

Excerpt from *An Oral History of Americans in Vietnam, 1945–1975*

GENERAL WILLIAM E. DePUY

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When I first arrived it wasn't so grim, or if it was I didn't know it. In April of 1964, Vietnam seemed peaceful. On the surface, very little was going on. The country and the U.S. program were trying to recover from the coup against Diem. The government was a shambles, a comic-opera kind of government, with coup after coup. I traveled all over the country. In that kind of a war, most of the time nothing is happening. It's just like today—the sun is shining, the birds are singing, the flowers are in bloom. There were some intelligence reports that things were beginning to stir, but the countryside was quiet. No North Vietnamese units had yet gone into combat. We weren't even sure there were any in the South. It was a small war, a guerrilla war with an occasional strike.

But all that changed in December of 1964, when the North Vietnamese, as we now know, ordered an offensive. It was launched by an attack against the Catholic strategic hamlet of Binh Gia in Phuoc Tuy province, just east of Saigon. The town was attacked by the 9th VC Division. That was a milestone, because the 9th was the first division to be formed by the other side in South Vietnam. It was formed first from two regiments that had been around for quite a while, the 272nd and the 273rd. A general was appointed, and he took them down from War Zone C to the coast. In Phuoc Tuy province they rendezvoused with a trawler from North Vietnam and got AK-47s, 80mm mortars, RPG-2s, radios, and so on. The third regiment in the division was then forming near Song Be.

One of the two regiments attacked Binh Gia, and the other ambushed all the likely landing zones around there. It was a classic. There were no ARVN troops at Binh Gia. None. There were Catholic popular forces, the village militia. They were no match for a regular VC regiment, so the first part was easy. Then the VC held the town for a while, just to show they could do it. When the ARVN started sending in reinforcements, they were ambushed. In the course of the battle the VC destroyed a marine battalion, beat up an airborne battalion very badly, and knocked off a couple of battalions from the regiment up at Xuan Loc.

Well, this terrified the Vietnamese government, and shocked MACV. We were shocked to find there was a division, which we learned from interrogating prisoners. And we were shocked that they had switched from hit-and-run to what we saw as a more serious effort to take a place, hold it, and then destroy the ARVN forces. We saw that as the beginning of a new, higher level of war.

The same VC division then picked up its third regiment. In June of '65 they attacked the Special Forces camp at Dong Xouai. There again, although they didn't hold the camp, they

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destroyed it. They ambushed all around it and practically destroyed the 7th Regiment of the 5th ARVN Division. Two of its battalions were pretty much knocked out, plus an airborne battalion.

In between those two, there was another battle in Quang Ngai province, which was fought by the 1st and 2nd Viet Cong regiments. After taking the district town of Binh Ba, the two regiments ambushed all the routes that converged on it. They destroyed the 38th Ranger Battalion to the man and beat up a marine battalion badly, along with a couple of battalions from a regiment of the 2nd Division.

My job in those days was to allocate U.S. helicopters so the ARVN could use them for reinforcement. I went to the battles as a representative of General Westmoreland, so I know a lot about them. Matter of fact, the J-3 of the Vietnamese joint general staff and I found the 38th Ranger Battalion at Binh Ba. It went out of communication and nobody knew where it was. The VC had destroyed it and killed all the prisoners. There was a little circular mountain, a conical hill, that was terraced for rice paddies. As we flew over we looked down. They had arrayed all the bodies. They put the battalion commander and the American adviser at the very top, and laid the rest of the bodies out on each terrace all the way around like the spokes of a wheel. It was a vicious kind of thing.

I was in Vietnam during the whole controversy over whether to put in American troops. Out there it wasn't a controversy, because the Viet Cong were destroying ARVN battalions so fast. When I say destroyed, they weren't obliterated to the last man, but put out of action. They had to be rebuilt from the ground up. The VC got about four at Binh Gia. About four at Binh Ba in Quang Ngai. And three or four at Dong Xouai. Then there was Song Be, where they got about two, and Dau Tieng, the Michelin plantation, where they got two or three more. So the ARVN lost, let's say, fifteen or sixteen battalions in six months. That's big business.

In the spring, Westmoreland sent a message to Washington that said over the last few months we'd been losing almost a battalion a week, and a district town every month. He gave the government six months to live unless something was done. It was that opinion, and that sense of alarm, that underlay the deployment of U.S. combat troops.

From then on, there was escalation on both sides. The North Vietnamese Army was on the way south before we put the marines in, but we didn't really know that. Both sides were pursuing their own program. The North Vietnamese were going to send their armies south. It didn't make any difference whether we deployed or not—they were coming south. In Karnow's book there's a story about a North Vietnamese colonel who was sent south in 1964 to make a survey and see how the war was going. He reported back that they would never win the war in the South if they relied entirely on the Viet Cong. So they decided to send their troops south. And we were worried that South Vietnam would lose the war without us, so we sent in our troops. Both sides were worried about "their" South Vietnamese. Both sides thought they might lose. So we both went in.

There was very little dissent within MACV over bringing in the troops. I would say General Maxwell Taylor, the ambassador, was the only leading figure who was reluctant. But he eventually agreed we had to come in. He was faced with a horrible dilemma in the early part of '65. He didn't want to fight a land war in Asia. But he was also the godfather of counterinsurgency. I'm just guessing, but I always felt he couldn't bear the thought that the whole counterinsurgency effort was going to be a failure in Vietnam without our doing everything we could to salvage it. I don't remember any discussions within MACV about the disadvantages of bringing in a Western army. It's an admission against interest, but I think we were affected by already having advisers in every unit and in every province. In other words, there were a lot

of Americans already over there. It's sort of like being a little bit pregnant. There may have been some astute military men who argued and worried about it, but I wasn't one of them. I really wanted to see whether by bringing in American troops we could turn it around. We were totally preoccupied with the growing VC forces. From then on, pacification was secondary.

It seemed to me that we needed to get American forces in there and unshackle them so they could go to work against those VC main forces. That's an important point. In 1964, we had a project to strengthen the pacification effort in the city of Saigon and its immediate surrounds. It was called Hop Tac, which I think means "cooperation." I was involved in the planning. If you visualize a target with three rings, the center was downtown Saigon. That's the area where the Vietnamese police were supposed to be predominant. It was supposed to be mostly secure, with the police fighting problems of subversion and intelligence but not military actions. We called that process "securing." The next ring went to the fringes of Gia Dinh province and Long An province and so on. The idea was to use RF/PF and ARVN troops to get rid of Viet Cong district companies and village platoons. We called that "clearing." Then outside that, going as far as you want to go, was the area for search and destroy. I coined that term. It turned out to be infelicitous, because later when some marine was televised setting the roof of a native house on fire with his cigarette lighter, the commentator said, "Here's a marine company on search and destroy," and from then on a burning house was the "destroy" part of it.

But that had nothing to do with search and destroy. The idea at first was to take the better ARVN troops, like the airborne and the marines and the better battalions of the regular infantry, to search for and destroy the VC main forces. The VC would come in and try to take over a district town, kill all the local forces, and terrify everybody. They only had to do that once or twice a year, and it defeated any pacification effort. It convinced people that the government couldn't protect them and the VC were stronger. So this outer ring of Hop Tac was to be patrolled by the stronger ARVN units, to keep the VC troops out of the areas being cleared and secured.

When General Westmoreland asked for American troops, he intended for them to be involved in search and destroy. They would go after the VC main forces. In my area, when I commanded the 1st Division, it was the 9th Division, which operated in an arc north of Saigon. We were one-on-one with the 9th Division, so I got to know them quite well. My job was to keep them on the ropes and out of the populated areas. And we succeeded, by the way.

I have no apologies for that concept. It was right then, and it's right even in retrospect. Only the Vietnamese can handle the counterinsurgency job, and the American troops should defeat the main forces—keep them deep in the jungle so that pacification could proceed. The problem was that we didn't stick to fighting the enemy's main force.

We had some big victories over the main forces. That's what we did best, and what was needed most. As for having any luck against the guerrillas in my rear area, we weren't much better than anybody else, which was very poor indeed. I think the Phoenix program and the RF/PFs did a damn good job later, in the '70s. The problem was that it came too late. We were ready to pull out. And the North Vietnamese just kept coming.

It seems to me there were two driving circumstances in the war. The first was that the minute you bring in American troops, you concede to the other side a tremendous political advantage. And the Communists exploited that to the hilt. They were very clever at it. Along with that, we were slow in realizing that the North Vietnamese simply intended to win that war no matter what it cost. They'd send their whole army down if it was necessary, and as a matter of fact that's what they finally did. They sent seventeen divisions against Saigon in 1975. Whereas we went through a self-inflicted period of confusion, starting with counterinsurgency. We convinced

ourselves that if we did that right, the war wouldn't get any bigger. Well, it did get bigger. We didn't know how to do counterinsurgency very well, and we had white faces. Plus the North Vietnamese looked at Indochina as a whole. They didn't hesitate to use Laos and Cambodia. They looked at the whole mountain chain and the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Mekong River as a single theater of war. We tried to keep Laos as a separate problem, Cambodia as another separate problem—South Vietnam as one theater and North Vietnam as another. Disastrous.

When the 1st Cavalry Division was deployed to South Vietnam, General Westmoreland and General Stilwell proposed that we ought to block the Ho Chi Minh Trail as an extension of the DMZ along Route 9, which goes from Dong Ha on the China Sea to Savannakhet in Laos. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended it, too. One of the plans was to put the 1st Cav on the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos. It would operate against the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the west, and the 3rd Marine Division would operate from the east. It would have been a big fight, no question about that. The North Vietnamese might have thrown in their entire army eventually, and we would have needed more divisions. But at least it would have been a clearly defined major confrontation. They would have had to fight.

