

# Notes



1. Avraham Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1980), xii.
2. Gordon R. Sullivan, "Delivering Victory: Improving Synchronization," *Military Review* (September 1992):3.
3. For Dayan's strategic thinking, Israel Tal, interview with the author, 3 July 1994, Tel Aviv, Israel. On Dayan widening the military objectives, Avraham Adan, interview with the author, 30 June 1994, Tel Aviv, Israel; Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 72, 84–86, 97–98; Moshe Dayan, *Moshe Dayan: The Story of My Life* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), 339–41, 347, 359–62.
4. For a detailed analysis comparing the 1956 and 1967 Sinai campaigns, see George W. Gawrych, *Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990).
5. Samir A. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 164. Statistics for Syria are still unreliable.
6. André Beaufre, "Une Guerre Classique Moderne: La Guerre Israélo-Arabe," *Strategie* (July-August 1967):19.
7. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, *Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), 39.
8. For a brief analysis of Israel's triumph over Egypt, see Gawrych, *Key to the Sinai*, 67–127.
9. It remains rather difficult to separate fact from fiction about the Israeli intelligence community. For a recent popular treatment of the role of military intelligence during this period, see Samuel M. Katz, *Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1992), 153–201.
10. Muhammad Hassanayn Heikal, "Kana al-'adw yu'rafa aktar mimma yanbaga," *al-Ahram*, 28 June 1968, 3.
11. Some sources claim that the advance warning was only twenty-four hours. See Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 102, endnote 26.
12. "The Agranat Report: The First Partial Report," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 4 (1979):74. Israeli intelligence also assumed Syria would not launch an all-out attack against Israel without Egyptian cooperation.
13. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, xii.
14. For a recent, detailed treatment of this three-year period, see David S. Korn, *Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967–1970* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
15. Muhammad Hassanayn Heikal, "al-Jaysh al-Israeli wa al-dawa'i al-mulha li-hazima fi ma'arka," *al-Ahram*, 11 April 1969, 1, 3. An English translation appears as "The Strategy of Attrition" in *The Israel-Arab Reader*, edited by Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, 4th ed. (New York: Facts on File, 1985), 423–24.
16. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 196, 203.

