and conduct the traditional war dances and war songs. Some authors

suggest that a Potawatomi chief named Winnemac urged the attack. Others suggest that the idea was solely the Prophet's. A further tradition proposes a militant group of Winnebagoes encouraged the attack on the soldiers. Shabonee, an Ottawa chief and one of Tecumseh's trusted lieutenants, states that there were also two British soldiers at Prophet's Town—dressed as Indians—who urged the Prophet to attack.<sup>12</sup>

In any case, the Prophet decided to attack the army encampment (see map 3 for the camp's disposition). The initial Indian plan required that the Prophet and his delegation meet with Harrison in the morning, agree to his terms, and leave the camp. Two Winnebago volunteers would accompany the delegation into the camp but remain near Harrison when the delegation departed. Once the delegation was outside of the camp, the volunteers would kill Harrison with their tomahawks as a signal to start the battle. Sometime during the Indian council, the Prophet changed the battle plan. After one of his visions, he announced that the American army was half dead and the other half crazy. The Prophet also told his followers that his medicine would make the white men's weapons harmless and that bullets would pass harmlessly through the warriors.<sup>13</sup>

The Indians eventually decided to attack before daybreak. The central component of the new plan still remained to kill Harrison. One hundred warriors would crawl through the swamps on the northeastern side of the encampment, kill any sentinels, sneak into camp, and then kill Harrison. If they were discovered early, the braves would give the signal for the attack, and warriors waiting in ambush would shoot Harrison off of his distinctive light-gray horse. In addition to providing the means to initiate the main attack, the Indians hoped that the signal would have a psychological impact on the soldiers.<sup>14</sup> Shabonee remembered that "the yell would be so loud and frightful that the whole of the whites would [hopefully] run for the thick woods up the creek, and that side was left open for this purpose."<sup>15</sup>

After the initial assault, warriors on several sides of the camp would fall upon the sleeping troops and destroy them. If the soldiers followed the pattern set by St. Clair's men, the Indians would encounter little resistance as they rushed into camp and routed an ill-prepared army. The Indians expected to fire at the backs of the American soldiers as they ran away or sought shelter in the nearby woods. Even though the Indians knew that Harrison had established a heavy guard around his campsites, they assumed that men who had marched all day would be in a deep sleep and unprepared for battle. Regardless of whether or not the attempt at surprise was successful, the most important part of the plan, the Prophet cautioned, was




Map 3. Plan of encampment, 6 November 1811

to kill Harrison. The Great Spirit warned that Harrison must die for the attack to succeed.<sup>16</sup>

### *The Engagement*

Early in the morning of 7 November 1811, General Harrison was in his tent, addressing a few of his officers. An orderly musician was also in the commander's tent waiting for orders to give the signal to call out the men. Meanwhile, a few soldiers had risen early to rekindle the fires before stand-to. Shortly after four o'clock in the morning, a shot rang out from the northeastern side of the encampment. Corporal Steven Mars of the Kentucky militia fired at and wounded an infiltrating Indian warrior. Immediately after Mars fired, an "awful Indian yell" rang out around the encampment,<sup>17</sup> and the Indians rushed the camp from several sides in a furious series of assaults.

During the Indian onslaught, the sentries immediately abandoned their posts and ran inside the camp's perimeter.<sup>18</sup> In the meantime, Harrison ran outside, mounted the first horse that he saw, and rode to the location on the perimeter where the fighting was at its peak. At about the same time, Harrison's aide, Colonel Abraham Owen, mounted a light-colored horse. Several Indians waiting in ambush immediately shot and killed him.<sup>19</sup> The Indians were unusually aggressive, their fanaticism fired by the Prophet's promise of success and by the idea that the bullets of their enemy could not



Modern-day view of the high ground that existed in front of the rear lines at Tippecanoe

Courtesy of Kimberly Bailey

harm them. The fight raged for several hours, with the Indians attacking from three sides of the encampment. The warriors fought with cunning and personal bravery, but they fought as individuals and, in most cases, did not coordinate actions between their attacking parties.<sup>20</sup>

Within a few minutes of the initial onslaught, the firing nearly engulfed the entire perimeter of the camp. Initially, the shooting extended along the left flank, then, quickly, it moved around the front of the encampment, the right flank, and finally along the rear line.<sup>21</sup> Harrison continually moved from one threatened location to another throughout the battle to direct his forces and inspire his soldiers. The fighting raged for over two hours.

The first critical event happened on the left flank, at the corner of the camp, where Captain Robert C. Barton's company of regulars tied in with Captain Frederick Geiger's Kentucky militia. The Indian attack in this area happened so quickly that the left flank of Geiger's company caved in. The fighting was fierce, with volunteers and Indians so intermingled that it became almost impossible to distinguish one from the other. Harrison arrived at the scene and quickly ordered Captain Joel Cook's 4th U.S. company and Wentworth's Indiana militia company (commanded by Lieutenant Peters, as Wentworth was already dead) to restore the angle.<sup>22</sup>

After reducing the Indian penetration at the angle, Harrison rode to the front line, the section of the perimeter facing Prophet's Town. As he reached the area, he saw Major Joseph Hamilton Daviess busy forming the dragoons as a reserve in the rear of several companies in contact. The elements already in contact continued to receive heavy fire from the enemy, who were located in a small grove of trees fifteen or twenty yards to the front. The men from the Rifle Regiment were close to the trees and engaged the enemy, while a militia company to their left started to give way in disorder. Daviess requested permission to attack the Indians in the grove, and after several entreaties from Daviess, Harrison allowed him to gather his dragoons and drive the Indians from their position. Daviess, at the head of about twenty dragoons, charged single file into the grove. The party was too small, however, and the Indians attacked the dragoons on their flanks, driving the soldiers back with several casualties. Captain Josiah Snelling (4th U.S.) and his company charged the Indians and immediately dislodged them.<sup>23</sup>

Several units of Indiana militia were fighting at the southwest part of the perimeter. The Indian attack in this area was late because the Indians were not in their final assault positions when Corporal Mars shot a comrade of



Courtesy of Kimberly Bailey

Modern-day view of the Indian approach from Prophet's Town  
(view looking from the front line).

theirs on the opposite side of the encampment. Although late, once in position, the Indians unleashed a powerful assault on the militiamen. Harrison arrived at the spot to find most of the officers already killed or wounded. The security of this important area was under the command of two new junior officers, recently promoted from enlisted ranks during the march to Prophet's Town. John Tipton, an ensign (later a captain), was the only surviving officer among Captain Spier Spencer's Yellow Jackets, and Second Lieutenant Thomas Montgomery commanded Captain Jacob Warrick's company.

Harrison searched for men to restore the line. A fortuitous mistake provided him with a company of Indiana militia. Someone had mistakenly ordered Captain David Robb's company from its position in Major Wells' command. An officer recognized the error and held the company in place near the center of the encampment. Harrison, advised of the available company, ordered Robb to move to aid Spencer's and Warrick's companies. Harrison, meanwhile, moved Prescott's Company (4th U.S.) (not the entire regiment) to restore the integrity of Wells' line at the north part of the perimeter.<sup>24</sup>

The Indians selected Stone Eater and White Loon (two Miami Indians), as well as Winnemac, a Potawatomi, to be the war chiefs leading the assaults. Meanwhile, the Prophet, the spiritual leader, occupied a position on a small hill overlooking the battlefield.<sup>25</sup> The Indian's attack plan,



Courtesy of Kimberly Bailey

Modern-day view of the Yellow Jackets' position,  
looking toward the Indians' approach area

however, ran into difficulty because Harrison's alert sentry threw off the timing of their surprise attack. The loss of surprise forced the Indians to conduct three uncoordinated assaults. In spite of the fact that the overall attack was unsynchronized, the Indians, nonetheless, managed to maintain a little control within some of the smaller assaulting elements. The pattern of attack seemed to be a series of local assaults, during which wildly yelling Indians rushed a particular area of the perimeter. Once driven back, they would quickly reorganize and, on signal, rush the line again. Throughout these assaults, individual Indians edged forward on their bellies and attempted to provide suppressive fire.<sup>26</sup>

The Indian assaults continued until daylight. The night before, the Prophet had told his warriors that he would beat his drum as a signal for them to continue fighting; as long as the warriors could hear his drum, they should continue the attack. For over two hours, the Indians attacked fearlessly, spurred on by the Prophet's promise that the enemy bullets would not hurt them. As the seemingly reckless onslaughts became more and more costly to the Indians, however, runners climbed the Prophet's small hill to inform him that his magic was failing. The Prophet, nevertheless, urged them to continue to attack the enemy position.<sup>27</sup> By daylight, the warriors knew that continued faith in the words of the Prophet was unjustified, and their attack would not succeed. In the light of dawn, the

braves could see Harrison “alive [and] riding fearlessly among his troops in spite of bullets, and their [the warriors’] hearts melted.”<sup>28</sup>

Harrison had been struggling throughout the night to maintain the integrity of the perimeter and to keep the Indians from breaking through. Once it became light, he thought that he could order a general charge of infantry and mounted troops. The charges would clear the remaining Indians off any important terrain around the perimeter. Meanwhile, Harrison ordered companies to reinforce the left and right flanks in preparation for the counterattacks at first light.