That was rejected—first of all because the ambassador in Laos said it was not warranted, and an intrusion into Laos was a violation of the Geneva Accords. The people in the State Department in Washington didn't think the situation warranted it. The CIA people who were doing pacification didn't think it was that kind of war; they thought it was an insurgency. We in the military didn't have good evidence of an invasion from the North. Maybe a regiment was coming down, but not the whole NVA. McNamara had a study made by systems analysis, and I think it showed that the VC consumption of war matériel in the South was fifteen tons a day in 1965. Fifteen tons is so little that there's no way you're going to stop it. You might stop 15,000 tons a day, but not fifteen. So blocking the trail, which meant escalating the war, to stop fifteen tons a day just didn't make sense. Well, the real figure wasn't fifteen tons a day, it was a lot more than that. But for all those reasons, the decision was made not to cut the trail.

There was also considerable discussion of invading the North Vietnamese panhandle, from Vinh south. I don't remember any serious talk of going to Hanoi with ground forces. The reason people wanted to go up to Vinh was they wanted to take the entrance to the Mughia Pass. All the supplies that came from North Vietnam and went over into Laos and down the trail moved through that pass. People wanted to go up there and shut off the flow. But that would have meant invading North Vietnam, which might have brought in the Chinese. After Korea, Washington was nervous about that.

When you operate on the borders of the Soviet Union or China, you ought to expect to get the same treatment from them that we would probably give if we had Chinese or Russians in Mexico. We don't like to think the world is like that, but it is. That means anytime you're close to one of the Communist giants, there are a lot of constraints. If you do enough to win the war against North Vietnam, you're apt to bring in one of the superpowers. They don't want an American victory on their doorstep, just like we don't want a Communist one in Mexico. We don't even want one in Nicaragua. But if you scale back below the level of provocation that would bring in the Chinese, you have a hell of a time ending the war.

Why didn't we object at the time? We were good soldier Schweiks. In a military organization, you have two personalities. One is your own opinion as to what's best. The other is the team player, doing what you're told. That's a precondition to playing the game. We should have fought a lot harder for cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We should have seen more clearly that a

North Vietnam undefeated and a trail uncut would make it impossible to end the war. We should have been utterly frank about that.

However, we continued to hope that we could inflict such losses on the VC or the NVA that it would be more than they would be able to take. That's the alternative to cutting the trail. That's an attrition war. It's a dirty word now in military circles. I think the concept of attrition was an outgrowth of counterinsurgency—which, after all, is a form of attrition. So we fell into that trap. We thought, and I guess Mr. McNamara thought, and Mr. Rostow thought, and probably the President thought, and the JCS thought we were beating the hell out of 'em, and they couldn't take it forever. It turned out they controlled the tempo of the war better than we would admit. We beat the devil out of 'em time after time, and they just pulled off and waited and regained their strength until they could afford some more losses. Then they came back again. They took terrible losses at Tet, and even worse losses in the Easter offensive of 1972. It took them two years after that to gather together the forces they used at the end. But they controlled their own losses by the simple device of either fighting or not fighting. So we ended up with no operational plan that had the slightest chance of ending the war favorably.

We also didn't know about the redoubtable nature of the North Vietnamese regime. We didn't know what steadfast, stubborn, dedicated people they were. Their willingness to absorb losses compared with ours wasn't even in the same ball park. Way back at the beginning, when they attacked the destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, we were doing what I call carefully controlled retaliation. Everybody thought, Oh, boy, we're sending American airplanes up and they'll bomb a couple of targets and the other side will be terrified. It was the notion of gradualism and retaliation, one more turn of the screw. I personally thought it would be a token of U.S. resolve, and a sample of what we could do. I really thought it would impress them. I now think it just infuriated them. And we just kept doing it. We did more and more and more and more, up until the Cambodia invasion and the mining of the harbors and the B-52s over Hanoi, and it was never enough. We never quite grasped the fact that the North Vietnamese intended to win. Regardless.

I figured out recently that if the North Vietnamese put up a memorial like the one we have on the Mall, and it was adjusted for the relative populations of our country and theirs, the one in Hanoi would have 7 million names on it. Just soldiers. Interesting, isn't it? The North Vietnamese lost about 500,000 dead, and the VC 300,000. That's 800,000. And we lost 58,000. Of course, the ARVN lost a lot, too. But the North Vietnamese main forces lost up to 40 percent of their troops every year. That's enormous. It's unbelievable. I didn't think they'd be able to keep their soldiers fighting, given the casualties we were inflicting. I should have known better. In World War II I fought in a unit with casualties like that. The 90th Division had 25,000 casualties in just eleven months, so I should have known.

When you're doing anything you think is important, there's a very high emotional content. It inhibits clear thinking—at least with me. When I was commanding the 1st Division, I was totally preoccupied with trying to find the 9th VC Division and the other main-force elements in my area. I was concerned about doing it better—more engagements, with more success and fewer casualties. It was a full-time job, learning how to do that. And you're very defensive. You only see the things you've been doing well, not the big mistakes you've made. We were all emotionally involved that way. We weren't as cool and detached as we should have been, and as we can be now. It's easy to be smart in retrospect. It's difficult to do it in the heat of the battle. I didn't do it too well. But I think I had a lot of company.

When you step back—and I didn't have these thoughts while I was there—you see the difference between a country that's fighting on its own terrain for its survival, and a country that's

sending its forces halfway around the world to “contain” Communism. We asked a lot of sophistication from our public and our troops—maybe more than the country was able to give. I don’t think Americans can be expected to support a long, inconclusive war.

The reason I think about these things is that I wonder what would happen if we went to war in Iran. There are a lot of parallels to Vietnam. It’s a long way away. There’s no threat to our homeland. In an expanded war, we’d have to go to the draft immediately. That would bring out all the opposition, bring the children into the streets again, polarize the Congress. No doubt about it, all those things would happen. That’s a sobering set of consequences. And if it’s close to the Soviet or Chinese border, it would probably be long and inconclusive.

Or take El Salvador. I think we have been pretty smart there. I’m impressed by the fact that we keep only fifty advisers in the country. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with giving them support with money and training and communications and intelligence and engineering and all that, as long as we don’t Americanize the war. As long as we stay below that magic threshold. Nobody knows exactly where it is. The point is that it’s very low. And it’s easy to step over it in the eyes of the natives. If they look around and see Americans everywhere, it’s an American war. If you have GIs going into villages or barrios and trying to sort out friend from foe, that’s a disaster. It gives the other side a precious asset—call it patriotism, xenophobia, or nationalism. And once that happens, God help you.

For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb

WILLIAM E. DePUY

Officers of the armed forces have been tendered a new and exciting career opportunity—that of becoming qualified and recognized as a Joint Specialty Officer. Those who choose to follow this route will be on the leading edge of a new wave. The opportunity has been fashioned by Congress. It is the product of long-festered congressional unhappiness about the state of joint affairs within the Department of Defense. Still beset by concerns over the outcome in Vietnam, Congress was irritated further by the *Mayaguez* incident of 1975¹ and especially by the failure at Desert One during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980. The momentum for reform within Congress was given a mighty twin boost by the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport on 23 October 1983—241 Marines were killed and scores more wounded—followed only two days later by Urgent Fury, the Grenadan campaign marked by serious problems of joint execution.

In October 1985, the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report² which became the inspiration for subsequent hearings resulting ultimately in the now-famous Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.³ That act represents an astounding and historic intervention by Congress in the organization and internal operation of the Department of Defense.

Officers who contemplate following the new joint specialist path as a major career option should read the Senate staff report from cover to cover in order to understand the perspectives, motives, and objectives of Congress. The most zealous of such officers may also wish to study the transcripts of the hearings. The stilted language of the law itself does not convey the spirit and drive of its intent.

The basic theme of the new legislation is to strengthen the joint establishment vis-à-vis the service departments.⁴ The most important aspects are these:

- The responsibilities and authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are greatly increased. He is now the chief joint military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the entire national security apparatus. He has clear control over the Joint Staff.
- A four-star Vice Chairman has been provided to assist the Chairman.
- Minutely detailed instructions are contained in the law regulating the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of Joint Speciality Officers.⁵
- The commanders of the unified commands (the CINCs) have been given increased authority over the service components of those commands and direct access to the programming and budgeting processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- The service departments have been reorganized to increase civilian control.

With respect to the distribution of power within the national security apparatus, there is the unmistakable presumption of a zero-sum game in the package as a whole. That is, Congress

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seemed to believe that strengthening the joint establishment required the weakening of the services. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary as we shall see. What is required is the strengthening of both.

Thus Joint Specialty Officers, and those who plan to become such, stand under the influence of this historic legislation, learning the ropes in respect to the organization, functions, and procedures of the reinforced and elevated joint establishment. In proceeding, it is wise to remember that it is the product, not the process, which counts and for which JSOs will be judged in the long run. The realization of the goals established in the new law and its implementing directives now passes to the hands and talents of a new generation. And full realization will take just that—generational change.

Let us now turn to five selected opportunities for improvement and innovation in the joint arena, five steep hills to climb:

- Raising the quality of joint military advice.
- Improving the track record in operational art.
- Determining joint force requirements.
- Providing joint command and control over joint collateral support operations.
- Creating the conditions required for the synchronization of cross-service support at the tactical level.