17. Ibid., 210.
18. Sa'ad al-Shazli, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco, CA: American Mideast Research, 1980), 127–29; Muhammad Hassanayn Heikal, *Oktobir 1973: al-Silah wa al-Siyasat* (Cairo, Egypt: al-Ahram, 1993), 248–51.
19. On this second meeting, see Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 234–36; Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 172–81; Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasi, *Mudhakirat al-Gamasi: Harb Oktobir 1973* (Paris: Shirka al-Tayb, 1990), 225–27; Musa Sabri, *Watha'iq Harb Oktobir* (Cairo, Egypt: al-Maktab al-Misri, 1974), 17–18.
20. Sayyid Mar'i, *Awraq Siyasiyah*, 3 vols. (Cairo, Egypt: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1979), 3:699–703. Sadat used Mar'i to conduct these talks with various leaders in the year before the war.
21. Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 327; Muhammad Hafiz Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi fi 'Asr al-Tahaddiyat* (Cairo, Egypt: Markaz al-Ahram al-Targama wa al-Nashr, 1987), 303–4; Gamasi, *Mudhakirat*: 276–79, 444; Heikal, *Oktobir 1973*, 312.
22. Gamasi *Mudhakirat*, 282.
23. Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 328; Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, 304; Gamasi, *Mudhakirat*, 281, 444–45; Heikal, *Oktobir 1973*, 312–13; Gamal Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya 'ala al-Jabha al-Misriyya* (Cairo, Egypt: al-Zahra' lil-I'lam al-'Arabi, 1989), 81.
24. "Anwar Sadat's Uncertain Trumpet," *Newsweek*, 9 April 1973, 43–45, 49.
25. Mar'i, *Awraq Siyasiyah*, 3: 698–703; Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, 266–67, 297; Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967–1991: Regional Dynamic and the Superpowers* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 136.
26. "Saudis Tie Oil to U.S. Policy," *Washington Post*, 19 April 1973, 1, 25; "The New Politics of Mideast Oil," *Newsweek*, 10 September 1973, 34–37; "Oil: The Miller Letter," *Newsweek*, 20 August 1973, 56–57. For a general discussion, see Donald Neff, *Warriors Against Israel: How Israel Won the Battle to Become America's Ally, 1973* (Brattleboro, VT: Amana, 1988), 110–14.
27. Trevor N. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974* (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1984), 395–96.
28. For a general discussion of Israeli war plans, see Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 57–58; Hanoch Bartov, *Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days* (Tel Aviv, Israel: Ma'ariv, 1981), 283–84, and map 2, "Dovecoat."
29. The concept of "stop line" comes from Amnon Reshef, interview with author, 30 June 1994, Tel Aviv, Israel; Aryeh Keren, interview with author, 4 July 1994, Armor Museum, Israel. Both men commanded armored brigades in the Sinai during the 1973 war.
30. Arnold Sherman, *In the Bunkers of the Sinai* (New York: Sabra Books, 1971), 23.
31. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 52–53.
32. Ibid., 106. For a similar quote, see 'Abd al-Mun'im Khalil, *Hurub Misr al-Mu'asirah fi Awraq Qa'id Maydani: 1939–1945, 1956, 1962–1967, 1968–1970, 1973* (al-Qahirah: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1990), 261.
33. Muhammad Ali Fahmi, interview with author, 22 June 1994, Cairo, Egypt.
34. 'Adil Yusri, *Rihla al-Shaq al-Mu'alaqa: min Ras al-'Ush ila Ras al-Qubra* (Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-Mu'arif bi-Misr, 1974), 184. Yusri lost a leg on the third day of the war.
35. Material on the war plan comes from various sources. Hasan al-Badri, Taha al-Mandub, Ziya' al-Din Zohdi, *Harb Ramadan: al-Jawla al-'Arabiyya-al-Isra'iliyya al-Rabi'a, Oktobir 1973* (Cairo, Egypt, 1974), 34; Gamasi, *Mudhakirat*, 211, 382–84, 387–95; Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasi, interviews with the author, 31 October 1993, and 25 June 1994, Cairo, Egypt; Fahmi, interview; and Murad Ibrahim al-Dessouki, interview with author,

- 28 June 1994, Cairo. In the 1973 war, Fahmi commanded the Air Defense Forces, and Dessouki, currently chief of the military section at the al-Ahram Strategic Studies Institute, led a mechanized infantry battalion in the 19th Infantry Division. For a recent study by an Egyptian military historian, see Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 68–70, 84, 101, 278.
36. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 27–39; Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, 323. Muhammad Hafiz Ismail was Sadat's national security adviser during this period. In his memoirs, however, Sadat suggests the plan called for a definite move to the passes with or without an operational pause, but this could be an attempt by Sadat to lay blame for the failure of reaching the passes on 14 October on the shoulders of the military. See Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 289, and Gamasi's book cited in footnote 19.
  37. Sa'ad al-Din al-Shazli, "al-Makal allathi 'arsul ila majjalla *Oktobir* fi 31/3/87: Hal 'arid al-qada al-'askariyun iqtirah al-Shazli bisahb al-alwiya al-mudarra'a," *al-Jabha* 75 (1988):9. The author received a copy of this article from Shazli, whose account was confirmed by Gamasi, interview, 31 October 1993. See also Shazli's letter published in Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 910–11.
  38. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 244; Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 102–4, 359–60.
  39. Numerous sources discuss the Egyptian deception plan. See Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, *Harb Oktobir fi al-Mizan al-Askari* (Cairo, Egypt: Madbuli, 1974), 53–58; Yusri, *Rihla al-Shaq al-Mu'alaqa*, 271–73; Muhummad Hassanayn Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), 16–17, 32; Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 206–7; Gamasi, *Mudhakirat*, 285–88; Hasan Mustafa, *Ma'arik al-Jabhah al-Misriyya fi Harb Ramadan* (Baghdad, Iraq: no publisher, 1982), 209–32.
  40. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 205.
  41. *Ibid.*, 211.
  42. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 211–12; Gamal Hamad, *Min Sina 'ila al-Golan* (Cairo, Egypt: al-Zuhra' lil-'Ilam al-'Arabi, 1988), 533–34; Heikal, *Road to Ramadan*, 29–31, and *Oktobir* 1973, 313; Gamasi, *Mudhakirat*, 280.
  43. Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 246–47; Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, 306.
  44. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 261.
  45. Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 470–72; Bartov, *Dado*, 240–43.
  46. Bartov, *Dado*, 258–66.
  47. On the reaction of Israel's leadership during the critical hours before war, see Golda Meir, *My Life* (New York: Putnam's, 1975), 425–27; Bartov, *Dado*, 273–92; Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement, October 1973* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), 52–54; Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 459–61; Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 171–203 passim; and "The Agranat Report," 74, 76–78.
  48. Meir, *My Life*, 427–28.
  49. Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 465.
  50. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 4.
  51. Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 463.
  52. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 41; discussions with Israeli veterans at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

53. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 20, 81–82; Bartov, *Dado*, 293–94, 297; Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence Through Lebanon* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 245.
54. Arnold Sherman, *When God Judged and Men Died: A Battle Report of the Yom Kippur War* (New York: Bantam Books, 1973), 37.
55. Gabi Amir, interview with author, 6 July 1994, Tel Aviv, Israel.
56. Bartov, *Dado*, 302–4, 317–18; Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 157; Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 92; Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, 249–50.
57. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 82; Ariel Sharon, *Warrior: An Autobiography of Ariel Sharon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 294–95.
58. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 51–52, 223, 225–26, 234–35; Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 156–60, 837–41; Hasan al-Badri, Taha al-Magdub, Muhammad Zia al-Din Zohdi, *The Ramadan War*, 1973 (New York: Hippocrene, 1978), 67; Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 161–62.
59. Eliezer Cohen, *Israel's Best Defense: The Full Story of the Israeli Air Force* (New York: Orbis, 1993), 342.
60. Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 154, 794–96; Badri, *Ramadan War*, 78–79; Bartov, *Dado*, 319; Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 35; Edgar O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 89–91, 97; Cohen, *Israel's Best Defense*, 333–42.
61. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 95.
62. Yuval Dvir, interview with author, Israel, Armor Museum, Israel, 4 July 1994. In the 1973 war, Dvir, then a captain, was the deputy commander of the reconnaissance battalion in the Sinai.
63. Cohen, *Israel's Best Defense*, 354.
64. Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 476–78; Bartov, *Dado*, 306–8; Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis*, 203–4.
65. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 471–73; William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1993), 152–56.
66. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 232–33; Gamasi, *Mudhakirat*, 332, 342.
67. Bartov, *Dado*, 314; Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, 248, 250.
68. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 92, 109; Bartov, *Dado*, 318.
69. Bartov, *Dado*, 332.
70. Sharon, *Warrior*, 295.
71. Bartov, *Dado*, 324–28; Meir, *My Life*, 428–29.
72. Bartov, *Dado*, 332; Eliezer Cohen, *Israel's Best Defense*, 353–54; Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 210.
73. For a discussion of this important meeting, see Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 95–100; Bartov, *Dado*, 334–36; Sharon, *Warrior*, 298–300; Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 183–84; van Creveld, *Command in War*, 211–15; David Eshel, "Counterattack in the Sinai, 8 October 1973," *Military Review* (November 1993):56–57.
74. For a detailed critical analysis of the day's events and the background to them from an Israeli perspective, see Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 91–164; Bartov, *Dado*, 334–72; Sharon, *Warrior*, 301–6; van Creveld, *Command in War*, 203–31; Eshel, "Counterattack in the Sinai," 54–66. See, also, Edwin L. Kennedy, "Failure of Israeli Armored Tactical Doctrine, Sinai, 6–8 October 1973," *Armor* (November-December 1990):28–31.

75. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 118–19.
76. *Ibid.*, 107–13.
77. *Ibid.*, 218.
78. Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 194.
79. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 119.
80. Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 195–200.
81. Bartov, *Dado*, 353–57; van Creveld, *Command in War*, 221–23. Elazar apparently gave the green light for the countercrossing during the third interruption.
82. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 120–29; Eshel, “Counterattack in the Sinai,” 63.
83. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 136; van Creveld, *Command in War*, 224.
84. For material from the Israeli side on this second attack, see Keren, interview; Amir, interview; Elyashiv Shemshi, interview with author, 7 July 1994, Tel Aviv, Israel; Ariel Sharon, interview with author, 7 July 1994, Tel Aviv; Elyashiv Shemshi, *Storm in October* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1986); Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 137–40; Sharon, *Warrior*, 301–2; Bartov, *Dado*, 360; Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 188–90; van Creveld, *Command in War*, 224–25. Egyptian perspectives appear in Musa Sabri, *Watha'iq Harb Oktobir* (Cairo, Egypt: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadis, 1974), 530–35; Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 198–201; Mustafa, *Ma'arik al-Jabhah al-Misriyya*, 327–31.
85. Yusri, *Rihla al-Shaq al-Mu'alaqa*, 175; Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 203; discussions with several Egyptian officers in attendance at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1984–94.
86. Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 203–9; Yusri, *Rihla al-Shaq al-Mu'alaqa*, 163–85; Sabri, *Watha'iq Harb Oktobir*, 552–55.
87. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 146–48; Bartov, *Dado*, 371–72; van Creveld, *Command in War*, 226.
88. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 152.
89. Bartov, *Dado*, 367.
90. *Ibid.*, 365–66; Terence Smith, “Fighting Is Bitter,” *The New York Times*, 9 October 1973, 1; “Excerpts From Israel’s News Parley,” *ibid.*, 17.
91. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 249–50.
92. Ze’ev Schiff, *October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973* (Tel Aviv, Israel: University Publishing Projects, 1974), 113.
93. Gamasi, *Mudhakhirat*, 353, 358.
94. Shazli, *Crossing the Suez*, 235–40.
95. Gamasi, interview, 25 June 1994; Fahmi, interview.
96. Bartov, *Dado*, 369–72; Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 169–72.
97. Heikal, *Oktobir 1973*, 392–94, and *Road to Ramadan*, 220.
98. Gamasi, interview, 31 October 1993; Fahmi, interview; Gamasi, *Mudhakhirat*, 382–84; Heikal, *Oktobir 1973*, 438.
99. Heikal, *Oktobir 1973*, 376–81.


100. Mahmut Gareev, interviews with author, 12 and 14 September 1995, Moscow, Russia; "Gareev and et al. Comment on Yom Kippur War," *Foreign Broadcast Information Services, JPRS-UMA*, 11 January 1989, 102.
101. For the Egyptian side, see Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 222–26; Yusri, *Rihla al-Shaq al-Mu'alaqa*, 198; Mustafa, *Ma'arik al-Jabhah al-Misriyya*, 331–32. Israeli accounts include Bartov, *Dado*, 385–87; Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 185–91; Sharon, *Warrior*, 306–9; Reshef, interview; Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 193–95.
102. Bartov, *Dado*, 389.
103. Gamasi, *Mudharikat*, 385; Heikal, *Oktobir 1973*, 377–78.
104. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 246–47; Gamasi, *Mudharikat*, 385–86; Gamasi, interview, 25 June 1994; Heikal, *Oktobir 1973*, 432; Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 289–90.
105. Bartov, *Dado*, 423.
106. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 244.
107. Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 303, 373–74.
108. Ibid., 282–89; This is in reference to author's discussion with an Egyptian officer from that brigade. I have been unable to find any figures on human casualties.
109. Meir, *My Life*, 432.
110. Bartov, *Dado*, 473.
111. "Israel Reports 656 Killed in War," *The New York Times*, 15 October 1973, 18.
112. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 252–54, 334; Bartov, *Dado*, 471, 476–79; Sharon, *Warrior*, 311–13; Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 209–10.
113. Material for the battle for Deversoir comes mainly from Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 210–22; Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 263–73; Sharon, *Warrior*, 313–24; Reshef, interview; Dani Matt, interview with author, 6 July 1994, Tel Aviv, Israel.
114. Reshef, interview.
115. Sharon, *Warrior*, 316.
116. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 274–97; Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 223–30; Bartov, *Dado*, 482–95.
117. Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 534–35.
118. Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 345–48, 360–64, 373–75.
119. Shazli, *Crossing the Suez*, 254–60; Gamasi, *Mudharikat*, 416–17; Khalil, *Hurub Misr al-Mu'asirah*, 206; Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 396–413, 426–30.
120. For Egyptian accounts of this last part of the war, see Shazli, *Crossing the Suez*, 260–70; Gamasi, *Mudharikat*, 417–31; Khalil, *Hurub Misr al-Mu'asirah*, 208–31; Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 434–41, 469–82.
121. Israeli sources on the last part of the war include Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 308–438; Bartov, *Dado*, 514–79; Herzog, *War of Atonement*, 234–50.
122. Bartov, *Dado*, 515.
123. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 368. See also Bartov, *Dado*, 557.
124. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 437.