As Harrison dispatched the companies, Major Wells, at the northeastern side of the encampment, also concluded that counterattacks were needed to dislodge the Indians around the perimeter in his area. With a mixed force of infantry and dragoons, Wells charged the Indians before Harrison completed the reorganization. Wells’ infantry dislodged the Indians with bayonets, and the dragoons mounted a pursuit until the marsh forced them to halt. As Wells drove the Indians back in his area, Lieutenant Charles Larrabee and Captain Cook moved their companies (4th U.S.) to the right flank of the camp toward the Yellow Jackets. Larrabee’s company arrived first, and Larrabee, as the senior officer present, quickly organized the infantry for an immediate assault. The subsequent charge of the regulars and militia routed the enemy to their front.<sup>29</sup>

### *After the Battle*

The combined efforts of the various charges forced the Indians to break off their attack. After the army repelled the Indians’ attack, it spent the rest of the day consolidating and reorganizing. It had taken considerable casualties—thirty-seven killed and 126 wounded.<sup>30</sup> Harrison’s force buried the dead, treated the wounded, and reestablished chains of command.<sup>31</sup>

Another part of the consolidation was to recover lost livestock. Horses picketed inside and outside of the camp before the attack were loose, and the cattle and hogs outside the camp’s perimeter were scattered or stolen by Indians during the fighting. Efforts to recover livestock proved unsuccessful until the next day. Meanwhile, the lack of fresh meat caused many soldiers to eat the horseflesh of animals killed in battle. Soldiers also wandered the battlefield scalping dead Indians or snapping off shots at any enemy seen fleeing in the distance. Several soldiers found a wounded Potawatomi chief, and only two things saved the wounded man from being killed on the spot, the first being several misfires by the weapons of the



Courtesy of Kimberly Bailey

Modern-day view of the high ground and the rear line area (view is from Burnett Creek)



Courtesy of Kimberly Bailey

Modern-day view of Burnett Creek looking south

soldiers who found him. The timely arrival of a message from General Harrison ordering the chief's capture ultimately saved his life. The last thing that the soldiers did was to prepare for a possible follow-on Indian attack. Against that possibility, the army built breastworks and maintained 100-percent security throughout the night of 7 November 1811.<sup>32</sup>

Harrison felt that his force had won a decisive victory over the Prophet and his followers. Even though the army routed its Indian attackers, though, it was incapable of conducting a pursuit of the Indian force. After the early morning attack, the army found itself 150 miles from Vincennes, deep in enemy territory, with almost 20 percent of the force as casualties. Additionally, the troops were low on rations and other support needed to sustain continued operations. Harrison, however, felt that the Prophet would not be able to gather enough warriors to interdict his movement back to Vincennes. While another attack seemed unlikely, Harrison realized that any attack, no matter how improbable or small, would reduce the force's capability even more.<sup>33</sup> The original objective of the campaign was to force the dispersal of the Prophet and his followers and destroy the Indians' headquarters. Harrison decided to stick with his plan and then return to Vincennes.

At sunrise on 8 November 1811, army mounted elements occupied Prophet's Town only to find the village abandoned except for an old woman who had been too sick to travel. A few Indians killed during the battle were found in the buildings, and several recent graves were discovered. Searches of the village and a nearby area resulted in a harvest of more than 5,000 bushels of corn and beans. In addition, before burning the town, the soldiers collected other abandoned supplies and foodstuffs that the army could use. Harrison's men also discovered evidence of British assistance to the Indians; the retreating warriors had left behind British gunpowder and several muskets in shipping containers from the British post at Malden (Canada). As their comrades destroyed Prophet's Town, soldiers back at the encampment burned all the officers' private baggage to make room for the wounded on the twenty-two available wagons.<sup>34</sup>

By noon of the next day, the army began its difficult journey back to Vincennes. As the army left the battlefield, the wounded chief remained behind under the care of the Indian woman. The chief carried a message from the governor advising the Indians to abandon the Prophet; any tribes that complied would have their past conduct forgiven.<sup>35</sup>

The troops began retracing their steps, determined to reach the capital in good order. They reached Boyd's Blockhouse on 12 November 1811 without incident. A resupply boat arrived at the blockhouse loaded with beef, flour, and whiskey shortly after the army arrived. Then, the wounded were transferred from the wagons to the boat and returned to Vincennes via the Wabash River.<sup>36</sup> The next day, prior to their departure, the soldiers burned the blockhouse. Destroying it ensured that it would provide no future service to the Indians. Between 13 and 15 November 1811, the army moved from the blockhouse to Fort Harrison. After leaving Captain Snelling and his company of the 4th U.S. to garrison the fort, the rest of the force closed on Vincennes by 18 November 1811.<sup>37</sup>


Meanwhile, most of the Indians scattered after the battle and returned to their own tribes or set out for new areas. A few Indians established a camp on Wildcat Creek within twenty miles of Prophet's Town. Indians not joining the band on Wildcat Creek spread news of the Indian defeat as they dispersed across the countryside. In the meantime, the Prophet no longer retained the ear of any tribes in the confederacy. In fact, many Indians blamed the loss on the Prophet and considered killing him. The Indians eventually decided to spare the Prophet's life, and about forty Shawnees remained loyal to him.<sup>38</sup> But the defeat at Tippecanoe and his subsequent loss of credibility guaranteed that the Prophet would never have a future role in Indian politics.

### *Analysis*

Combat power is an organization's ability to fight. The U.S. Army's capstone manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*, states that there are four main elements that define combat power: maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain a positional advantage. Firepower is the amount of fire delivered by a position, unit, or weapons system. Protection is how the commander conserves his unit's fighting potential. The final element of combat power is effective leadership. Leadership is the most important aspect of the dynamic because leaders inspire soldiers as well as provide purpose, direction, and motivation for them.<sup>39</sup>

Indian maneuver at the battle was hampered by widespread superstition, and overconfidence within the Indian force negated many of the strong points of its plan. The initial acceptance of the Prophet's prophecies gave the attackers unrealistically low expectations about the capabilities of the American force. Furthermore, all of the proposed plans relied on attacking and killing Harrison.

Finally, the plan also attempted to capitalize on intimidating the U.S. force psychologically by rushing the encampment while yelling. Psychological intimidation often provides an advantage, but its best use is to complement maneuver rather than to replace it. Furthermore, based on the Indians' earlier experiences during campaigns in the 1790s, they should have been aware that intimidation only works on poorly trained and disciplined troops and not on disciplined ones. The Indians observed Harrison's army several times throughout its training period at Vincennes campaign, and they should have been aware of its discipline and force protection efforts.<sup>40</sup>



Tippecanoe Monument (approximate location of General Harrison's headquarters)

The planned Indian three coordinated assaults.

the attack forced the Indians to begin the attack before they were in their final assault positions. This compelled the

successive assaults rather than a quick attack to penetrate the sentries and kill Harrison, followed by two nearly simultaneous attacks from opposite ends of the encampment. The lack of coordination between the Indian assaults allowed Harrison to reposition companies inside the perimeter and counter various threats. The Indian efforts were initially violent enough to penetrate the angle of the perimeter on the left flank. Another attack was also severe enough on the right flank to make that position untenable without reinforcement. Harrison, through calm battlefield direction, was able to reposition his forces, which protected the integrity of the perimeter. The final aspects of Harrison's maneuver relied on forces conducting a series of local counterattacks at daylight to rout the enemy.

The major weapons systems employed were rifles and muskets. The Indians failed to take full advantage of the muskets available to them because the Prophet preached a return to the traditional Indian lifestyle, which included using only traditional weapons in warfare. Additionally, the Prophet promised protection against the weapons of the Americans. The unused cache of muskets captured at Prophet's Town indicated that many

Indians accepted the Prophet's entreaties to return to traditional methods and his guarantees of protection from U.S. bullets.