Hill One: Quality Advice

The government turns to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military advice on a very wide range of national security issues and policies. There is no higher military authority and thus nowhere else to turn for such assistance. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsive and useful and when the views of the incumbent administration and those of the Joint Chiefs are generally compatible, the relationship is healthy and productive. When either of these conditions is absent, there is a pattern of mistrust, rancor, and bad decisions. Therefore there is much at stake in these relationships, which are complex at best.

The environment in which military advice is rendered to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the national security apparatus is interesting in an open democracy. Under the new law, it is the Chairman, JCS, who is personally responsible for advice to the government and is also responsible for strategic planning. This suggests the existence of a grand Clausewitzian design to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff can refer for answers to all the lesser included questions. It is not quite like that.

In the first place, historically in this pragmatic nation there has been no true codified national strategy within which the military strategy could fit as one of several components alongside an economic strategy, a political strategy, and perhaps social and technological strategies. Congress has been goading the executive branch to produce such a national strategy, and efforts have been made.

But the reality remains that the real US strategy consists of the whole loosely bound portfolio of current security policies dealing with individual problems and issues, both foreign and domestic, facing an administration. If a grand design were to be drafted which projected changes in current policies, it would have to be so closely held as to be ineffective as an instrument of government. Current policies are delicately balanced between opposing sets of pressures. Any prospects for future change announced publicly would produce a fire storm of contention within our political system and amongst our allies. And of course real national strategy requires public

and congressional support, so it cannot be closely held. Do not hold your breath for a grand design.

Military strategy is confined by the policies it serves. The real military strategy, therefore, is the compendium of plans, deployments, operations, and programs supporting the long list of national security policies, which range from the defense of NATO to the transfer of defense technology and the size of an advisory group in country X. There is of course a necessity to protect actual military operational plans and to protect from the eyes of our adversaries our priorities for the distribution of military resources across all the plans. This is the closest we come to a military strategy.

The business of military advice is booming. Always active whenever a new administration arrives, we now have the added dimension of the extreme turbulence generated by Gorbachev's initiatives, instability in China, and a roiling Middle Eastern scene. And this is not to mention the budget crunch in the United States and economic trauma in much of the Third World. It is unlikely that there are *any* policies not under some kind of review, and the former planning assumptions associated with a bipolar world are now all up in the air. Even before the congressional measures to strengthen the joint establishment have taken their full effect, the new system has been plunged into this maelstrom of activity. That condition may be expected to persist for a long time. And when policies change—military strategies must follow.

The perspectives of the Congress on JCS performance were downbeat in 1985 and 1986. In the Senate staff report two comments from former luminaries on the defense scene were quoted as follows:

Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger: "Advice proffered by the JCS was generally irrelevant, unread, and largely disregarded."

Former Chairman, JCS, General David Jones: "JCS advice was not crisp, timely, useful, or very influential."

What this means to the new joint specialist is that the Schlesinger-Jones assessments of the quality of military advice must be fully turned around—stood on their head so to speak. In short, military advice must be crisp, timely, useful, relevant, persuasive, intellectually rigorous, and logically compelling. That is a tall order. The joint establishment works in a highly competitive environment not all friendly. The other departments of government and other philosophies compete for influence and the same shrinking resources. It is not enough to be convinced of the virtues and rightness of one's positions. It is also necessary to win in the fierce competition within the government. We might add that there is no law which requires a president or his administration to accept military advice. History tells us that often they do not.

This is the environment into which joint specialists are moving. To the extent that they are professionally sound, completely candid and clear, and devoted to the best interests of their country in the broadest sense, they will have done their duty as the law and the people require.

Hill Two: Operational Art

If military strategy is the compendium of existing plans, then the quality of the strategy is the sum of the quality of those plans. At the joint level these are operational plans connected at the top with policy and at the bottom with the tactical employment of forces.

Recently there has been great emphasis on operational art throughout the structure of professional military education. Much of that study has been devoted to past masters, theorists, and campaigns. That is good, but since the advent of nuclear weapons and the appearance of limited wars, the criteria for victory have tended to change. It is wise, therefore, to study our

own experiences in the second half of the century from the operational perspective. The track record is spotty but illuminating. It seems to tell us that success is defined as the attainment of *political* objectives in a reasonable time, at bearable cost, and with public support until the end. These criteria have become the bottom line in our time. Any other outcome equates to failure. Failure is cruel. It ignores the elegance of tactical performance, the good intentions, and the devotion and sacrifice of individual members of the armed forces and their families throughout the country. Failure is corrosive. Success, then, is the business of today's joint specialist.

Let us review some of our recent military experiences from this perspective and while so doing pay special attention to the baleful consequences when policy and operations diverge or are otherwise disconnected.

Korea. When President Truman sent our enfeebled armed forces into Korea in 1950, at least the mission seemed clear—stop the North Koreans and protect the fledgling government in the South. But the outcome could have gone either way—as Wellington said after Waterloo, “It was a close run thing.”

General MacArthur's brilliant operational stroke at Inchon cut the North Korean line of communications and collapsed the invasion by the already exhausted and overextended North Korean army encircling Pusan. Then General MacArthur sent his forces north in pursuit of a broken enemy. The debate continues as to whether he and his Washington superiors were in any kind of agreement on policy goals and objectives in respect to the North Korean government, people, and territory. It seems probable that MacArthur had run out ahead of Washington thinking—a disconnect which can probably be laid at the feet of the government, not the commander in the field, who naturally wished to finish the matter off once and for all.

In any event the Chinese came in, revealing the utter inadequacy of the policy and the forces available at the time. When MacArthur's army was back in the South, very precise policy instructions were issued to confine operations to the border area with a mission of preserving the political and territorial integrity of the South. The United Nations forces recovered and faithfully executed the new policy, driving the Chinese and North Koreans back to, and slightly beyond, the original demarcation.

But with the reins held so tightly, there was no leverage to end the war, which went on inconclusively at high cost, eventually losing the support of the people. There was no workable concept for ending the war militarily. Attrition warfare against China was unappealing. President Eisenhower broke the stalemate with a nuclear threat rendered via India, and we achieved an armistice which extends to this day. The nuclear option is probably no longer available, and we should be mindful that wars are easier to start than to stop.

Vietnam. An entirely different kind of war at the beginning, the Vietnam War came to resemble the Korean War at the end. Starting as a counterinsurgency in the South plus retaliatory air strikes in the North after the Tonkin Gulf affair in 1964, the war ended with massive bombing in the North and a full-fledged invasion of the South by a North Vietnamese army which threw five army corps, comprising 17 divisions, at Saigon in 1975.

US policy lagged behind the transitional realities throughout the war. Even after the North Vietnamese army began to arrive in the South in 1965, the policy remained one of counterinsurgency and attrition, while the bombing of the North—prior to the heavy bombing of 1972, which was simply too late—was used to send admonitory messages to Hanoi rather than to destroy its warmaking capabilities.

The command in Saigon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff both failed to persuade the Administration that the North Vietnamese line of communication (the Ho Chi Minh Trail) needed

to be cut and that the port of Haiphong needed to be mined. The Administration considered these measures inconsistent with the nature of the war, which it persisted in viewing as an insurgency. Washington was also afraid of a Korean-like Chinese intervention—indeed, Chinese air defense and supply troops were already in North Vietnam.⁶

So the war went on inconclusively and expensively, and the American people gradually withdrew their support. The American government was forced to withdraw its forces from Vietnam in an agonizing failure of both policy and operations.

Beirut. The mission of the Marines in Beirut in 1983 at the time of the bombing of their barracks was “peacekeeping.” It was never quite clear what that meant. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense opposed the deployment. There was never an operational plan. The Marines at the airport were just waiting. This tragic episode counsels us to beware of vague missions for which no discernible military operational plan seems relevant. Some say the Marines were a “presence.” The Shiite factions were not impressed. Vague, exploratory deployments like “showing the flag” or “presence” are doubly dangerous because they permit incremental, flabby thinking in Washington. That is, little time or analysis is spent on the possible consequences of a contemplated action or the next steps to be taken should the first move prove to be ineffective or even disastrous.

Grenada. This was a success by all of our criteria—it was fast and relatively inexpensive, and the public had no time in which to become disaffected. On the other hand, execution was ragged. We seem to have a problem in organizing, training, and equipping joint headquarters before they are needed. They are therefore not always fully prepared for the complexities of modern joint operations. It is a problem worthy of the joint specialist’s most urgent attention.

Persian Gulf. The tanker escort mission was well done—no disconnects between policy and operations (with the exception of the Iranian airbus shoot-down, which was a tragic mistake)—and the means were adequate to the ends. However, let us suppose, hypothetically, that we had gone into Iran in pursuit of Silkworm missiles or earlier in accordance with the Carter doctrine. Would we have set ourselves up for the same dilemma that plagued us in Korea and Vietnam? If we had prosecuted a vigorous war against Iran, would it have brought in the Soviet Union directly or indirectly? And if we had held operations below the threshold of Soviet provocation, how would we ever have ended the war? The study of neither Clausewitz nor Napoleon reveals easy answers to this dimension of operational art in an era of limited wars and nuclear deterrence. It seems to be the classic operational trap of the last half of the 20th century. True, things went well with the Air Force and Navy’s punitive airstrikes against Tripoli in 1986, when the means seemed to fit the ends. But the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and Noriega in Panama present us with different but no less vexing dilemmas as we approach the 1990s.