125. Shazli, *Crossing of the Suez*, 265–67; Gamasi, *Mudhakhirat*, 419–21; Gamasi, interview, 25 June 1994; Fahmi, interview; Khalil, *Hurub Misr al-Mu'asirah*, 211; and Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 641–42, 665. In his memoirs, Shazli wrongly identifies the meeting as taking place on the evening of 19–20 October.
  126. Heikal, *Oktober 1973*, 511; Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, 344–45.
  127. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 532–68; Quandt, *Peace Process*, 166–71; Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 537–38; Neff, *Warriors Against Israel*, 241–74.
  128. Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 538–39.
  129. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 401–2.
  130. Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis*, 173, 223–24.
  131. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 568–611; Quandt, *Peace Process*, 171–77; Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, “The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis,” *International Security* 7 (Summer 1982):132–56; Neff, *Warriors Against Israel*, 274–89.
  132. For treatments of the battle for Suez City from different perspectives, see Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 409–25; Hamad, *al-Ma'arik al-Harbiyya*, 535–86; Glenn F. Rogers, “The Battle for Suez City,” *Military Review* (November 1979):27–33.
  133. For an analysis of this paradox, see Charles S. Lieman, “The Myth of Defeat: The Memory of the Yom Kippur War in Israeli Society,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 29 (July 1993):399–418.
  134. Insight Team (Sunday Times, London), *Insight on the Middle East War* (London: Times Newspaper Limited, 1974), 228.
  135. Reuven Gal, interview with author, 3 July 1994, Israel; Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 209–19. Gal served for five years as chief psychologist in the Israel Defense Forces, including the period under discussion.
  136. Mahmud Riyad, *Mudhakhirat Mahmud Riyad I: al-Baith 'an al-Salam wa al-Sina' al-Sharq al-'Ust* (Beirut, Lebanon: al-Mu'essah al-'Arabiyya lil-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 1987), 477.
  137. Eric Marsden, “Israel’s Battle of the Generals Hots Up,” *The (London) Sunday Times*, 10 February 1974, 7.
  138. For a published version in English, see “The Agranat Report: The First Partial Report,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 4/1 (1974), 69–90. See also next note.
  139. “Excerpts from Israeli Report and Elazar Letter,” *The New York Times*, 4 April 1974, 12. The sins of overconfidence and arrogance have been admitted by many Israeli officers in attendance at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1985–94.
  140. For brief discussions of these military changes after the 1973 war, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War, Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973–1989* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 109–14; Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army: the Israel Defence Force, 1948–1978* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1979), 213–24.
  141. Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 25–36, 68–72.
  142. See endnote number two.
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
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Dr. George W. Gawrych

Dr. George W. Gawrych obtained his Ph.D. in Middle East history from the University of Michigan in May 1980. Since then, he has taught at the University of Hawaii (Manoa), the University of Kansas, and the School of International Studies, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Dr. Gawrych's publications on modern Middle East history have appeared in *The International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *The International Journal of Turkish Studies*, *Armed Forces and Society*, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, *The Journal of Contemporary History*, and *Military Review*. His first monograph, *Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Wars*, was published by the Combat Studies Institute in 1990 as Research Survey No. 7. In November 1989, Gawrych received the Turkish Studies Association's biennial prize for the best published article. Dr. Gawrych has been on the faculty of USACGSC since July 1984 as a member of the Combat Studies Institute.



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## SYNOPSIS OF LEAVENWORTH PAPER 21

Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967.

This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt's president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance.

The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.