The army effectively employed most of its weapons systems. The single most important contribution to firepower was the simple way in which the troops massed fires to meet the initial Indian assaults. The order to the men to sleep opposite their posts with weapons loaded and bayonets fixed allowed soldiers to react quickly, as individuals, and to form immediately into units. The units were shifted also to different areas to take advantage of a particular weapon or capability. Harrison did this throughout the night to restore the perimeter and to drive the Indians out of contested areas. He also changed the force's task organization near the end of the battle in anticipation of the charges that he wanted to execute at first light. Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew, for example, commanded the militia infantry companies in the front line. Militiamen normally used their personal weapons, and in this case, these men used "squirrel rifles" that did not accept bayonets. Harrison shifted a company from the 4th U.S. with muskets and bayonets to Bartholomew immediately prior to the counterattack.<sup>41</sup>

In the area of protection, the Prophet relied on several attempts at deception to gain an advantage over the Americans. The efforts at deception focused on creating a story that indicated the Indians were not hostile. First, the Prophet sent emissaries to Harrison while the army organized and trained at Vincennes. The purpose of the emissaries was twofold: to spy on the army and to assure Harrison that the Prophet was a friend and not a threat. Later, as the army moved toward Prophet's Town from Fort Harrison, the Prophet sent a delegation to meet the governor. A possible purpose of the delegation was to stall Harrison and allow the Prophet more time to prepare for operations against the army. The final effort by the Indians at deception was to propose a meeting to discuss terms in the morning.<sup>42</sup> Indian efforts at deception were largely unsuccessful, however, because they mixed these efforts with overtly hostile actions (such as shooting the sentry), which forced Harrison to consistently employ force protection measures. Harrison's vigilance in the area of force protection limited the Indians' ability to achieve overwhelming surprise.

On his part, Harrison used deception early in the campaign to hide his real route of march through the new purchase. A reliance on training, discipline, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) protected the force once in the area of Prophet's Town. The SOPs developed to protect the force in a static encampment were the employment of a large guard detail

and the conduct of stand-to. The major failure in Harrison's protection effort was the lack of breastworks. Instead of building breastworks, the governor chose to use the available pioneer tools to cut wood for fires.

Although he remained cautious, Harrison believed he might be able to resolve the campaign without a fight. Consequently, he focused on improving the environmental conditions of soldiers living in the elements. Most of the militiamen did not have tents or any similar form of protection. The campaign had been in progress for almost sixty days, and the weather varied between rain, frost, and snow. The force also suffered various nonbattle injuries and illnesses during the campaign. Harrison might have harbored concerns about the fitness of the force for combat the next day if the planned negotiations with the Prophet failed. The fires also caused tactical problems for the army. The warming fires provided illumination for the Indians as they fired into the camp. As the battle raged, the soldiers realized the fires provided their attackers an advantage and tried to extinguish the fires. But many soldiers were shot as they approached the fires; consequently, the fires were never completely extinguished. The lack of breastworks and the use of warming fires probably increased the number of casualties among Harrison's force.<sup>43</sup>

Harrison, however, posted the guard in a way that would counter the Indians' skill and ability to infiltrate a static encampment.<sup>44</sup> The guard was large and posted close to the perimeter to limit the number of gaps available for the Indians to penetrate. The guard was to fight and delay any initial assault, allowing the soldiers time to occupy their positions on the perimeter. In reality, the guard provided early warning, but the speed and intensity of the first Indian attack caused the guard members to abandon their positions immediately. In the end, however, the early warning was ample enough for the other soldiers to occupy their positions.

Perhaps the simplest element of protection was Bartholomew's suggestion to have the men sleep on their arms. This suggestion, coupled with Harrison's orders to have soldiers sleep opposite their posts and man the perimeter in single, rather than double, ranks, was extremely effective. The logic was that, in Indian warfare, there was no "shock" from bayonet or cavalry charges to resist. Single ranks also offered advantages in speed because inexperienced troops maneuvered faster in single ranks rather than in double ones.<sup>45</sup> A single rank also reduced the potential for fratricide because there was only one rank firing in one direction during the confusion of battle.

Leadership was a critical element on both sides. The Prophet was not a combat leader but rather a spiritual leader. His brother was the respected warrior. The Prophet had the leadership ability to embolden his followers and encourage them to attack, but he did not have the leadership ability to lead them, by personal example, during the attack. It also seems that the Prophet's prophecies, while they initially encouraged his warriors' fanaticism, eventually became a detriment to morale once the warriors' expectations went unfulfilled.

Harrison performed well as a leader and had a good reputation in the army. Lieutenant Larrabee wrote that the governor was "a firm man and a verry [sic] good displenarian [sic] and is acquainted with Indian fiteing [sic], which is different from all others."<sup>46</sup> Harrison was careful to set the example and share in the hardships encountered by the soldiers. Before the return march to Vincennes, he made sure that his personal property was among the equipment burned when the army made room on its wagons for the wounded. He also moved throughout the battle area, inspiring soldiers and providing direction: "In the heat of the action, his voice was frequently heard and easily distinguished, giving his orders in the same calm, cool, and collected manner with which we had been used to receive them on drill or parade. The confidence of the troops in the General was unlimited, and his measures were well calculated to gain the particular esteem of the 4th Regt."<sup>47</sup>

Harrison was astute enough to understand the nature of the militiamen and how to gain their loyalty. He realized that the Regular Army's style of discipline would not get the best effort from militia troops. Thus, he limited the types of punishment allowed in the army. The army that Harrison led consisted mainly of units from Indiana and Kentucky who joined for a short campaign to fight Indians. He knew that individualistic frontiersmen were unfamiliar with organizational discipline and that the militia members and volunteers might choose to go home before submitting to the harsh discipline associated with the Regular Army.<sup>48</sup> (For a tactical analysis of elements of combat power, see table 3.)

Harrison's standards of discipline seem to have been successful. The army maintained its field discipline throughout the campaign, soldiers manned their positions in spite of serious casualties, and units repositioned and assaulted enemy positions while under fire. The small number of desertions during the campaign is noteworthy as is the willingness of junior leaders immediately to fill the void of killed or wounded commanders. All

	UNITED STATES	INDIAN CONFEDERACY
<b>MANEUVER</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enemy lack of coordination allowed the U.S. commander to reposition troops.</li> <li>• Dismounted dragoons employed as reserve.</li> <li>• Bayonet charges used to dislodge enemy.</li> <li>• Mounted charges used to dislodge enemy.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Three planned assaults.</li> <li>• Initial assault compromised before all forces were in attack positions.</li> <li>• Did not reposition; assaults continued in the same general areas.</li> </ul>
<b>FIREPOWER</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Muskets, rifles, and bayonets.</li> <li>• Massed fires and bayonet charges.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Muskets, rifles, bows and arrows, and tomahawks.</li> <li>• Fires usually not massed, delivered by individuals.</li> </ul>
<b>PROTECTION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SOPs.</li> <li>• Single ranks.</li> <li>• Sleep opposite posts, with weapons loaded, and bayonets fixed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relied on deception.</li> <li>• Relied on stealth.</li> <li>• Relied on psychological impact of their attack.</li> </ul>
<b>LEADERSHIP</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong leadership by General Harrison.</li> <li>• Chain of command quickly reestablished during battle.</li> <li>• Few desertions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prophet's leadership was poor.</li> <li>• Prophecies that did not come true eventually had a detrimental effect on morale.</li> </ul>

**Table 3.** Tactical analysis, elements of combat power

of these results imply that the organization developed a respectable foundation of discipline during its training.

The Prophet's forces, in contrast, failed in large part because of poor leadership. The Prophet tried to enhance the morale of his warriors by making promises, disguised as prophecies, that proved unrealistic. The approach worked in the initial stages of the battle, and the Indian assaults penetrated the perimeter. Eventually, the failure of the Indian force to achieve its objective of controlling the interior of the camp and killing Harrison caused the force to culminate. The fact that U.S. troops continued to kill and wound Indian warriors, despite the Prophet's promises to the contrary, eventually degraded morale to such a degree that the Indians called off the attack.

Combat power and its application determined the relative success or failure of each side's efforts during the engagement. One engagement often

decided the outcome of a campaign during this era. Consequently, understanding the importance of combat power was often crucial to the success or failure of a major military effort. Harrison understood the importance of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership and how these elements contribute to the success of military operations. Harrison took advantage of superior combat power to defeat the Indian forces at Tippecanoe.