Hill Three: Joint Force Requirements

Disturbed by the service-centered promotion of the 600-ship Navy, the Army’s light divisions, and the Air Force plan to substitute F-16s for the aging A-10s as the preferred close air support platform, Congress wants force requirements to be derived in the future from the war plans of the combatant commanders—the CINCs.

However, it is not that simple. There are four essential participants in this centrally important function. The resource availabilities are set forth by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic plans and direction; the CINCs draw up the war plans; and the services develop the forces.

None of these functions is transferable. No one but the Navy can organize, train, and equip carrier battle groups; the Army—corps and divisions; the Air Force—wings and squadrons; and the Marines—amphibious forces. The force development process is therefore circular, iterative, interactive, and complex. It represents a vast sharing of responsibility across several huge bureaucratic institutions. It does no good to simplify it on paper. It won't simplify.

The pendulum of influence should swing toward the joint establishment, but not too far. Congress doesn't seem fully aware of the seminal contribution of the services in combining technology and tactics within fighting organizations and in training individuals and units up to high performance in the employment of those forces.

To some extent the shift from service dominance to joint participation is a cultural process. It may also be generational. That points to the emergence of the joint specialist.

Hill Four: Joint Control of Collateral Operations

In 1944 the Allies conducted a collateral deception operation which kept the German 15th Army pinned in the area of Calais waiting for the "real" invasion. Even after seven weeks of combat in Normandy, the Germans kept one eye on the Pas de Calais. Had it been otherwise the invasion might not have prospered. The deception operation was run directly out of the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander. In 1985 the Israelis wished to invade Lebanon to force out the PLO. But the Syrian air defenses would have made it difficult to provide adequate air support to the Israeli army. After performing a protracted joint intelligence operation, which mapped the Syrian air defenses down to precise locations and communications links, nodes, and frequencies, the Israelis conducted a preliminary set of collateral operations. Drones activated the defenses; aircraft, artillery, and electronic warfare measures attacked the system simultaneously; fighters shot down the reacting Syrian air force; and commandos knocked out the central control headquarters. Then, and only then, did the Israeli army begin to roll. This preliminary set of collateral operations was controlled by the chief of staff of the Israeli air force.

It seems certain that US joint commanders will wish to conduct similar collateral operations at their level in support of their joint concepts of operations. Over time, they might include any or all of the following candidates: joint intelligence; joint deception; joint command, control, and communications countermeasures; joint suppression of enemy air defenses; joint special operations; joint counterfire; joint regional air defense; joint special logistics; joint deep attack (FOFA); and others.

Each requires a commander, a concept of operations, a task organization, specified command relationships, and a qualified and seasoned joint staff. At the present time only special operations have such staffs and headquarters. For the others there are none, and in most cases such command arrangements have not even been conceptualized. This is exactly the kind of problem the joint specialist will wish to take on.

Hill Five: Synchronizing Cross-Service Support to the Tactical Level

The several armed services are specialized around the mediums in which they operate—land, sea, air, space, etc. But some of their specialties are also required by the other services. The organizational dilemma has always been whether to duplicate functions or share them. Sharing is the heart of jointness.

The Army has always been the leading proponent of jointness—not because it is more earnest or altruistic, but because it is massively dependent upon the other services. The Army can neither

deploy nor fight exclusively with its own resources. In fact, there is cross-service involvement in every single Army combat and support function.

The Army deploys by air or sea. Army intelligence operations depend upon cross-service surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, target acquisition, and help in intelligence fusion. Fire support always includes close air support and battlefield air interdiction—and sometimes naval gunfire support. Tactical maneuver may involve airborne or amphibious operations which depend upon Air Force or Navy support. Army and Air Force electronic warfare efforts are joint. Joint air defense is commanded by an Air Force officer. The Army depends constantly on air and sea lines of communication, including air delivery to forward units of critical munitions and repair parts. The Army in the field is a joint force.

The Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS) is simply an extreme example. JSTARS, which is operated by the Air Force, is to the Army what the AWACS is to the Air Force itself. By locating and tracking the movement of enemy ground forces, JSTARS provides the real-time information required by corps, division, and brigade commanders to maneuver their forces and target the enemy. It is therefore at the heart of Army tactical operations. It is not just nice to have—it is indispensable.⁷

On the basis of JSTARS information, the Army corps, division, and brigade commanders rapidly develop their concepts of operations, which key all the battlefield functions to the support of maneuver. This is the way a commander concentrates combat power against the enemy in decisive bursts of intensity to win battles. Obviously, this process of synchronization must embrace the now integrated and essential cross-service support. Seizing the initiative in battle requires not only precision, but also very rapid synchronization. For this purpose command relationships must be tight, effective, and thoroughly understood. There is a certain looseness in the system today which can and should be tightened up. The term *support* is the key. It is not sensible to even think about attaching elements of the fleet to an Army corps for naval gunfire support nor extending the command authority of an Army division commander over the air bases from which his close air support is launched. But at the same time it is no longer tolerable to even think about withdrawing the Air Force JSTARS from support of an Army corps in action.

The modalities of support developed over the last century which regulate the command relationship between artillery and maneuver within the Army may have broader application to these increasingly intimate and time-sensitive cross-service relationships. For example JSTARS sorties could be placed in direct support of a corps—meaning that would not be withdrawn except in the most extreme and unusual emergencies. The divisions and brigades would receive a continuous stream of information on the location and movement of enemy forces. And yet JSTARS would remain unequivocally under Air Force command and control.

Close air support and battlefield air interdiction could be placed in general support, reinforcing the fire support of a particular corps but not necessarily in support of each division at all times. It would continue to operate within the Air Force tactical air command and control system. Deep air interdiction could be placed in general support of the Army group or joint task force.

These modest adjustments to command relationships across service lines in the tactical arena might be beneficial and clarifying. They give a richer meaning to the term *support*. Just leaving everything up to the day-by-day or even minute-by-minute determination of a remote joint commander—the current practice—is not conducive to fast, effective synchronization of joint combat power and is not consistent with the degree of cross-service dependency which has arisen over the years.

Concluding Thought

How far the impetus of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation will carry the joint specialist up these five hills and many others only time will tell. We may find there are natural limits to the scope and utility of tactical jointness. But we most certainly have not even closely approached them thus far. Over the years ahead, the Joint Specialty Officer will need to introduce many changes in the joint establishment and in how it operates. He will bring a fresh generational viewpoint to the task, and that is exactly what is now needed.

NOTES

1. On 14 May 1975, 250 US Marines were landed on Koh Tang Island off the coast of Cambodia to rescue the 39 crew members of the SS *Mayaguez*; which had been seized along with its crew by a Cambodian gunboat. It turned out that the crew was not on the island chosen for assault, and the Marines, who encountered heavy Cambodian resistance, themselves had to be evacuated under fire. The operation resulted in 38 US dead, 50 wounded, and three missing. Although the *Mayaguez* itself was recaptured, the Cambodian government had already announced the release of the ship and crew when the attack began. See John E. Jessup, *A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945-1985* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 534.

2. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Staff Report, "Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change" (Washington: GPO, October 1985).

3. Public Law 99-433.

4. For an excellent discussion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Don M. Snider, "DOD Reorganization: Part I, New Imperatives," *Parameters*, 17 (September 1987), 88-100; and "DOD Reorganization: Part II, New Opportunities," *Parameters*, (17 December 1987), 49-58. The joint specialty for officers is discussed in Part I, pp. 94-96.

5. Pursuant to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the Secretary of Defense was to determine the number of joint duty positions within the defense establishment. The presently determined figure is 8300 (Rick Maze, "Services Blasted Again for Handling of Joint-Duty Posts," *Army Times*, 29 May 1989, p. 4). The Secretary is required to designate 1000 of these slots as "critical," meaning they must be filled with a JSO. The law further states that approximately half of the joint duty positions must at any one time be filled with an officer who is or has been nominated as a JSO, with this half including the 1000 "critical" JSO-required slots. To educate JSOs, the Skelton Panel has recommended a two-phase process. Phase I would be taught at the intermediate or senior service colleges; Phase II would be presented in a TDY status at the Armed Forces Staff College, following graduation from the intermediate or senior service colleges, to JSO-nominees en route to a joint-duty assignment (see US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 101st Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print 4 [Washington: GPO, 1989], pp. 3-4 and chap. III).

6. See "China Admits Combat in Vietnam War," *The Washington Post*, 17 May 1989, p. A31.

7. For the details of JSTARS, see Robert S. Dudney, "The Battle Vision of Joint STARS," *Air Force*, June 1989, pp. 42-45.

Infantry Combat

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On the premise that it is easier to work your way into the future if you know where you've been in the past, I'm going to talk about infantry combat as it has developed in the 20th century. Obviously, I'm a voice out of the past and whether what I have to say to you today has any relevance to the world in which you live, and to your jobs as you see them, you'll have to decide.

Before I talk about infantry tactics and their evolution, I want to put my remarks in an operational context, because I think that if you just do a bottoms up look at it there's always something missing. I'm going to start with a proposition that will run through my comments. It's a little above your present rank level, but it's going to affect your lives and I want you to grasp its significance.