## NOTES

1. Draper MSS. 1X41. This is from General Harrison's official report to Secretary of War Eustis. Harrison wrote his initial report from his headquarters near Prophet's Town on 8 November 1811. A second letter to Eustis, written after the command returned to Vincennes, describes the engagement in detail.
2. Beard, 55; Eckert *Gateway*, 714-15; Logan Esarey, ed., *Governors Messages and Letters*, vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922-24), 606-7; and Richard J. Reid, *The Battle of Tippecanoe* (Fordsville, KY: Wendell Sandefor, 1993), 26-27. The boatmen were along the shore pulling the boat with a rope. One of the men remained in the boat asleep. An Indian party, which had abandoned Prophet's Town once it heard of Harrison's advance through the new purchase, was traveling down the opposite bank of the Wabash when they encountered the boat. One of these Indians swam to the boat and killed the sleeping boatman.
3. Draper MSS. 1X39.
4. Beard, 54; Freeman Cleaves, *Old Tippecanoe* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 89-91; William M. Cockrum, *Pioneer History of Indiana* (Oakland City, IN: Press of Oakland City Journal, 1907), 257; Downey, 86; and Eckert, *Gateway*, 380.
5. Draper MSS. 1X41.
6. Draper MSS. 1X41; John Tipton, "John Tipton's, Tippecanoe Journal," *Indiana Magazine of History* 2, no. 4 (1906): 180-81; Pirtle, 39-40; and Walker, 19-20.
7. Adams, 365; Carter, 133; Draper MSS. 1X41; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 564-66; Sgt. Isaac Naylor, "Isaac Naylor's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 2, no. 4 (1906): 164; Walker, 20; and Florence G. Watts, 242. The delegation that the Prophet's emissaries referred to is the same delegation addressed in notes 39 and 40, chapter three. The Indians were probably not as surprised as they professed to be at the rapid advancement of the army since they had partially fortified their village with breastworks that ran around the village to the banks of the Wabash. Fortification of a static position was an unusual tactic for most Woodland Indians.

8. Burnett Creek is also known as "Burnett's Creek."
9. Esarey, *Messages and Letters*, vol. 1, 614. Harrison received severe criticism after the battle for allowing the Indians to select the army's campsite. The criticism was unjustified because the Indians did not select the campsite or lead the army to their eventual remain overnight (RON) location. Harrison asked the Indians about locations with enough wood and water to support the army, since the army had passed few suitable locations en route. The Indians described a general area to Harrison and Major Marston Clarke, and Major Waller Taylor from Harrison's staff conducted the reconnaissance for the RON. Clarke and Taylor selected the actual campsite for the army.
10. Cockrum, 261; and Draper MSS. 1X42.
11. Draper MSS. 1X42; Cockrum, 263-64; George Pence, "General Joseph Bartholomew," *Indiana Magazine of History* 14, no. 4 (December 1918): 292; and Walker, 21, 24, 29. The guard consisted of about 130 men and was under the command of the field-grade officer of the day. The guard consisted of two captains' guards of four NCOs and forty-two privates each and two subalterns (lieutenants or ensigns) guards of twenty NCOs and privates. Harrison habitually established a strong guard immediately outside of his perimeter each night. The idea of employing guards of this type in Indian warfare was to keep them close enough so that the Indians could not infiltrate between them. The traditional approach of stationing pickets to watch roads and other traditional avenues of approach was not practical because the Indians did not fight in traditional formations. The soldiers not on guard duty slept fully clothed with their weapons and opposite their posts on the perimeter. The fires were lit in front of the tents between the troops sleeping on the perimeter and the line of guards. After the battle started, the soldiers tried to extinguish the fires but were never completely successful because the Indians engaged them as soon as they silhouetted themselves against the flames.
12. Cockrum, 239; Esarey, *History*, 188, 334; Hook, 33; Pirtle, 51; Tucker, 224; and Wesley J. Whickar, 356. It is believed that the Potawatomi, led by Winnemac, were the largest contingent at Prophet's Town. Winnemac's leadership of the largest element might have gained him more influence than other leaders during a council.

13. Beard, 69-71; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 564; Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 556-67; Edmunds, *Quest*, 156-58; Hook, 33; and Pirtle, xv.
14. Downey, 87; and Whickar, 355-58.
15. Whickar, 358.
16. The summary of the Indian battle plan is from several sources: Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 565-66; Pirtle, 52, 56; Tucker, 224-26; and Whickar, 356-59. Shabonee commented about Harrison's practice of posting a strong guard: "Every night he picked his camping ground and set his sentinels all around, as though he expected we would attack him in the dark. We should have done so before we did, if it had not been for this precaution."
17. Cleaves, 99; Cockrum, 297; Naylor, 165; Pirtle, 52-53; Reid, 32-33; and Walker, 29. Corporal Mars, a member of Geiger's Company of Mounted Riflemen, was killed in action on 7 November 1811.
18. Cockrum, 279-308; Draper MSS. 1X41; and Naylor, 163-69.
19. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 565; Downey, 87; Pirtle, 53; Tucker, 224-26; and Walker, 30. Some reports claim that Owen found Harrison's horse and mounted it; other reports say that Owen owned and rode a light-colored horse throughout the campaign. In any case, the result was the same—Owen was shot and killed.
20. The description of the aggressiveness of the Indian attack and its lack of coordination is summarized from several sources. Tucker, 226, addresses the personal bravery of the Indians and their lack of coordination. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 565-66, Klinck, 101-2, and Pirtle, 69-70, describe the effect of the Prophet's predictions in promoting Indian aggressiveness during the attack.
21. Cockrum, 265.
22. Cleaves, 99; Draper MSS. 1X43; and Walker, 22, 26.
23. Draper MSS. 1X43; Pirtle, 59; Reid, 36; and Walker, 23-24. The charge was that Daviess led a single file of dragoons rather than one on line (abreast).
24. Cockrum, 265; Draper MSS. 1X43; and Reid, 36-38. Harrison was not sure if Robb's company was driven from their positions or moved because of some

mistake. Most sources attribute Robb's movement to an improper order or some other mistake.

25. Pirtle, 57. The Miami Indian tribe was not part of the confederacy, even though some individual members of the tribe supported the confederacy. The small hill that the Prophet watched the battle from is known today as "Prophet's Rock."
26. Pirtle, 61-62. Indian tactics are from Cockrum, 265, and Watts, 244. Larrabee remembers the signal as a whistling noise on an instrument made for that purpose; Cockrum describes it as a rattling noise made with dried deer hoofs. Both reports could be correct; there were several different tribes involved in the attack, and they could have used a variety of signaling techniques.
27. Draper MSS. 1X41-44; Drake, 152; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 624-27; and Eckert, *Gateway*, 438-39. General Harrison remarked that the "Indians manifested a ferocity uncommon even with them."
28. Whickar, 358-59.
29. Cockrum, 265; Draper MSS. 1X43; Reid, 37-38; and Watts, 244.
30. DeHart, 83; Draper MSS. 1X4, 1X40-44; and Pirtle, 56. See Appendix A for the breakdown by position of Americans killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA). Twenty-five American soldiers eventually died of wounds, and four died en route to the battle, making the total number of deaths during the campaign sixty-six. Harrison suggested that the Indians had poisoned or chewed their ammunition to increase the lethality of any wounds they administered. He commented on this because it seemed as if his soldiers were dying of wounds from which they would normally have recovered. Harrison was sure that some of the Indians chewed their ammunition because he saw examples of it in captured ammunition pouches. Few precise estimates of Indian casualties exist because the Indians usually attempted to recover their casualties. Consequently, most references limit statements of Indian casualties to thirty-six, thirty-eight, or forty. These casualty figures are derived from first-hand accounts of the number of Indians found dead on the battlefield the next day. Indian dead and not yet buried and several recent graves were discovered the next day by the dragoons at Prophet's Town, so the number of Indian casualties is probably higher than forty. Harrison or members of his command also received subsequent reports that Indian casualties were high. Many reports note

that the Indians carried off their dead as well as wounded during the battle. Harrison noted that a soldier had killed and scalped an Indian, and the Indian's body was found the next day at Prophet's Town, which confirms the practice of Indians recovering their dead. The Americans were also concerned with recovering the remains of their dead—Harrison reported that three American scalps had been taken and two of them were eventually recovered.

31. Naylor, 166. Naylor notes that Ensign John Tipton was elected and commissioned captain of Spencer's Yellow Jackets within one hour of the end of the battle. The commander, Captain Spencer, and both of his lieutenants were killed during the battle. Tipton, 181, notes that Samuel Flanagan, Jacob Zenor, and Phillip Bell were the other soldiers elected to positions in the chain of command to replace the officers killed in action. Lieutenant Larrabee assumed command of a company of the 4th U.S. upon the death of the commander, Captain Baen.
32. Cleaves, 103; Naylor, 167-69; Pirtle, 71; Tipton, 181; Walker, 33, 35; and Watts, 245.
33. DeHart, 83; and Draper MSS. 1X40.
34. Cockrum, 269; Downey, 89; Draper MSS. 1X44; Edmunds, *Quest*, 159; Naylor, 167-69; Pirtle, 9, 76; Tipton, 181; and Walker, 33-34.
35. Draper MSS. 1X44; and Walker, 33, 38. The wounded Indian was treated and left at Tippecanoe. The Indian survived his wounds long enough to deliver the message. Harrison received confirmation of this and reported it to the secretary of war in a report dated 4 December 1811.
36. Cockrum, 270; Walker, 35-37; and Watts, 245-46. There were two deserters from the battle. Sergeant Reed and his eight-man detachment at the blockhouse captured the deserters and turned them over to Harrison once the army arrived at the blockhouse. Immediately after the battle, Harrison dispatched an express rider to Vincennes with news of the engagement. At Fort Harrison, Lieutenant Colonel James Miller received word of the army's lack of supplies and sent a resupply boat to the blockhouse.
37. Adams, 369; Cockrum, 270; and Watts, 245-46.
38. Drake, 155-56; Edmunds, *Quest*, 158-60; Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 13; Draper MSS. 1X48; Pirtle, 62-63; and Walker, 38.

39. All definitions for the elements of combat power are from Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, 2-10 to 2-11.
40. In one of Tipton's journal entries, he notes that General Harrison threatened to "break the officers" because they had not been enforcing the requirement to parade in line of battle before reveille (stand-to).
41. Cleaves, 102; and Pence, 292.
42. Walker, 16. Walker remarked that the Indians "lurked" around Fort Harrison nightly and alarmed the sentries. Their attempts to spy on the army or use the delegation to deceive Harrison about the intent of the Prophet are from Whickar, 353-63. Shabonee's account indicates that the Indians wanted to draw Harrison farther into the new purchase and, once Harrison's LOCs were extended, attack the army. This would fit the Indian pattern established in earlier combat in the American northwest.
43. Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 604-5. After the battle, Harrison claimed that a shortage of pioneer tools forced him to decide between building breastworks or chopping wood for fires. Controversy surrounds this decision, and many of Harrison's detractors believed that Harrison was using the shortage of tools as an excuse for his failure as a commander. Before the battle, in a 29 October 1811 letter to the secretary of war, he commented on a shortage of axes and the poor quality of the axes that were available. He told Eustis that it was taking the army twice as long as expected to build Fort Harrison because of the lack of tools and the poor quality of those that were available.
44. Walker, 35. The Indians could approach within a few feet of a sentry without discovery. The sentinel at Fort Harrison was shot from a thicket of bushes about twelve feet to his front.
45. Draper MSS. 4X42.
46. Watts, 232.
47. Walker, 44.
48. Cleaves, 90; Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison," 24; and Walker, 15-16, 31-32. Wayne was noted for his harsh punishments to enforce discipline in the American Legion. Gunderson notes that Harrison was not as "Draconian" as Wayne, and he managed to secure a "fierce bonding" with his troops. Many

sources comment on Harrison's ability to exercise an appropriate style of leadership that resulted in effective performances from militia troops. Contrast the desertions of several hundred militia troops during St. Clair's expedition to fifteen reported desertions (Reid, 15) during Harrison's campaign. Reid's figures do not differentiate between Regular Army and militia deserters; records and accounts that are available indicate that militia and regulars both deserted. Cleaves writes that Harrison directed that soldiers would not receive "petty punishments" for "the most trifling errors of the private soldier." Walker remarked that the order developed among the troops "an affectionate and lasting regard for their General." The order was not always followed, and some problems ensued as a result. Colonel Boyd (Harrison's second in command) ordered the flogging of a wagoner for a breach of discipline. The militia captain assigned to conduct the flogging refused. Harrison eventually resolved the situation to the satisfaction of the militiamen. The Regular Army of the time was recognized for strict discipline developed through a harsh system of punishments. Harrison knew that militia soldiers would not respond well to this type of discipline, and about two-thirds of his army was militia. Walker said that while at Fort Harrison:

. . . some murmuring took place among them [militia], being heartily sick of the camp, and desirous of returning to their homes. Many, indeed, threatened to leave at all hazards, which caused the Governor much anxiety and trouble. He appeared not disposed to detain any man against his inclination; being endowed by nature with a heart as humane as brave; in his frequent addresses to the militia, his eloquence was formed to persuade; appeals were made to reason as well as feeling—and never were they made in vain—when the militia, unused to military restriction, threatened desertion, his eloquence calmed their passions, and hushed their discontented murmuring and in a short time all became tranquil, and unanimity reigned throughout the army.

## V. BATTLEFIELD STAFF RIDE

Sam, sleep with your moccasins on, for them red devils are going to fight before day.<sup>1</sup>

—J. S. Pfrimmer, *from a story told by his father, Sam, who fought at Tippecanoe*

### *Introduction*

The current terrain of the Tippecanoe encampment does not significantly differ from General Harrison's description. Several small built-up areas and roads encompass the approaches to the encampment. The battlefield is on a small plateau that is generally open throughout most of the area. Moreover, there is still a drop-off from the encampment site to Burnett Creek, and the terrain in this area remains wooded. The area behind the creek leads to Prophet's Rock and consists of open areas broken by small stands of trees. A two-lane road runs along the hillside below Prophet's Rock.

A fence surrounds most of the encampment area, and there is a set of steps that lead to Burnett Creek. The monument and museum are in the general area that Major Samuel Wells and the mounted riflemen from Kentucky occupied. This built-up area of the park leads to the town of Battle Ground, Indiana. The swamps and marshes that protected the Indians from the dragoons' assault no longer exist. The opposite end of the battlefield, near the position of Spencer's Yellow Jackets, is still wooded. Today, a two-lane road and railroad tracks run parallel to the positions occupied by the infantry and militia commanded by Maj. G. C. Floyd (4th U.S.) and Lt. Col. Bartholomew (IN militia). The area leading to Prophet's Town is generally open fields. A historical marker notes the general location of the town itself.

Since the encampment occupied a relatively small area, a survey of most of the battlefield can be made from a single vantage point. The main areas of action during the battle are close enough together to allow a walking tour to cover the events chronologically. Personnel conducting the staff ride can also choose to cover the events in a clockwise or counterclockwise manner. Regardless of the method selected, the participants will be able to see other key pieces of the battlefield from most vantage points.

This chapter contains a map for the suggested route of the staff ride, identifies stands that locate specific events, provides vignettes, and presents discussion topics. Units conducting the staff ride should allow for two days

in which to visit all of the stands associated with the campaign and battle. The campaign route is approximately 150 miles and will require transportation to visit all of the stands along the route; one day is sufficient for this phase of the staff ride. Another day is needed to conduct a walking tour of the battlefield. Transportation between Prophet's Town and the battlefield is not required, as the distance is less than one and one-half miles. Prophet's Town is on private property, and units must coordinate with the owner if they plan any extensive activity at that stand. The vignettes will highlight the specific actions at each stand. The discussion topics should be tailored to fit the particular training objectives of the unit conducting the staff ride.

The Tippecanoe battlefield is part of the Indiana state park system. Visitors to the battlefield will find various monuments and a battlefield museum that are interesting sources of background information and can supplement the field-study phase of the staff ride. Additionally, several area libraries and a county historical association can provide information for the visitor to the battlefield. As a starting point, visitors can contact the Tippecanoe County Historical Association at (765) 567-2147.

### ***Suggested Route and Vignettes***


There are two distinct elements to the suggested staff ride route. The first part of the staff ride is oriented on the operational aspects of the campaign and follows the route of Harrison's army from Vincennes to Prophet's Town. The second part of the staff ride focuses on the tactical aspects of the battle and takes place at the Tippecanoe battlefield. To prevent confusion about how the discussion should be focused at a particular stand along the route (i.e., should the discussion orient on operational or tactical aspects), each route is identified differently. *Note: The operational-level stands along the campaign route are identified alphabetically, while the tactical stands are identified numerically*

#### **Stand A**

#### **Grouseland<sup>2</sup>**

(Park and Scott Streets, near the center of Vincennes, Indiana. See Indiana map 4 for locations in relations to a modern map. Letters indicate stand locations.)

***Situation:*** Between 1808 and 1811, four major meetings were conducted in the Vincennes area between Indian leaders from Prophet's Town and



Map 4. Tippecanoe campaign (letters indicate stand locations)

Governor Harrison. The first two meetings were between the Prophet and Harrison, and the third and fourth meetings were between Harrison and Tecumseh. The Prophet, during his meetings with Harrison, attempted to convince the governor that the settlement at Prophet's Town was not a threat. During the meetings, Harrison noted that the Indians accompanying the Prophet appeared destitute. The governor later sent supplies to Prophet's Town to help sustain the settlement during the winter of 1808-9.

The meetings between Tecumseh and Harrison were quite different, their purpose being to resolve problems generated by Harrison's successful conclusion of the Treaty of Fort Wayne. Several hundred Indians, most of whom were warriors, accompanied Tecumseh to Vincennes for these meetings. They were a stark contrast from the destitute Indians that had accompanied the Prophet during his earlier meetings with Harrison.