That proposition is this: that the purpose of offensive operations—tactical offensive operations—is to achieve freedom of operational maneuver toward strategically important operational objectives. That's a big mouthful. What it means, though, is that just attacking isn't the objective of the exercise. The object of the attack is to break through the defense or go around it so you can move to important objectives. Conversely, then, and obviously, the purpose of the defense is to prevent the enemy from doing that to you—to prevent him from breaking or circumventing your defense, achieving operational freedom of maneuver, and moving toward the objectives you don't want him to have. (In NATO, that is not too difficult to visualize.) All else is secondary. Raids, special operations, and so on, are all important, but they're all secondary.

EXAMPLES

Now let me further explain this—still in an operational context—with some examples from this century. Then I'll go back to the nuts and bolts of the infantry business.

In World War I—none of us in this room were alive then—the German Army outflanked the French Army by going through Belgium, which was neutral. The Germans were going around the flank to get behind the French Army and destroy it and, incidentally, to get Paris, which was the hub of France.

For a little over a month at the beginning of the war, the Germans achieved freedom of operational maneuver. But they ran out of steam in the First Battle of the Marne when their infantry was exhausted and the French mounted a counterthrust. Then both the British and the French on the one hand and the Germans on the other tried to outflank one another in what was later called a race for the sea, and they extended their northern flanks all the way to the English Channel. When they arrived at the Channel, linear warfare descended on the military scene for the first time in history. And we have much of it with us today, although we are now in a transition back toward non-linearity, the mode familiar to Napoleon, Wellington, and Lee.

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After these opening moves and the race to the sea, and after there were no more open flanks, the French and the British were unable to expel the German Army, which went on a strategic defensive in the west while it tried to finish the Russians off on the east. So for four years, the western Allies tried, but failed, to break through and chase the Germans out, and they lost a generation of young men trying. For example, the British lost 60,000 in the first day of the Battle of Somme in 1916.

In 1917 the Russians were defeated and had a revolution. The Germans then redeployed their army from the east back into France—they wanted to finish the war before the U.S. Army arrived in strength. To just give you a feel for that, in July 1918 alone (one month) 600,000 American soldiers arrived in France. So the Germans were in a hurry.

They had a general named Oskar von Hutier, who at Riga in September 1917 had successfully infiltrated his army deep into the rear of the Russians. General Erich Ludendorff, who was fascinated by Hutier tactics, re-organized and retrained the whole German Army in a period of about three or four months to use those tactics against the British and the French.

In March 1918 the Germans attacked the British 5th Army under General Hubert Gough and destroyed it. They actually advanced 50 miles, which was unheard of in the era of trench warfare, and nearly got to Amiens, a road hub that would have split the British from the French. But they had no operational mobility. Everything was horse drawn. And that was the way the war ended—mutual exhaustion.

From that experience, the Germans learned that they needed operational as well as tactical mobility, and they went to tracked vehicles. Twenty years later, the system they developed was called Blitzkrieg.

In 1940 the Germans attacked through the Ardennes. In this case there was no open flank, but the Ardennes at that time was a weak spot. They gained freedom of operational maneuver as soon as they crossed the Meuse River, and they split the French from the British just as they had tried to do in 1918. The British were evacuated at Dunkirk, and the Germans turned south and rolled up the French Army. Thus, in 1940 they did precisely what they had failed to do in 1918. In 1940, they had the mobility and knew how to use it.

In 1944 the Germans threw a linear defense around the Allied beachhead in Normandy, and the Allies' efforts to break out of that defense failed during seven weeks of attrition warfare. Then, at the end of July, with the help of well over 1,000 heavy bombers, the American forces broke out at St. Lo, moved into Brittany, shrugged off a counterattack at Mortain, trapped remnants of the German Army at Falaise, and moved on into Holland, Belgium, the Rhineland, and Lorraine. For a month and a half, the Allied forces had freedom of operational maneuver, but they ran out of gas (literally), the Germans rallied, and the war returned to the attrition mode.

I want to make a point here. People talk a lot about attrition versus maneuver. This is not an intellectual choice. The same generals who so brilliantly dashed across France were suddenly forced back into conducting attrition warfare. Nobody doubts that General George Patton preferred maneuver, but maneuver warfare is not a doctrinal choice; it is an earned benefit.

The efforts to break through and obtain operational maneuver in the Fall of 1944 at Arnhem, with the great air-ground operation called Market Garden, failed; the attacks through Huertgen and Aachen were bloody and indecisive, and the attack by the Third Army across the Saar bogged down. In a last operational effort in the middle of December—three months later—the German Army once more sought freedom of maneuver through the Ardennes.

The Germans enjoyed another tactical success. They penetrated about 75 miles to the west, but they never could turn north toward Liege and Antwerp, which were their operational

objectives. They were stopped by the flexibility and mobility of the U.S. Army. That, by the way, was the first and only time in the history of the U.S. Army that it faced a breakthrough armored attack of the kind we have been preparing for in NATO for many years.

If the Germans had had a couple of second-echelon armies then like the Russians have today, the Battle of the Bulge might have turned out quite differently.

After that battle, the Allies gnawed their way through the remnants of the German Army, went to the Rhine and the Elbe, to Czechoslovakia, and to the end of the war. For the last two months of the war, they again had freedom of maneuver. That means they had a total of three and one-half months of freedom of operational maneuver out of 11 months of combat. They wanted it 100 percent of the time; they were able to achieve it less than 33 percent of the time.

After Stalingrad, the Russians developed the breakthrough operation into a brutal art. They broke through at Stalingrad, on the Don, the Donets, the Dneiper, the Vistula, the Oder, and each time surged forward 100 miles or more.

The two Soviet army fronts, which we would call army groups, that were involved in the breakthrough on the Vistula were commanded by Georgi Zhukov and Ivan Koniev, the Ukrainian and Belorussian fronts. Those two fronts alone comprised 2,200,000 men, 7,000 tanks, and 46,000 artillery pieces, which in the breakthrough area amounted to 460 artillery tubes per kilometer of front. They broke through in a week, went on to the Oder at about 35 kilometers a day, and were stopped there on the last German defensive position in front of Berlin.

Korea was a linear war. The North Koreans started out with freedom of operational maneuver, which culminated at Pusan where the South Koreans and the United Nations troops, mostly Americans, threw up a linear defense around the city. At Inchon the Allies gained freedom of operational maneuver. Some of their elements got all the way to Yalu, but then the Chinese in turn pushed the UN forces back south of Seoul. The war then deteriorated into a battle of attrition, which President Eisenhower ended with a nuclear threat.

In Vietnam, we, the United States, never decided firmly and collectively on operational objectives. And without operational objectives we went on and fought hundreds of successful tactical operations. We inflicted 800,000 KIA on the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong and wounded a million, to no good end. We never achieved freedom of operational maneuver simply because we never decided which objectives we needed to take, and many of them were in North Vietnam.

Grenada was a non-linear war like the Falklands campaign of the British. The operational objectives were all within reach of the tactical forces from the first day.

Now, you can say, what does all this mean to you, the commanders at the tactical level? Well, it means in the first place that you are going to be executing tactical missions that are part of an operational commander's concept—operational commanders, army group joint commanders, and the like.

If the commander's mission is strategic defense as in NATO and his purpose is to deny freedom of maneuver to the Russians, then of course there are certain defensive and counteroffensive operations you may be asked to undertake. The NATO commander has to maintain the forward defense and break the enemy attack. According to AirLand Battle doctrine, you could have the mission of blocking, delaying, counterattacking, spoiling by deep maneuver, or attacking deep with the fires of rockets, missiles, or TACAIR. Or you could be part of a deep operational counterstroke.

Now, which of these missions you receive depends on the whole set of concepts, all the way from the joint commander at the top, down through the corps, divisions, brigades, battalions, and

down to you. Make no mistake about this—in all cases, you're going to be told what to do as the company commander. In most cases, you will be permitted and required to decide how to do it.

INFANTRY EVOLUTION

With that in mind, I want to go back to the infantry evolution over this same period. Now we're in the meat and potatoes part.

World War I was an infantry-artillery war. The standard offensive tactic was to fire an incredible amount of ammunition over a very long period of time, followed by an assault of long lines of infantry, supported by other long lines of infantry, trying to follow close behind the grinding, slow moving artillery barrages.

The German defenses were deep and elastic, layered, dug in; machinegun crews came out of deep bunkers when the artillery lifted. The machineguns were generally devastating against the long lines of exposed infantry trying to move through wire, shell holes, mud, and churned terrain. After the machineguns did their deadly work, the remnants of the attacking force, which by then had fallen behind the rolling barrages, were almost automatically counterattacked by division-sized elements. And the defending artillery, of course, fired very effectively on pre-registered concentrations and barrages.

Indirect fire suppression turned out to be inadequate during that entire four years, during which time one generation of Frenchmen, one generation of Britons, and one generation of Germans all went down.

The direct fire that came from the lines of skirmishers turned out also to be inadequate; moving skirmishers could not develop enough rifle fire to suppress the enemy machineguns. And by virtue of their linearity they masked their own machineguns. So, all in all, World War I was an operational and tactical failure, except that at the very end the Germany Army—the German nation—was simply worn out. The French were also staggering at the time, as indeed were the British. The fresh American Army was coming on strong. But the American Army also failed to solve the problem of the trenches and the machineguns and operational mobility. So it ended almost with a whimper instead of a shout.

When World War II came along, we found we hadn't learned much, while the Germans had. Our infantry went into World War II just about the way it had come out of World War I. Suppression was done primarily by artillery. And although the troops were told in all the manuals published here at Fort Benning between the wars that open warfare by skirmishers was the way to go and that fire suppression had to be achieved by the infantry itself, it was rarely tried and more rarely accomplished.