The activities conducted at Grouseland were diplomatic in nature and oriented on preventive diplomacy. (Preventive diplomacy consists of the diplomatic actions taken before a predictable crisis in order to prevent or limit violence.<sup>3</sup>) All of the meetings between Harrison and the Prophet, as well as Harrison and Tecumseh, fit into this category. During the last meeting, in the summer of 1811, Tecumseh informed Harrison that he would begin his southern travels to recruit more Indians for the pan-Indian confederacy.

**Discussion Points:** Could the location of the meetings have influenced their outcome? Since Tecumseh and Harrison refused to change their individual points of view about the validity of the Treaty of Fort Wayne, was preventive diplomacy a realistic option? Before the last meeting, during the summer of 1811, Harrison asked Tecumseh to limit the number of Indians that accompanied him to the meeting. He made the request because of the near outbreak of violence at their first meeting. Harrison also ensured that Vincennes was well garrisoned prior to Tecumseh's arrival for the second meeting. Tecumseh, meanwhile, decreased the number of Indians that accompanied him, but his entourage still remained large, as befitted a warrior of his status. Harrison continued to chafe at the size of the delegation, apparently not understanding that a smaller retinue would be demeaning to Tecumseh. Considering the atmosphere of distrust on all sides, it is not surprising that the meetings began poorly and ended without positive result. What impact did these misunderstandings have on the effectiveness of the attempts at preventive diplomacy? Should the meetings have been held? What could have been done to prevent the misunderstandings?

## **Stand B**

### **Fort Knox, Indiana Territory**

(Several historical markers two miles north of Vincennes, Indiana, on Lower Fort Knox Road and the Wabash River)

**Situation:** The fort protected the approaches to Vincennes and was positioned on the Wabash. It was occupied by regulars, who were often augmented by militia (as the situation dictated). The army for the Tippecanoe campaign was initially organized in this area.

**Discussion Points:** Was the fort in the proper position to protect the approaches to the territorial capital (Vincennes)? Was manning of the fort, or increasing the size of the garrison at the fort, an example of a preventive deployment?<sup>4</sup>

## **Stand C**

### **Fort Harrison, Indiana Territory**

(Historical marker at 3350 North 4th Street, Terre Haute, Indiana—the Elks Club)

**Situation:** Fort Harrison was built to show U.S. resolve regarding occupation of lands ceded by the Indians in the Treaty of Fort Wayne. The fort was also the training location for the army before its deployment to the Prophet's Town area.

**Discussion Points:** Was this an appropriate show of force? Did establishment of the fort demonstrate American resolve or incite violence on the part of the Indians? Is this an example of a preventive deployment?

## **Stand D**

### **Army Deception Crossing Site on the Wabash River**

(Approximately three miles north of Big Raccoon Creek, vicinity Montezuma, Indiana)

**Situation:** The army departed from Fort Harrison and began moving through the new purchase toward Prophet's Town. Harrison wanted the Indians to believe that the army would travel along the eastern route, which was a shorter route, but also a less secure one because of the close terrain that offered advantages to an ambushing force. To complete the deception,

Harrison ordered his soldiers to cut a road (which was normally done to ease movement of logistics trains) further along the deception route of march. Harrison and his army crossed the Wabash on 31 October 1811 to the side of the river that was used less frequently but offered better protection for the force because of its more open terrain.

**Discussion Points:** Harrison still believed that a show of force might accomplish his operational goals. Was deception appropriate during a peace operation? How does a commander balance the need for force protection with maintenance of a nonhostile or less-offensive posture?

### **Stand E**

#### **Boyd's Blockhouse**

(The mouth of the Vermillion River on the west bank of the Wabash River)

**Situation:** Once the army reached the vicinity of their crossing site at the Vermillion, the force halted and built a blockhouse to protect the army's water LOC. The blockhouse was twenty-five-foot square, with breastworks on each corner, and was used to store the extra equipment, heavy baggage, and boats not needed in the objective area. Injured and sick soldiers were also left at the blockhouse.

**Discussion Points:** Was the construction of the blockhouse an effective means of protecting the army's LOC? What advantages were gained by downloading equipment? Was there a better LOC? How effective would an overland LOC have been as the army's primary LOC?

### **Stand F**

#### **Army Crossing Site on the Vermillion River**

(SR63 and the Vermillion River)

**Situation:** After its departure from the blockhouse, the army crossed the Vermillion River and continued its approach to Prophet's Town. The army still had approximately sixty miles to travel to reach the villages, and the final approach to the objective area would require another three days. Although the troops continued to find signs of Indians, the earlier deception proved successful, and the army was not compromised as it continued its march into Indian Territory.

**Discussion Points:** The successful deception allowed the army to conduct an unopposed and unobserved river crossing of the Vermillion River. Did this benefit outweigh the possible shortcomings of using deception operations during a peace operation?

### Stand G

#### Final Army Encampment, 5 November 1811, Before Arrival at Prophet's Town

(Two miles west of Montmorenci on 800W and Little Pine Creek)

**Situation:** The army camped within ten miles of Prophet's Town and remained undetected by the Indians until the next day, 6 November 1811. (See map 4 for Tippecanoe campaign locations in relation to a modern map. Letters indicate stand locations.)

**Discussion Points:** Security was obviously enhanced because of the deception. Did showing up unexpectedly in the area of Prophet's Town offer any operational advantage to the army? Was Harrison's bargaining position with the Prophet improved, or did the army's unexpected arrival force a confrontation with the Prophet?

### Stand 1

#### Prophet's Town


(A historical marker located on State Road SR225 at Houston Road)

**Situation:** The Prophet was in charge at the Tippecanoe headquarters, where Tecumseh had left strict orders that the Indians were not to engage Harrison's forces. The Tippecanoe headquarters was a large Indian village that was partially fortified with rudimentary breastworks. The town was between one to two miles long and ran generally along the Wabash River. The living areas of the village were made up of between 100 and 200 Indian-style huts. There was also a large storehouse containing corn and beans. Cultivated fields used for farming probably ran to the south of the village; Harrison said that they were about 500 yards "below the town" and extended all the way to the banks of the Wabash.<sup>5</sup>

**Vignette:** "He [Tecumseh] was not at the battle of Tippecanoe. If he had been there it would not have been fought. It was too soon. It frustrated all of his plans. He [The Prophet] was a great medicine. He talked much to the

Indians and told them what had happened. He told much truth, but some things that he told did not come to pass. He was called 'The Prophet.' Your people new [knew] him only by that name. He was very cunning, but he was not so great a warrior as his brother, and he could not control the young warriors so well who were determined to fight. Perhaps your people do not know that the battle of Tippecanoe was the work of white men who came from Canada and urged us to make war. Two of them who wore red coats were at the Prophet's Town the day that your army came. It was they who urged Elskatawwa [the Prophet] to fight. They dressed themselves like Indians, to show us how to fight. They did not know our mode. We wanted to attack at midnight. They wanted to wait till daylight."<sup>6</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Unity of command, objective. (For American troop dispositions, see map 5.)



Map 5. Tippecanoe battle, 7 November 1811 (numbers indicate stand locations)

## Stand 2

### Encampment at Tippecanoe

(Tippecanoe monument)

**Situation:** The encampment formed a trapezoid. Spencer's Yellow Jackets were at the western end of the encampment. The front of the trapezoid (the front line) faced Prophet's Town, while the rear of the trapezoid (the rear line) abutted Burnett Creek. The eastern end of the perimeter was Wells' position and that of the mounted riflemen. The dragoons, dismounted and serving as the army's reserve, were to the rear of the mounted riflemen and formed at right angles to the riflemen and the front line. Many of the horses and wagons were inside the perimeter. The remainder of the livestock was outside the perimeter, on the prairie.

Soldiers lit warming fires, and a large detachment guarded the camp. Breastworks were not built around the perimeter of the camp. Some of the regulars and officers pitched tents, but most of the soldiers slept in the open near their battle positions. All soldiers rested, wearing their equipment and accouterments, with weapons loaded and bayonets fixed. Most of the army slept in the elements, since the militia did not have tents.

**Vignette 1:** "It was my constant custom to assemble all of the field officers at my tent every evening by signal to give them the watch word and their instructions for the night—those given for the night of the 6th were that each Corps which formed a part of the exterior line of the encampment should hold its own ground until relieved. The Dragoons were directed to parade dismounted in case of night attack with their pistols in their belts and to act as a Corps de Reserve. The Camp was defended by two Captains Guards consisting of four noncommissioned officers and 42 privates and two Subalterns Guards of twenty noncommissioned officers and privates. The whole under the command of the field officer of the day. The troops were regularly called up an hour before day and made to continue under arms until it was quite light."<sup>7</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Commander's guidance, SOPs.

**Vignette 2:** "At or near 4 o'clock in the morning I was alarmed by the discharge of a gun, on which I immediately repaired to my company, where I found my men all paraded at their posts. The position of the men during the night, together with myself, while at rest was lying on our arms with our clothes on—as for myself I lay with my boots on greatcoat on &

accouterments buckled round me, with my rifle in my arms. At the report of the gun I had no more to do than to throw off my blanket, put my hat on & go to my company which was eight or ten steps from my tent, the time might be one or two minutes, where I found my men as above mentioned.”<sup>8</sup>

*Teaching Points:* SOPs, location of key leaders.

### Stand 3

#### Initial Engagement by the Sentry

(The east side of the camp; the sentries were located outside of the perimeter)

*Situation:* The orderly was standing by preparing to give the signal for stand-to. General Harrison was in his tent talking to some of his officers. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew, the field officer of the day, was inspecting his sentries.<sup>9</sup> Some soldiers were awake or waking up in preparation for stand-to. Other soldiers were adding fuel to the warming fires as a drizzling rain fell. Then, the sentry near Major Wells’ command fired at an infiltrating Indian. The wounded Indian cried out, and his companions rushed the camp from several sides, pursuing the retreating sentries. As the sentries retired into the camp, the units on the perimeter were awake and forming for battle.

*Vignette 1:* “I awoke about four o’clock the next morning. . . . A drizzling rain was falling and all things were still and quiet throughout the camp. I was engaged in making a calculation when I should arrive at home. In a few moments I heard the crack of a rifle. . . . I had just time to think that some sentinel was alarmed and had fired his rifle without a real cause, when I heard the crack of another rifle, followed by an awful Indian yell all around the encampment. In less than a minute I saw the Indians charging our line most furiously and shooting a great many balls into our camp fires, throwing the live coals into the air three or four feet high. The sentinels, closely pursued by the Indians, came to the line of the encampment in haste and confusion. My brother, William Naylor, was on guard. He was pursued so rapidly and furiously that he ran to the nearest point on the left flank, where he remained with a company of regular soldiers until the battle was near its termination. A young man, whose name was Daniel Pettit, was pursued so closely and furiously by an Indian as he was running from the guard fire to our lines, that to save his life he cocked his rifle as he ran and turning suddenly round, placed the muzzle of his gun against the body of the

Indian and shot an ounce ball through him. The Indian fired his gun at the same instant, but it being longer than Pettit's the muzzle passed by him and set fire to a handkerchief which he had tied round his head."<sup>10</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Establishing security, force protection measures.

**Vignette 2:** "The men that were to crawl upon their bellies into the camp were seen in the grass by white man who had eyes like an owl, and he fired and hit his mark. The Indian was not brave. He cried out. He should have lain still and died. Then the other men fired. The other Indians were fools. They jumped out of the grass and yelled. They believed what had been told them, that a white man would run at a noise made in the night. Then many Indians who had crept very close so as to be ready to take scalps when the white men ran, all yelled like wolves, wild cats and screech owls; but it did not make the white men run. They jumped up right from their sleep with guns in their hands and sent a shower of bullets at every spot where they heard a noise. They could not see us. We could see them, for they had fires. Whether we were ready or not we had to fight now for the battle was begun."<sup>11</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Stealth, alternate plans in case of an early compromise.

## Stand 4

### First Indian Attack

(Apex of Geiger's and Barton's companies)

**Situation:** The Indians gained an advantage almost immediately in the area where Captain Barton's company (4th U.S.) tied in with Captain Frederick Geiger's company (KY mounted riflemen). The onslaught happened so rapidly that the Indians broke through the companies to the inside of the camp perimeter. General Harrison arrived in the area, quickly assessed the situation, and ordered Cook's company (4th U.S.) and Wentworth's company (IN militia, commanded by Peters) from the rear line to the shattered angle formed by Barton and Geiger.

**Vignette 1:** "At this moment my friend Warnock was shot by a rifle ball through his body. He ran few yards and fell dead on the ground. Our lines were broken and a few Indians were found on the inside of the encampment. In a few moments they were all killed. Our lines closed up and our men in the proper places. One Indian was killed in the back part of Captain Geiger's tent, while he was attempting to tomahawk the Captain. The

Indians made four or five most fierce charges on our lines, yelling and screaming as they advanced, shooting balls and arrows into our ranks. At each charge they were driven off in confusion, carrying their dead and wounded as they retreated.”<sup>12</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Immediate response to the threat, SOPs.

**Vignette 2:** “I rode to the angle that was attacked. I found that Barton’s company had suffered severely and the left of Geiger’s entirely broken. I immediately ordered Cook’s and the late Capt. Wentworth’s under Lieut. Peters to be brought up from the centre of the rear line where the ground was much more defensible and formed across the angle in support of Barton’s and Geiger’s.”<sup>13</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Location of the commander, the impact on decision making, the assumption of command after leaders are killed or wounded.

## Stand 5

### Second Indian Attack

(Southeast edge of the line in Floyd’s area)

**Situation:** Harrison rode to the next critical area, which was at the front line (facing Prophet’s Town). There, Major Daviess was organizing his dragoons (KY militia), and he repeatedly asked Harrison for permission to attack a group of Indians in a stand of trees fifteen or twenty feet away, who were effectively engaging the soldiers on the front line. Harrison then authorized Daviess to drive the Indians from the small grove. Daviess led a single-file charge of about twenty dragoons. The Indians attacked the dragoons on their flanks, killing Daviess and another dragoon and wounding a third. Snelling and his men responded by attacking the Indians in the trees, dislodging them with bayonets.

**Vignette:** “. . . having the command of Capt Baens company, and judging it was better to charge the indians in front, than to stand and receive their fires, I so requested of Major Floyd, who commanded the right wing, as did Lieut. Hawkins commanding Whitnes, but was refused on the ground of leaving this part of the line and angle wholly exposed to the Indians.<sup>14</sup> [T]hese two companies not only had to contend with the enemy in front, but those at the head of the camp, that were nigh this angle. Major Daviss had formed a party troop in the rear of these companies. [T]he commanding in chief arrived here, and seeing the situation of the companies, he ordered Major

Daviss to charge those indians in front. [T]he Majors undaunted courage hurried him forward with two small a force to assure success. [I]n the charge the Major received a Mortal wound Coll White killed and one dragoon wounded. [T]he party returned without accomplishing its object, however the indians soon found too warm a reseption [sic] and left the ground in front.<sup>15</sup> [T]he action had by this time become almost general on all sides. Capt Snelling and Prescott was ordered from this wing, to support the line across the head of the camp [vicinity Major Wells' command, to fill the space vacated by Robb's company], their vacancy supplied [sic] with dragoons. Capt S[nelling] charged and dislodged a boddy [sic] of indians in that direction and nigh this angle. [T]he manner the indians faught [sic] was desperate."<sup>16</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Commander's repositioning of men on the battlefield, use of the reserve, execution of the reserve mission by other units if the reserve fails.

## Stand 6

### Third Indian Attack

(Spencer's Yellow Jackets on the west side of the camp)

**Situation:** Spencer's Yellow Jackets (IN militia) were among the last engaged in the battle because the Indians in this area were not prepared to assault when the attack was compromised. The Yellow Jackets defended an area too large for them;<sup>17</sup> the attack in this area was particularly savage and quickly decimated the Yellow Jacket chain of command. As Harrison arrived, he found that John Tipton, an ensign, was the only surviving officer among Spencer's Yellow Jackets. Thomas Montgomery, a second lieutenant, was commanding Warrick's company (IN militia), which was adjacent to the Yellow Jackets. Harrison ordered Robb's company (IN militia) to move to the aid of Spencer's and Warrick's companies. Harrison directed Prescott's company (4th U.S.) to fill the gap at Robb's old position.

**Vignette 1:** "[A] blood[y] Combat Took Place at Precisely 15 minutes before 5 in morning which lasted two hours and 20 minutes of a continewel [sic] firing while many times mixed among the Indians so that we Could not tell the indians and our men apart. [T]hey kept up a firing on three sides of us took our tent from the gueard [sic] fire. [O]ur men fought Brave and By the timely help of Capt Cook [actually Lieutenant Larrabee, Cook arrived

later] with a Company of infantry we maid [sic] a Charge and Drove them out of the timber across the prairie.”<sup>18</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Location of commander, repositioning of forces, assaults used in the defense to disrupt and dislodge attacking forces.

**Vignette 2:** “Where’s your captain?” “Dead, sir.” “Your first lieutenant?” “Dead, sir.” “Your second lieutenant?” “Dead, sir.” “Your ensign?” “Here, sir!”<sup>19</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Reestablishment of the chain of command.