In Normandy in 1944, it was standard practice to fire mortars at the first hedgerow, where the first layer of German defenders were, 105mm howitzers at the second hedgerow, 155mm howitzers at the third, and then (you guessed it) to line up the infantry and assault straight forward into the killing zone.

In its six weeks in Normandy, the division to which I was assigned lost 48 percent of its rifle platoon leaders each week. That means the on-the-job time for a lieutenant was two weeks plus a day or two and the losses were 300 percent in six weeks. The end effect, of course, was that few were seasoned and few were around long enough to learn how to fight.

In the face of these kinds of problems, some units resorted to marching fire to fill the gap between the lifting of the indirect fire and the arrival of the assault line at the enemy position. In marching fire the soldiers simply fired a round every few steps, aimed or from the hip, to try to

retain fire superiority while moving. The anomaly was, of course, that when they needed fire superiority most, they rose from their positions behind the hedgerow and lost most of it. And generally they were masking their own machineguns. This, incidentally is a problem you have today.

LONG HISTORY

There's a long history with respect to direct fire suppression, and not all of it in the U.S. Army. I know you have solved a lot of these problems, but I doubt that you have solved all of them.

I suppose most of you have read General Erwin Rommel's book *Infantry Attacks*, and you may remember that he had the same problem with the Italians and the Rumanians, in the Carpathians and the Alps. He was in that unusual battalion that had three, four, five machinegun companies and a lot of rifle companies, and he personally positioned all the machineguns and gave them targets. After shutting down all enemy fire, he then penetrated on about a one-squad front—brought his reserves through personally and operated in the enemy's rear. That is probably the most difficult task—tactical technique or task—that one could devise. But it's just about the only way you can get through a linear defense frontally with acceptable casualties (acceptable means very low).

I know you practice that some of the time. That means that instead of two up and one back, you've got one up and five back, or one up and three back. In other words, the bulk of the force is shooting. The greatest part of the force is involved in firepower and the smallest part is involved in maneuver in that particular technique. I know that is counter-intuitive in an Army that favors *maneuver*—but think about it.

The Israelis solve the problem by dropping into a base of fire position any element that initially receives fire from an enemy trench line or a bunker or an airfield defense, and bringing armored vehicles up to augment the base of fire. Then they go around the flank and work down the trench line with rifles and hand grenades.

About halfway through World War II, the U.S. Army began to learn how to do that. The first signs of wisdom are enshrined in a statement that became popular: "Pin 'em down and go around 'em." That is good sound tactics.

Armored combat commanders, much like you have in your mech and tank task forces, from the very beginning learned how to suppress with all the firepower of the armored task force. The first time I ever saw that happen I was awestruck. I saw a tank-infantry task force of the 4th Armored Division going by the edge of a forest. On the way by, they turned every gun they had toward the woods. They called it reconnaissance by fire in those days, but what it was was suppression. They put so much fire on the woodline no one ever knew if there was anything in the woods.

Mechanized infantry today has the same opportunity. Ninety percent of the firepower of the mechanized platoon is in its armored vehicles and others of the task force, and only a small amount with the dismounted infantry. Obviously, you're not going to put the 15 to 20 men in the rifle platoon in a killing zone unsupported. So you're going to have to shut the enemy down.

That is a short story of the evolution of infantry tactics. It connects what you're doing with what people learned the hard way a long time ago.

I want to talk to you now about another dimension of these problems that I call the baleful influence of boundaries. In World War I, such great men as George Marshall, who was then G-3 of the 1st Division and then G-3 of an army, became famous for moving masses of troops around and squeezing them into very narrow zones of attack. For example, in the Meuse-Argonne some

of the American division sectors or zones were only three kilometers wide, and these were divisions of 27,000 men. Now that, gentlemen, is why the whole idea of two up and one back became ingrained—embedded in the doctrine and the consciousness of western armies. It was the way to crowd a lot of troops into a very small area. But, obviously, the effect of that was that they all attacked straight ahead.

Unfortunately, the two up and one back technique—which was invented for control purposes, a way to squeeze a lot of people into a small area—was adopted by our World War II amateur army (that was what it was) as a concept of operations. I would say that half of our battalion commanders in World War II thought that two up and one back was a concept of operation instead of just a formation. The very first attack I participated in in Normandy as a battalion S-3, we did exactly that—two up and one back right into the killing zone. It accounted for the kinds of casualties we suffered.

It has also been devastating at the operational level. When you look back and wonder why, for example, the U.S. Army ever attacked in the Huertgen Forest, the answer is obvious. The forest was straight in front of the VII Corps of the First Army—and everybody just went straight ahead.

Now, in most cases, it's not just a formation, but two up and one back is, of course, the worst possible thing to do. I know none of you would do that, but there are plenty of people who still do it. If you know where the enemy is, then you certainly won't put two of your three combat elements in his killing zone. And if you *don't* know where the enemy is, you aren't going to put two of your elements forward where they might stumble into his killing zone.

LEADERSHIP COP-OUT

Anyhow, using formations instead of concepts of operation is simply a leadership cop-out. The Russians call them corridor commanders—commanders who simply take their mission, divide it up among their subordinates, and sit back and wait for the bad news.

In my discussions earlier this morning with some of you, and in the read-ahead material I was sent earlier, I found and we discussed some questions about decentralized versus centralized control, and we talked about attrition versus maneuver. I want to say to you that none of these theological debates get you very far. The fact of the matter is that when you get in your companies and battalions you're going to be executing concepts of operation cooked up by your next higher commander, and it will inhibit you to some extent. His concept—his order—will tell you exactly what to do, where to do it, and when to do it. You can look on that as being restrictive and counterproductive, but let me tell you that if your superior commanders do not have a concept of operation and if that concept is not dominating the battle you are in, your side is losing. You may have all the freedom you want, but you're also going to have the freedom to lose. You need to put yourself in that context.

What is left for you to do, and how do you do it? There's often a discussion of whether synchronization is incompatible with maneuver, but that's a dumb way to look at it. Synchronization is not just a complicated word. Synchronization is combining the arms within some kind of operational concept in a particular engagement or battle. You should be horrified, each of you, if your battalion staff, brigade staff, and division and corps staffs are not synchronizing all the combat support they can get their hands on in behalf of their concept and your lesser included role within it.

Synchronization is not a bad word. The name of the game, the formula to be followed, is that you should get all the synchronization that time and good judgement will allow.

I want to end up by saying that although we don't like rules, we do like principles. But it seems to me that there's a rule we learned in World War I, in World War II, in Korea, and in Vietnam that really ought to be elevated to the status of a principle. That rule or principle is "Never fight a battle—any battle, in the offense or defense—the way the other guy wants you to fight it." He wants you in his killing zones. He wants you to get mousetrapped, and then destroyed by a counterattack. He wants you to be two up and one back.

So the name of the game is never to do that, but to use your head to figure out some way to handle the other guy in a way he doesn't want, doesn't like, doesn't expect, and can't handle.

I'll just give you a few of the things we discovered along the way, some of which are applicable to you and some of which may be chiefly of historical interest. The repertoire of alternatives to ploughing into the enemy's killing zones arise out of the conviction that almost anything is better than that.

The easiest solution, and the one that armored divisions in World War II used, was encapsulated in that somewhat rude statement—"Bypass, haul ass, and call for the frigging infantry." That is, just leave the problem behind. One problem is that we now have armored forces, but no infantry divisions following along to do the dishes. So just bypassing the enemy and leaving him there is not always permissible. But when you get to exploitation and operational maneuver, it's exactly the thing to do. Just let him stay back there hopelessly and uselessly behind.

The second best solution, we thought, was to find a gap and slip through it with a battalion (usually a whole battalion) often single file, often at night, and sit down on a piece of terrain behind the enemy that he couldn't afford to let us have—a piece of terrain that once we were on it he had to come after us or abandon the entire position.

Then the enemy has to attack you and you're down and waiting and he's up and moving and, gentlemen, no matter how romantic you may be about the attack being the preferred method, my preferred method is staying alive while killing the enemy. The aim is to get him up and moving while you're down and waiting. That doesn't mean you don't go on the offense. But if you can sit down on a piece of terrain right behind his front, in the middle of his airfield or whatever, and he has to come to you, that's what you constantly seek once you become a seasoned soldier.

If you can't find a flank or a gap, the third solution that we learned to prefer was simply to infiltrate through him, at night, using very small units (squads, maybe platoons) right to the final objective.

That is not the way the enemy wants to fight the war. He doesn't want somebody infiltrating through him. He wants them to come in by platoons and companies and issue orders and talk on the radio and call artillery and to keep trying it again and again. All of this, of course, he wants to take place on the terrain he has selected. Infiltration, then, is a superior solution.

The fourth is to pin him down with very heavy suppression and go around him and attack him on the flank or the rear. That is, I would say, sort of the classic solution, right? That's a sort of drill that we go through, and the drill the Israelis go through all the time.

And the fifth solution, the toughest of all, is to do a Rommel. You ought to be able to do a Rommel in your light infantry company or your battalion, but you won't be able to do one unless you practice it a lot.

I would say that if you become professional at your job, whether you're in a mechanized company or in a Ranger company, whether you're going on a raid, whether you're fighting in Europe or in a light battalion in Central America, you're going to come up against all of the problems I've been discussing. They are eternal infantry problems.