## Stand 7

### Bayonet and Dragoon Charge

(East side of the camp, in the vicinity of the Kentucky mounted riflemen)

**Situation:** Harrison wanted to conduct coordinated assaults from each end of the encampment at first light. Major Wells, unaware of Harrison’s intent, prepared to attack the Indians at his end of the encampment, marshaling infantry and dragoons for the difficult task. The infantry subsequently attacked with fixed bayonets and drove the Indians back. The dragoons, now mounted, continued the attack until the marsh prevented continued pursuit.

**Vignette 1:** “Major Wells who commanded on the left flank not knowing my intentions precisely, had taken the command of these companies [and] had charged the enemy before I had formed the body of Dragoons with which I meant to support the infantry, a small detachment of those [dragoons] were however ready and proved amply. The Indians were driven by the Infantry at the point of the Bayonet and the Dragoons pursued and forced them into a marsh where they could not be followed.”<sup>20</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Use of counterattacks, impact of subordinate initiative on synchronization, situation awareness.

**Vignette 2:** “As soon as daylight came our warriors saw that the Prophet’s grand plan had failed—that the great white chief was alive riding fearlessly among his troops in spite of bullets, and their hearts melted. After that the Indians fought to save themselves, not to crush the whites. It was a terrible defeat. Our men all scattered and tried to get away. The white horsemen chased them and cut them down with long knives [swords].”<sup>21</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Morale, assignment of unachievable objectives.

## Stand 8

### Final Counterattack

#### (Vicinity Spencer's Yellow Jackets)

**Situation:** Light was beginning to break over the battleground. Harrison had already repositioned several companies to reinforce his left and right flanks in preparation for the daylight assaults. Wells, unaware of Harrison's wishes, began his series of assaults to destroy the Indians in his area. Companies from the 4th U.S. moved into position to support the battered Yellow Jackets. As soon as the infantry arrived in position, they charged with bayonets and drove the Indians out of their position. (For the scheme of maneuver in the battle, see map 6.)

**Vignette:** “. . . at the same time I received an order (as did Lieut Hawkins) and proceeded accordingly to support the rear line. [O]n my arrival the indians had gained ground upon Spencers company, being the senior officer present, commanded and formed the companies, charged the indians killed five and put the rest to flight. Capt Cook (and company) was also ordered to this point, but arrived too late to bare [sic] any share of the charge.”<sup>22</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Use of counterattacks, junior leader initiative and ability.


## Stand 9

### Prophet's Rock

(Historical markers on Prophet's Rock Road and the hillside southwest of Battleground, Indiana)

**Situation:** During the battle, the Prophet established himself on a small hill overlooking the battlefield. To inspire the warriors and contribute his mystic powers that would help guarantee success in battle, he beat a drum and shouted incantations to the Great Spirit. Throughout the morning, runners informed the Prophet that his magic had failed to stop the bayonets and bullets of the enemy. The Prophet urged the warriors on and promised that the prophecy would be fulfilled. As daylight broke over the battleground, the warriors realized that the attack had failed and abandoned further attempts.

**Teaching Points:** Poor exercise of command and control, poor leadership.



**Map 6.** Interior movements, Tippecanoe battle, 7 November 1811: (A) Cook and Peters are ordered to reinforce the angle formed by Geiger and Barton. (B) Robb is driven from his position or mistakenly moves out of position and is halted by a staff officer. Robb is eventually ordered to reinforce the Yellow Jackets. (C) Prescott fills the spot on the left flank that was vacated by Robb. (D) Snelling, Albright, and Scott from the front line and Wilson from the rear line are ordered to the left flank. The bayonet charges on this flank are ordered by Wells before Harrison has the dragoons completely organized and prepared to assist. (E) Larrabee and Cook are ordered to the right flank in preparation for the daylight bayonet charges.

## Stand 10

### Encampment

(Tippecanoe monument)

**Situation:** 7-8 November 1811. Throughout the day, the army consolidated and reorganized. In addition, the soldiers erected breastworks about four feet high to strengthen their defensive position, treated the wounded, buried the dead, and reestablished their chains of command. That night, the force maintained 100-percent security in case of another attack. The next day, 8 November 1811, a mounted force moved to Prophet's Town and found the village empty. At the village, the army seized any usable supplies that it could transport, and all remaining captured supplies and material were burned along with the village. A captured and wounded Indian was treated and left at the village under the care of an Indian woman.

**Vignette 1:** "... no company suffered like ours. [W]e then held an Election for officers. I was elected Capt. Saml Flanagan first Lieut and Jacob Zenor second Lieut and Philip Bell Ensign. [W]e then built Breast-works our men in much confusion, our flower [flour] been too small and our beeve [beef] last [lost]. Last night onley [sic] half Rations of whisky [sic] and no corn for our horses. [M]y horse killed I got [M]cmahons to Ride 37 of them had been killed wounded and lost last night. I had one quart of whisky [sic]."<sup>23</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Reestablish the chain of command, reestablish security.

**Vignette 2:** "... the day was spent in attending to the police of the camp fortifying the same, and preparing to attack the town the next day. [T]he night of the 7th was cold and rainney [sic], and but a little Soldiers rest obtained. [A]t sunrise the 8th inst the dragoons were sent to discover the situation of the town, and in 15 minuets [sic] an express arrived informed that the indians where leaveing [sic] town and all its contents had crossed the [W]abash and that the Dragoons had possession of the town. [A] number of waggons [sic] where [sic] dispatched, and returned from town loaded with beans corn and peas. . . . [T]he day was spent burning and destroying the town of Tippicanoe [sic], and preparing for the march the next day."<sup>24</sup>

**Teaching Points:** Preparation for future operations, focus on accomplishment of campaign objectives, redeployment upon accomplishment of campaign termination criteria.

## NOTES

1. As cited in DeHart, 119. The quote is from a comment made to Pffrimmer's father, Sam, by a soldier named Bayard. Bayard made the remark to Sam on the evening of 6 November 1811.
2. Eckert, *Sorrow*, 935-36. The governor's mansion was known as Grouseland because of the large numbers of ruffed grouse that inhabited the surrounding woods.
3. The definition of preventive diplomacy is from Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 2.
4. According to Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 2-3, preventive deployment is the deployment of military forces at the interface or zone of potential conflict in order to deter violence.
5. Draper MSS. 1X41; and Walker, 20, 30.
6. Shabonee, as cited in Whickar, 356.
7. Draper MSS. 1X42. Isaac Naylor, 169, describes the watchword for the night of 6 November 1811 as "wide awake, wide awake." The present-day 151st Infantry Regiment, Indiana Army National Guard, retains the watchword as their regimental motto.
8. Report submitted 8 January 1812 by Captain Joel Cook, 4th U.S., in Presidential Papers Microfilm, *William Henry Harrison*, Presidential Papers Microfilm Series 1: 1734-1813 Aug., Reel 1.
9. Pence, 292.
10. Naylor, 165.
11. Shabonee, as cited in Whickar, 357.
12. Naylor, 165-66.
13. General Harrison's report to the secretary of war, in Draper MSS. 1X42.
14. Lieutenant Charles Larrabee commanded Captain Baen's company because Baen was serving as an acting major (battalion commander) during the battle. Larrabee continued to command the company after the army's return to Vin-

cennes because Baen was wounded during the battle and subsequently died on 9 November 1811. The reference to Hawkins commanding Whitnes refers to the fact that Captain Whitney (Whitnes) resigned from the army in July 1811, and Lieutenant Hawkins commanded his old company. The information on Whitney is summarized from note 21, Watts, 243. Green, 125, and Walker, 6, note that Whitney resigned because of a scandal that resulted from some of the unorthodox disciplinary measures he used while he was a company commander.

15. Colonel White was a militia officer whose unit was not called up to participate in the campaign. Colonel White enlisted and served as a private during the campaign. Colonel White was not the only officer that volunteered to serve at a lower rank. Major Wells was a major general in the Kentucky militia who volunteered to serve as a private. Harrison appointed Wells as a major and gave him command of a battalion of mounted riflemen. See George Fauntleroy White, "Memoir of Colonel Isaac White," *Indiana Magazine of History* 15, no. 4 (1919): 327-41, for more information on Colonel White.
16. Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, as cited in Watts, 243-44.
17. Draper MSS. 1X43. Harrison, in his report to the secretary of war, acknowledged that the Yellow Jackets were assigned a position on the perimeter that was too large for them to cover.
18. Tipton, 180-81.
19. Exchange between General Harrison and Ensign John Tipton as cited in Downey, 88.
20. General Harrison's report to the secretary of war, in Draper MSS. 1X43.
21. Shabonee, as cited in Whickar, 357.
22. Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, as cited in Watts, 244.
23. Tipton, 180-81.
24. Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, as cited in Watts, 244.