In other words, you will find yourself having to attack an enemy position to accomplish a mission. Wherever it may be, you're going to find out that the defender has a lot of advantages that you will have to avoid or overcome. The time to think about all those things is now.

When I commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam, we received hundreds of lieutenants from Fort Benning and OCS, and I have to tell you that almost without exception—this was in 1966 or 1967—these platoon leaders would, if not otherwise instructed, almost automatically proceed in a column and deploy into a line when the first shots were fired and assault into the enemy position as a sort of puberty rite, a test of manhood.

Instead, a platoon leader should always think of the leading element as being on a reconnaissance mission for the company commander and the battalion commander so he's out there to find out where the enemy is, try to figure out the enemy strength so that the company and battalion commanders can make decisions. That's the professional way to fight a war.

It just so happens that the Viet Cong very often did it right. Our companies or battalions would be probed a few times by their reconnaissance elements and then sometimes nothing more would happen. We had to conclude that they took a look at us and decided it was a bad show and they would wait until another day. The U.S. Army seldom does that. There's some kind of an automatic exhilaration that takes place when the first rounds are fired. We have a very strong tendency then to charge.

I know that the lessons I have been talking about were primarily learned in World War I, learned again in World War II and Korea, and learned again the hard way in Vietnam, in Grenada, and probably in Panama. They have not gone away. They are classic infantry problems that you, too, will face. The thing to do now is to think them out ahead of time and practice ways to avoid repeating the U.S. Army's bloody initiation rites during almost all of its wars.

Good luck!

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[H.A.S.C. No. 101-57]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF: SANCTIONS,
DIPLOMACY AND WAR

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARINGS HELD
DECEMBER 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, AND 20, 1990

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STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM E. DePUY, USA (RET.),
FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

General DePUY. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I attended the session this morning, and I am glad I did. Among other things, it caused me to tear up my notes, and so I am going to extemporize this afternoon. If I may respectfully suggest that a couple of things may make your enterprise easier, may help you go where I think you are trying to go, and they have to do with the fact that during the morning session, time and time again either members of the panel or Members of your committee talked about going to the air war solution.

I submit to you that that is a shorthand solution to the problem, but it is not the kind of terminology that I think will communicate well between your committee and, say, the Pentagon and General Schwarzkopf and the joint establishment.

Let me try to explain what I mean by that. I think instead of talking about the air war and the ground war, what we are really talking about is a joint operation. You can call it an air-land war, but that is not very good because you have got maritime forces involved, so you are really talking about a joint operation.

Let me use the example of the Israeli attack that preceded their operation that they call "Peace for Galilee." You may remember that. Now, that was a classic. I would call it a front-end operation.

Let me refresh your memory about it, because I think that is the kind of thing that we have been talking about here this morning, but we haven't been focused on it correctly. The problem was that the Israelis didn't want to send their armor into Lebanon without air support. That is almost an article of faith with them, but they were concerned about the extent of the Syrian air defense and, indeed, the Syrian air force, and so they put on what I would call a preliminary set of operations.

They were in fact put together by the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force. His job was to eliminate the Syrian air defense system because once that air defense system was eliminated, then the Israeli Air Force would have freedom of movement over Lebanon, and they could let the tanks roll.

Let me remind you of the kinds of things that were involved in that operation. The first thing was that they mounted an intelligence-collection operation over a period of several months ahead of time. You don't always have several months, but they located every Syrian missile, all the loading facilities, all the communications, the frequencies and call signs of the communications links. In other words, they knew everything about it. Then they sent some drones up to activate the system, and then they used a whole variety of capabilities.

For example, they put in an EW jamming operation, which shut down not just the air defenses, which was done by the Israeli Air Force, but also the command and control links of the air defense system. They put in a special operation raid on the main command and control facility of the Syrians. They went in and just took it out with special operations. They put a lot of fighters in the air, and I don't remember—maybe you do, Chuck. They shot down some incredible number of Syrian aircraft in the first 6 hours. I mean, it was like 1980.

Now, what they were doing was they were creating the conditions that they had to in order to operate, in order to move and maneuver into Lebanon, and in order to get freedom of what I would call operational maneuvers, so that they could go up into the Beirut area and into the Bekaa Valley.

I think what we have all been talking about this morning and what I have been eavesdropping on, is a lot of operations that have to be undertaken in modern warfare at the front end, and we have been calling it the air war.

I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that it will involve at the front end perhaps mostly air. I don't doubt that because many of the things that have to be done can only be done by air. It might involve a lot of C-3CM operations involving the Army as well as the Air Force. It may well involve some special operations. It probably will involve counter-missile and offensive counter-air operations, and then at some point you can begin to do other things. You can begin to use the rest of the force safely at a lower level of casualties. I suspect that that is what we have been talking about.

In other words, I don't think you have been talking about an air war versus a ground war. I think you have been talking about the configuration, size, sequencing, and objectives of a whole series of these—call them whatever you want to—collateral operations, joint supporting operations.

I cannot imagine that Schwarzkopf will not have a whole series of similar things. I am not going to try to second guess him because I don't have the intelligence, but I strongly suspect that he will be doing a lot of the kind of things that the Israelis did so that he can fight the war smart at the lowest casualties and get the job done.

Now, the thing that tells you what needs to be done is not that we are going to fight an air war and that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, for example, is going to run it. It is a joint operation. He has to come up with a concept of operations. I am sure he has one. We just don't know about it, and I don't think we ought to know about it, frankly. But his concept of operations will undoubtedly have things like that in it at the front end. It may have, for example, some heavy bombardment of deep targets, I don't know, but it will be his best judgment drawn up in conjunction with his commanders as to how to get the job done.

Trevor Dupuy this morning—I agreed with him completely. He talked about, yeah, you are going to have a big air operation at the front end. He even said that might be enough. Well, if it is enough, you can break out the champagne and everybody can go home. That is the best possible outcome. But Schwarzkopf's concept of operation, which has to do with shutting down the air defenses, taking care of his missiles, taking care of his air defenses, is all part of his scheme.

Now, we are probably going to hear some more schemes here today that may or may not bear any relationship to this, but may be, say, perhaps similar. In no case do I think you are talking about a choice between a ground war and an air war.

That is my chief recommendation to you. I think you will do a better job of communicating with the Pentagon and with the people in charge if you will accept the fact that there is no simple choice before them, but that a lot of what you have talked about is important and relevant. So I offer that to you respectfully for whatever it is worth.

Now, I would like to go into one other matter, which is the relationship between interdiction and maneuver, because that also lies at the heart of what we are talking about here.

There is a lot of history available, and we can consult our own experiences in this connection, and I think that this committee ought to reflect upon what we can learn from that.

Let me use the example first of Normandy. Before the landing in Normandy, there was an air operation. Part of the objective was to isolate the battlefield by knocking out French communications, railroads, roads, bridges and so on, even locomotives, and that that worked. The French communications were shut down at great cost in civilian casualties and so on, but

back in the bend between the Loire and the Seine also were the German Panzer reserves hiding. The tanks were tucked in French villages and barns and so on, and they remained untouched.

Now, then, all of a sudden the landing took place. That was maneuver. The minute the landing took place, the German Panzer reserves, you have no doubt read about this, there were lots of arguments in the German army between the Russian generals and Rommel, the German Panzers began to stream toward the beachhead.

In other words, they came out of hiding. They exposed themselves, and the U.S. Air Force and the RAF ate them up. It was a magnificent operation. I was there in Normandy in a very minor capacity in an infantry regiment. I can tell you that I honestly believe that if the air interdiction program hadn't worked, and I don't think it would have worked had the Germans not been flushed by the necessity posed by the landing in Normandy, we could have lost that one.

Let me go to the folly which took place at the end of the Normandy experience, when after a lot of hard and bitter fighting the Germans began to stream out of Normandy on their way back toward Germany. They were moving over essentially one road, but the artillery and the air were having a very hard time exacting a heavy level of casualties on them until the single road was cut. The minute the single road was cut, the U.S. Air Force and the RAF created a holocaust.

Anybody who has ever seen the pictures or who has been there will recognize it was one of the great triumphs of tactical air. It worked because of the constructive relationship between interdiction and maneuver.

Let me give you one more. In Vietnam in 1972 at Easter, Harry, I think you were there in Vietnam at the time? The North Vietnamese got greedy. They didn't wait until we were all gone; the U.S. Army was out, but the Air Force was still there. Fritz Kroesen, I believe, was up in I Corps, were you not, Fritz?

General KROESEN: Yes, I was.

General DePUY. As the advisor to the corps commander there, these two gentlemen were right in the middle of that.

Now, during the long years and months of the war in Vietnam, if you add up all of the sorties flown and divide them by the number of casualties inflicted, you get about one KIA per sortie, including B-52s, OK? If you want to talk about cost effectiveness, there is one you can nibble on.

Now, what happened at Easter, however, was that the North Vietnamese Army—by that time most of the VC had been converted into North Vietnamese—came out of their sanctuaries, and they attacked Pu Hue and Dong Hoi and I guess Da Nang, Kontum, and An Loc. They came out and exposed themselves because they had to reach what were their operational objectives. They felt that if they took those cities, the Government of South Vietnam would collapse.

John Evoten was over there running the Air Force. The Air Force and the Vietnamese had no help from the U.S. Army except the good help of advisors like Fritz. The U.S. Air Force went in there, and the Vietnamese will admit to you to this day, if you can find one who was there, that the U.S. Air Force made a lot of difference, some of them will say made the difference.

So it wasn't the U.S. Army working, but it was the Vietnamese Army. It was a maneuver force that occupied critical terrain that the enemy had to have. This, then, created the conditions in which tactical air forces—I am not talking strategic—reach a very high level of effectiveness.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that that relationship is an important one for your committee to think about. It is another reason for not fighting an air war or a ground war. It is a reason for fighting an air/land war, which is integrated, synchronized, sequenced, et cetera. I brought the second one up because I thought it was a logical extension of the first point I have made with you.

Now, having torn up my other notes, and having gone extempore, I will subside now and take any questions which may arise later.

EXTRACT FROM TESTIMONY

The CHAIRMAN: Let me go to General DuPuy [DePuy] there for just a second, sir, if you can talk to the mike.

I am trying to understand a little bit about how you differed from the folks talking this morning. I take it you are talking about the extent to which air power works, that in the examples that you used, you need to get the forces up and maneuvering, in order to make them vulnerable to air power. Is that your point?

General DePUY. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. The enemy forces, for example, how the Germans were vulnerable when they came out of their hiding and began to attack the landing forces.

Landing forces—the point is that sometimes that in order for the air force to be effective, or the forces to be effective in attacking those units, they have to be out and in some kind of a maneuver fashion.

General DePUY. What I was trying to say is that there is a constructive relationship between maneuver and tactical error [air], DAI [BAI] interdiction, whatever, but we are mostly talking about interdiction here. The problems for interdiction in the past—and perhaps these have been solved by high technology—have always been finding targets, out in an area where nobody was pushing the enemy around, like on the Ho Chi Minh trail or hiding in the bushes in Vietnam or hiding in the French farm houses.

The cooperative, constructive relationship between the maneuvering forces and the interdicting air forces is a positive joint venture in which the total is worth more than its parts. It is a synergistic symbiotic kind of a relationship, and it has been proved over and over again. I just gave two or three little examples in which that has been the case.

So rather than talk about fighting an air war, I am suggesting that we put the forces over there that we need to execute Schwarzkopf's concept of operation, and it will include a lot of air. I would be very surprised if most of that air isn't used very early on doing the kinds of things that the Israelis did.

See, there are a lot of other things that he is going to want to do. Deception, counter C-3, special operations, et cetera, to satisfy specific problems of execution of his total plan. Some of those will be done by Marines, some of them by the Navy, some of them by the Air Force, some of them by Army helicopters. The planners that [Jim] Blackwell was talking about are going to pick the best solution to the problem from the warehouse of units that are being deployed over there.

Now I think that is reality. I think it is quite a different reality than arguing about whether we are going to fight a ground war or an air war.

Highfield
 Box 29
 Delaplane, VA 22025
 26 September 1991

General Colin L. Powell
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 The Joint Staff
 Washington, DC 20301

Dear Colin:

I have thought a great deal about DESERT STORM, what it means to the country, and what it must mean to you. You have an unprecedented opportunity: the American public has never been more fully informed on military affairs, nor more receptive to sound military proposals, and the Congress has finally witnessed the operational jointness it has long advocated.

I have assumed that among your many duties and responsibilities, you accord high priority to readying the U.S. armed forces for the inevitable challenges of the kinds of wars or near wars that will occur at the turn of the century. Presumptuous as it may be, I would like to offer you some advice on how the joint establishment might improve its effectiveness in meeting those challenges. The five propositions set forth below constitute a central set of concepts for guiding joint doctrine, the key to training for heightened performance against any enemy, and elements of a distinctive American style of joint warfare.

First, as a nation we must resolve once and for all the question of air wars and ground wars. The very way that we talked about military operations in Southwest Asia during DESERT SHIELD/STORM reinforced the misperception that the President, the Congress, or the American people could choose between conducting one or the other. There was no such choice. The fact is, to the contrary, that military operations such as the President directed, to forestall an aggressor's extending control over land and people, and ultimately, to destroy his army, must involve AirLand Warfare, that is, the employment of air forces and ground forces in concert, drawing upon the whole panoply of U.S. forces, from all of the armed services. The time has come for the joint establishment to embrace without reservation the doctrinal principles for cooperation among aviation and ground formations that the Air Force and the Army have adopted in recent years, and that have long underwritten Marine Corps doctrine.

I suspect that you're fed up to the gills with all that, but you're the only person who could write a book on the issues without referring to notes, and I have a strong feeling that you may be the only really senior military chap with the authority, the instincts, and the perceptiveness to lead all of us to proper understanding.

Second, as a vital corollary of the first proposition, it is one function of air forces—the aviation of all services—to gain and to maintain freedom of operational maneuver for ground forces. I fully recognize that there [are] other important jobs for aviation, but their decisive contribution

to DESERT STORM was to ensure the swift, deadly, and unprecedentedly efficient advance overland by the combined allied forces. I suspect that in future wars their decisive contribution will be the same. In the joint scheme of things, I would not be surprised should you find it wise simply to announce arbitrarily that the function of providing for freedom of operational maneuver on land is the primary mission of aviation elements of joint forces within a theater of operations.

Third, consistent with the thrust of the first two propositions, it should be the function of U.S. maritime forces to gain and to maintain access to critical theaters or sub-theaters of operation. I am well aware that the regional CINCs employ supplementary means—such as international exercises, combined base development schemes, prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and the like—but for the foreseeable future, access from the sea will be essential to deploying and supporting joint forces for combat. As the aviation within joint forces will provide for freedom of operational maneuver, so maritime elements of joint forces will provide for freedom of strategic maneuver.

Fourth, all historically important armed forces have developed their own distinctive operational style. For example, historians agree that the Roman style of warfare fitted well the objectives of the Senate and the People of Rome, and of the Roman emperors. The Romans' habit of encamping at the end of each day's operations, and then of connecting their camps with high speed roads, enhanced freedom of both operational and strategic maneuver. Their was nothing casual about the Roman military style. The Roman commanders all understood it, and so did their adversaries. And the Romans almost always won.

There is emerging a distinctive American style of war, a style that is essentially joint, drawing on the unique capabilities of each service via centralized planning and decentralized execution. This jointness, plus an amalgam of surprise, discriminate use of overwhelming force, high operating tempo, and exploitation of advanced technology, has led to a whole new order of military effectiveness. This is the "revolution in military affairs" that certainly figured in the Soviet decision to end the Cold War. You might find it useful to ask your staff to lay out for you all the elements of this distinctive American style, and to consider using that analysis as a point of departure for the further development of joint doctrine.

Fifth, doctrine is pointless unless it leads to consensus within the armed forces. You know better than most that the surest way to lend substance to joint doctrine is through tough, realistic joint training. I believe that you should lead the way to put a joint overlay on the ongoing separate-service training activities in the Southwestern United States, to set up a continuously-operating, surrogate "theater of war"—much as General Marshall did there during World War II, and for the same purposes of developing joint proficiency—wherein forces of all four services can train the way they will fight: under a joint command, exploiting jointly collected and analyzed intelligence, and drawing upon each other's strengths to enhance their tactics and techniques.

Colin, I am not writing a book or otherwise considering publication. My interests in all of this is only to see if I can help. Nor am I asking for your endorsement of the foregoing ideas. You can either use them, or discard them. I suppose that you have a stable of bright young men and women to whom you might turn to vet all of this, and if so, and they think there might be some value in these ideas, I would be very happy to elaborate, to talk to them about the conceptual underpinnings. But I know you are very busy, and there may be no time for you to pursue these matters. If so, I will understand completely.

26 September 1991

My best wishes to you, and to your colleagues of the JCS, in all your undertakings.

William E. DePuy
General, U.S. Army (Retired)

Joint Operations — An Anatomy of Functions.

The anatomy of warfare in the 20th Century has changed radically and will continue to change. In a few short years, the media focus on air wars and ground wars in the Gulf will seem as archaic as trench warfare. As we look to the future, there appears to be a set of essential, interdependent functions that might usefully serve as the basis for our strategic, operational and tactical evolution as we turn the corner on the next millennium. Many of these were hard at work in the Gulf, but not necessarily as "joint" functions. These elements of the "operational anatomy" are at the center of what we must design, organize, equip and train our forces to accomplish.

I would note that central to this thesis is a shift from "means" to "ends" — i.e., the functions that must be performed to achieve victory and not the Service-defined means of participation. My list of ends should make clear the point::

1. Gain and maintain Access to the Critical Theaters of Operation

This essential function recognizes the necessity to be able to project power in sufficient quantity and in sufficient time to assure success of military operations.

2. Gain and Maintain Freedom of Operational Maneuver

- Maritime Operations
- AirLand Operations
- Deep Bombardment of Key Opposing Military Forces

This essential "umbrella" function recognizes the necessity for sea, air, space and land forces to maneuver independently or jointly within a theater of operation under a single chain of command, in order to maximize the combat potential of all forces to achieve joint operational objectives.

3 Gain and Maintain Freedom of Logistical Maneuver

This essential function recognizes the necessity to sustain joint forces in combat or in preparation for combat within a theater of operation for whatever period is necessary to achieve joint operational objectives.

4. Gain and maintain Freedom of Access to National Targets

This essential function recognizes the necessity to destroy, neutralize, or otherwise remove enemy "national level" targets from positions of real or potential warmaking capability or sustainability.

Fragment of work being down by General DePuy at the time of his final illness. fragment provided by William E. DePuy, Jr.



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COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Missions

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-level activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following missions:

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- Publish works in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the Army.

NOTE: The author-compiler, Colonel Richard M. Swain, is the former director, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

